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Preface and acknowledgements  
Isaiah Berlin once remarked, in a conversation with the Polish philosopher Beata 
Polanowska-Sygulska about the prospects for democracy in Eastern Europe, that “[t]here’s 
no need to read either Popper or me. One must simply follow the normal moral instincts” 
(Berlin and Polanowska-Sygulska 2006:110). There are several aspects of that short quote 
which in my view need to be elaborated.  
The idea that ‘normal moral instincts’ may serve as a guide for those who want to 
build a better democracy is however at best only part of the story. We may also learn key 
lessons from practical experience and from what others have written before. This is 
especially the case if we take some of our cues from thinkers like Berlin and Popper, who 
informed their theories of how society ought to be organised with a keen interest for history, 
and especially the origins of popular ideas and misconceptions. We do not have to make the 
mistakes of the past all over again, if we know how they came about in the first place. 
 Another possible objection to Berlin’s reckless attitude towards his own and Popper’s 
work is that his alternative – to follow one’s normal moral instincts – is to put a lot of trust in 
a very fragile human faculty. In fact, the human ability to separate right from wrong is an 
unreliable guide to what we should do next, as we quite often come across situations in 
which there is no solution which is clearly and obviously better than all the alternatives. That 
is why we need careful reflection and serious debate, as well as a systematic collection of 
practical experiences, which may give us additional clues about what we should do in a 
particular situation. In this, perhaps quite surprisingly, even political theorists may be of 
assistance.  
I have called this thesis The Politics of Freedom, because freedom is one of the basic 
ideas which unite the political theories of Berlin and Popper. Freedom is also a central 
concept in neoliberal thought, which is the third basic theme in the thesis. My discussion in 
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the third part of the thesis is focused around the differences between Berlin’s and Popper’s 
liberal political theories on one hand, and neoliberal political thought on the other.  
*   *   * 
As C. Northcote Parkinson once said, “[t]he thing to be done swells in importance and 
complexity in a direct ratio with the time to be spent” (Parkinson 1958:4). It is therefore no 
wonder that most doctoral theses, including this one, become rather unwieldy after a few 
years of procrastination. I therefore thank everyone I have met over these last few years for 
their tolerance towards me. If anyone should have the bravery to read the following thesis in 
full, I also thank them in advance for their truly superhuman patience with me.  
I especially wish to give many heartfelt thanks my supervisors, Bernt Hagtvet and 
Raino Malnes, who have both gone well and far beyond the call of duty, in order to 
contribute to my Bildung and to help me give shape to this study. I also owe a great debt of 
gratitude to my supervisor for my master’s degree, Robert Huseby, who in addition to 
everything he was supposed to do, also helped to shape my own views on many issues, from 
political theory to single malts. I also thank the Department of Political Science and the 
Ethics Programme at the University of Oslo for use of their facilities and money over many 
years. I thank them for giving me the opportunity to get to know many interesting 
colleagues, and for giving me excellent and interesting surroundings in which to work.   
Special thanks goes to the members of the Nordic Network in Political Theory from 
whose guidance I have benefited greatly. I would also like to convey my gratitude to 
colleagues, especially Kim Angell, Lene Bomann-Larsen, Nik. Brandal, Øivind Bratberg, 
Jakob Elster, Asgeir Falch-Eriksen, Are Vegard Haug, Kristian Helland-Hansen, Anders 
Ravik Jupskås, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Amund Lie, Tor Otterholt, Stina Hansteen Solhøy, and 
Ellen Stensrud. In addition, I owe a great many thanks to those who took me in during my 
stay at the University of Oxford in 2007, especially Michele Cohen, Henry Hardy, Kei 
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Wolfson College. I would also like to express my gratitude to the late Jerry Cohen for his 
friendship and many interesting discussions during the same period. 
Throughout my work on this thesis, I have benefited greatly from discussions with 
friends, especially discussions which have forced me to explain more clearly what I do for a 
living.  I would especially like to give my thanks to the people whom I supervised for their 
master’s degree, and from whom I have learnt a great deal. Ole André Gjerde, Torbjørn Røe 
Isaksen, Tommy André Knutsen, Eirik Jørgensen Sollie, and Magnus Worren beat me to it, 
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Oslo, October 2011.  
 
x 
 
 
1 
 
1. Introduction  
1.1 Statement of purpose 
The central objective of this thesis is to explore some of the tensions in twentieth century and 
contemporary liberal theory, between the political theories of Isaiah Berlin and Karl Popper 
on one hand, and the so-called neoliberal theories – the political theories of among others 
Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, and Robert Nozick – on the other.  
The thesis is divided into three parts, consisting of two chapters each. In the first part, 
I describe and discuss the political and ethical thought of Isaiah Berlin, as well as a selection 
of the most central academic criticisms and interpretations of his thought. In the second part, 
I present and debate the philosophical and political theories of Karl Popper, and the most 
important evaluations and analyses of his political thought submitted by other philosophers 
and political scientists.  
These discussions of two of the most important liberal political theorists from the 
middle of the twentieth century, serve as a background for the third part of the thesis. In this 
final part of the thesis, I first present and discuss the concept of neoliberalism – basically the 
belief that government ought to be ‘minimal and dispersed’ – and some of the most 
prominent political theorists associated with it, before I try to make sense of the pronounced 
differences between neoliberalism and the liberal political theories of Berlin and Popper. The 
next section below contains a more detailed outline, as well as a more formal presentation of 
research questions. 
Both Berlin and Popper are, quite naturally, for the most part identified as liberals. 
This is also the ideological epithet they themselves most often use to describe their own 
political theories. There is however some controversy over the relationship between their 
political theories and the various theories they propound in other areas of philosophical 
enquiry (cf. section 1.3.1 below). Specifically, we see that Berlin’s ethical theory (called 
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value pluralism) is not universally thought of as being compatible with liberalism. We also 
see that there are disagreements in the philosophical and theoretical literature about which 
way influences run between Popper’s political thought and his epistemological theories 
commonly called critical rationalism, as well as disagreements over which political ideology 
the proponent of critical rationalism in the end should endorse. 
Is Berlin’s value pluralism or Popper’s critical rationalism capable of providing a 
basis for liberal conclusions in political theory? This question is a point of departure for the 
next four chapters of this thesis. Of these, I will devote the first two chapters to discussing 
the relationship between Berlin’s political and ethical thought, before I in the fourth and fifth 
chapter examine Popper’s political theories, as well as their relationship with his theories of 
human knowledge – his epistemology and his philosophy of science. The central conclusion 
in these chapters is that their political theories are largely compatible with their theories in 
other fields of philosophical enquiry. I also conclude that the kinds of liberal political 
theories recommended by Berlin and Popper are not that different from each other.  
Ultimately, I conclude that they both end up with a moderate and gradualist type of 
‘organised liberalism’ which demands that a strong and active government should guarantee 
the basic rights and liberties of everyone (cf. sections 3.6., 4.4.3., and 5.6. below). That way, 
I conclude that their political theories belong in the centre ground of the political spectrum, 
and that they both may be described as left-leaning liberals. This interpretation of mine goes 
right to the core of the academic debates over how one should understand the political 
thought of both Berlin and Popper (cf. especially chapters 3 and 5 below), and an important 
goal of this interpretation is to evaluate and synthesise other interpretations of their political 
thoughts and theories. Because of this, I end up with interpretations of Berlin’s and Popper’s 
political theories which are only partly consensual, in the sense that I develop some fairly 
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mainstream interpretations given by other students of their thought further, while I reject 
other, more inventive interpretations of their thought.   
The liberal political theories of Berlin and Popper are, according to my interpretation, 
representatives of a sort of liberalism which is very much unlike the kind of liberalism 
presented by proponents of what is sometimes called ‘neoliberalism’. In contrast to Berlin 
and Popper, neoliberals centrally recommend less government intervention in the economy 
and a ‘rolling-back of the frontiers of the state’, often in order to secure an increase in 
individual liberty or economic efficiency (cf. chapter 6 below). What are the central features 
of the body of thought commonly called neoliberalism, and how does Berlin’s and Popper’s 
type of liberalism compare to these theories called ‘neoliberalism’? Is it possible to see in 
Berlin’s and Popper’s political theories the beginnings of what one may call a liberal 
alternative to neoliberalism, or a political theory which takes neoliberalism seriously as a 
genuine expression of liberalism and liberal concerns, but which nevertheless emphasise 
other and perhaps greater parts of the liberal tradition than the neoliberals do? These 
questions provide us with a point of departure for the last two chapters of this thesis. 
1.2 Questions and outline 
There are three basic questions, and three follow-up questions to each of these, which inform 
the discussions in this study:  
- Is Berlin’s ethical theory of value pluralism capable of providing us with a basis for a 
recognisably liberal political theory? What are the most central characteristics of the 
political theory Berlin ultimately recommends? 
- Is Popper’s epistemological theory of critical rationalism capable of providing us 
with a basis for a recognisably liberal political theory? What are the most central 
characteristics of the political theory Popper ultimately recommends? 
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- What are the central features of the body of political and economic thought 
commonly called neoliberalism? How does it compare to the kinds of liberalism 
recommended by Berlin and Popper?  
 
The study of these questions is in this thesis divided into three parts. In the first two parts, I 
will answer the first two groups of questions, in the form of a presentation and discussion of 
the political thought of both Berlin and Popper. These two parts consist of two chapters each, 
and are structured in a similar way. Two themes will be emphasised throughout the first four 
chapters, namely Berlin’s defence of gradualism and ‘realism’ in political thought and 
action, and Popper’s defence of what I call ‘organised liberalism’ – as well as the 
connections between ethics or epistemology and political thought in their works.  
In the second chapter, I first will first describe and explain Berlin’s ethical theories, 
commonly called value pluralism, and the relationship between them and related theories 
with similar names. I also discuss Berlin’s conceptual divide between positive and negative 
liberty, as well as his idea that successful political action is dependent on sound political 
judgment and ‘a sense of reality’. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of his idea that we 
– in politics as well as other areas of human existence – need to maintain an uneasy 
equilibrium between different values and goals. 
In the third chapter, I emphasise that there are few strong arguments in favour of the 
view, put forward by John Gray and others, that value pluralism cannot provide a basis for a 
liberal political theory in any straightforward way. Instead, Berlin’s own view, that value 
pluralism entails a measure of negative liberty for everyone, is largely vindicated. I have 
therefore indicated that value pluralism may indeed provide a basis for liberalism, at least if 
liberalism is understood very broadly as a strong preference for liberal democracy.  
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Value pluralism does not, however, lead its proponents directly to liberalism in any 
more restricted sense, and certainly not directly to conventionally liberal economic policies, 
which Berlin occasionally warned against. It is clear, moreover, that the type of liberalism 
advocated by Berlin is more moderate and egalitarian in outlook compared to a more 
traditional brand of economic liberalism, and that he was more like a political eclectic who 
combined liberalism with political ideas more easily associated other traditions of political 
thought. Unlike Gray, I find Berlin’s combination of value pluralism with a moderate and 
egalitarian sort of liberalism to be not obviously illogical. One might therefore say that value 
pluralism and liberalism are indeed compatible doctrines, and one might perhaps even say 
that value pluralism may provide a basis for the kind of liberalism recommended by Berlin, 
even if there is no strict, logical link between liberalism and value pluralism.   
The fourth chapter contains a description and my interpretations of Popper’s political 
thought, as well the epistemological theories he and others have given the name critical 
rationalism. I find that there are several links between his epistemology and his political 
theories, often originating in and running through a rather sketchily developed set of moral 
considerations. It is especially his view that one should minimise avoidable human suffering, 
an idea Popper calls ‘negative utilitarianism’, which links his various theories together so 
that they become parts of a philosophical system. Because ignorance, unfreedom, and 
economic exploitation in Popper’s mind lead to much avoidable suffering, it is his view that 
the state should actively protect the freedom and integrity of all. I therefore describe 
Popper’s political thought, using a concept originally developed by the German political 
theorist and politician Eduard Bernstein to describe his own version of democratic socialism, 
as a form of ‘organised liberalism’. 
In the fifth chapter, I present and discuss some of the remarkably different 
interpretations of Popper’s political thought. In the ensuing discussion, I side with those 
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commentators who above all describe Popper as a political moderate who wants human 
reason and knowledge to guide political action. There is however also a lively dispute 
between those who emphasise his war-time books and who tend to think of Popper as a 
social democrat, and those who call attention to his later works, and who believes that 
Popper ought to have come out more clearly in favour of ‘classical liberalism’. In this 
dispute, I side with the former group. To the latter group I concede, however, that it is 
ultimately an empirical question whether or not Popper’s ‘protectionist view of the state’, or 
the view that political institutions should protect everyone from exploitation and minimise 
avoidable suffering, is compatible with traditional economic liberalism. 
The third part of the study, called ‘the neoliberal challenge’, is a discussion of the 
third group of questions mentioned above. The first chapter of this part, chapter six, presents 
a set ideas of ideas commonly called neoliberalism, which despite the nominal similarity on 
closer inspection turns out to be very different from the kinds of liberalism proposed by 
Berlin and Popper. In fact, the differences between the two theorists and the neoliberals, 
discussed in chapter seven, illustrate the many disagreements between different groups of 
people who have found it useful to describe themselves as liberals.  
In my exposition in the sixth chapter, I try to highlight the differences between 
modern liberalism and liberal egalitarianism on one hand, and classical liberalism and 
libertarianism on the other. I find that political ideologies such as classical liberalism and 
libertarianism are not far removed from the political theories commonly called 
neoliberalism. This is the case at least if one primarily looks at the basic economic policies 
recommended by thinkers who have been described using one or more of these epithets, 
even if they to varying degrees differ from each other on other scores. There is nevertheless 
so much agreement between proponents of neoliberal policies that it is clearly quite useful to 
describe neoliberalism as a loosely demarcated set of political and economic ideas which – 
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in spite of certain theoretical differences between the various political theorists most 
commonly described as neoliberals – in practical terms amounts to a demand for a 
thoroughgoing ‘rolling back of the frontiers of the state’. 
In the seventh and final chapter, I bring the political thought of both Berlin and 
Popper back into the discussion. In it, I describe the relationship between key theories 
proposed by the two philosophers, most prominently value pluralism and political 
protectionism, as well as the moderate and above all democratic and egalitarian liberalism 
which they in the end recommend. I also ask whether or not it is possible to see in Berlin’s 
and Popper’s political theories the beginnings of what one may call a liberal alternative to 
neoliberalism, or a political theory which takes neoliberalism seriously as a genuine 
expression of liberalism, but which nevertheless emphasise other parts of the liberal tradition 
than the so-called neoliberals tend to do. 
1.3 Berlin, Popper, and liberal democracy 
1.3.1 From ethics and epistemology to political theory 
Among academic philosophers, political theorists, and historians of ideas who were active 
during the twentieth century, Isaiah Berlin and Karl Popper stand out, not only because they 
are important liberal theorists, but also because they were notable members of all three 
categories. Apart from a certain unwillingness to specialise in a particular scholarly field, 
there are several other similarities between them as well. One common feature of their 
thought, which especially has caught my attention, is that their shared efforts to construct a 
normative, political theory based around a strong preference for liberal democracy could be 
viewed as upshots of their work on other philosophical problems. 
 In his most famous essay, Two Concepts of Liberty, Berlin suggests that ‘a measure’ 
of negative liberty is entailed by the ethical outlook he called pluralism, and which 
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commentators have called ‘value pluralism’ in order to separate it more clearly from other 
theories and perspectives called pluralism (Berlin 1958; 2002:166-217, cf. chapter 2 below 
for a further explanation of these concepts). Berlin claims that there are many different goals 
or values competing for our attention. This, according to Berlin, calls in its turn for a degree 
of respect and generosity towards others, especially those who choose to live by other values 
or with other ends in mind than the state or the majority. One ought therefore to leave others 
alone to pursue their own ends, unless the demands of competing values such as equality, 
social justice, or common decency cancel out our demands for even more negative liberty.  
Because of the rivalry between different values or ends it purports, Berlin’s pluralism 
implores us to dispense with efforts to create a perfect society, what Berlin calls Utopianism, 
and instead direct our best efforts at establishing and maintaining an ‘uneasy equilibrium’ 
between conflicting values and goals (Berlin 1990:1-19). Pluralism is, therefore, an ethical 
outlook of consequence to politics and political theory, because it suggests that we ought not 
to expect to be able to find an ultimate solution to all our social and political problems. We 
should therefore, within reason, respect each other’s privacy and negative liberty: 
Pluralism, with the measure of ‘negative’ liberty that it entails, seems to me a truer 
and more humane ideal than the goals of those who seek in the great disciplined, 
authoritarian structures the ideal of ‘positive’ self-mastery by classes, or peoples, or 
the whole of mankind. It is truer, because it does, at least, recognise the fact that 
human goals are many, not all of them commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with 
one another. To assume that all values can be graded on one scale, so that it is a mere 
matter of inspection to determine the highest, seems to me to falsify our knowledge 
that men are free agents, to represent moral decision as an operation which a slide-
rule could, in principle, perform. To say that in some ultimate, all-reconciling yet 
realisable synthesis duty is interest, or individual freedom is pure democracy or an 
authoritarian State, is to throw a metaphysical blanket over self-deceit or deliberate 
hypocrisy. (Berlin 2002:216) 
 
Popper, on the other hand, puts forward the view that a commitment to protect the ‘the open 
society’ and the ‘freedom of men’ proceeds from a set of basic epistemological assumptions 
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which he calls critical rationalism (cf. Popper [1945] 1966; [1945] 1966a, especially pp. 
224-258, cf. also chapter 4 below). As the name implies, critical rationalism is a form of 
rationalism, but one which in addition to believing in the usefulness of the human capability 
to reason and find out new things about the world we live in, also aims to adopt a critical 
attitude towards established theories and beliefs, including itself and its own presuppositions 
(Popper [1963] 2002a:3-86; cf. also Albert 1991). It is, basically, a way of looking at things 
which claims that human knowledge will develop and grow whenever and wherever it is 
possible to submit any theory or set of beliefs to a process of open-ended criticism, in the 
form of severe tests which may prove such theories wrong (cf. Popper [1945] 1966; [1945] 
1966a; 1979a; [1963] 2002a).  
It is his firm belief that the practice of critical thinking is best preserved in a liberal 
and democratic polity, and it is this belief which forms a bridge from his theories of 
knowledge to his theories of politics. Another point of departure for his political thought is 
his idea that many of the existing alternatives to liberalism are based on what he considers to 
be poorly conceived or fraudulent theories (Popper [1957] 2002c). Only liberal democracy 
is, according to Popper, well suited to facilitate critical thinking, and thereby the continued 
growth of human knowledge and the overall freedom of humankind: 
[R]ationalism is linked up with the recognition of the necessity of social institutions 
to protect freedom of criticism, freedom of thought, and thus the freedom of men. 
And it establishes something like a moral obligation towards the support of these 
institutions. This is why rationalism is closely linked up with the political demand 
for practical social engineering – piecemeal engineering, of course – in the 
humanitarian sense, with the demand for the rationalization of society, for planning 
for freedom, and for its control by reason; not by ‘science’, not by a Platonic, a 
pseudo-rational authority, but by that Socratic reason which is aware of its 
limitations, and which therefore respects the other man and does not aspire to coerce 
him – not even into happiness. (Popper [1945] 1966a:239-40) 
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The links between political theories and ideas in other fields of philosophical enquiry are 
often very hard to pin down exactly, and it is not entirely clear what it means for a 
philosophical theory to ‘entail’ or ‘link up with’ a political point of view distinct from 
others. Nevertheless, this is what both Berlin and Popper come close to asserting, when they 
in their most seminal works claim that their preference for liberal democracy has been 
deduced from their perspectives in ethics or epistemology. In addition, terms such as 
‘liberalism’ or ‘liberal democracy’ are, to say the very least, ambiguous and nebulous 
concepts. For Berlin, becoming a liberal was a matter of rejecting the “brutal and fraudulent 
simplifications” which inspires the “actual enemies” of liberal democracy (Berlin and 
Williams 1994:309). Equally, Popper understood liberal and democratic political 
arrangements partly as a way of making sure that erroneous theories of government did the 
least possible damage if their proponents gained access to political authority (cf. e.g. Popper 
[1945] 1966; [1945] 1966a; 1994a:151-160).  
I do not disagree with Berlin’s and Popper’s view that they are indeed liberals, but 
with the idea that a very detailed sort of political theory is directly entailed by their theories 
in ethics or epistemology. Instead, I give support to a weaker proposition, namely that while 
value pluralism and critical rationalism may lead their proponents towards a strong 
preference for liberal democracy, it is not the case that such theories lead their proponents 
directly to a very detailed political programme called liberalism. Nevertheless, they both 
come out quite strongly as proponents of a left-leaning type of liberalism I have called 
‘organised liberalism’, whenever they combine their theoretical outlook with their own view 
of what lessons we might learn from our recent history.  
To put it more directly, the liberalism which Berlin and Popper claim to deduce, 
respectively, from value pluralism or critical rationalism is the liberalism which is shared by 
most people, at least in the western world. One does not have to subscribe to particular 
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economic policies in order to become a liberal in this broader sense. One only needs to reject 
political ideologies which actively seek to replace liberal democracy with other forms of 
government. The political theories of Berlin and Popper do not, therefore, lead to an 
endorsement of liberal economic policies – let alone so-called neoliberal economic policies. 
Instead their political theories come across as an egalitarian and interventionist form of 
social liberalism akin to the ‘new liberalism’ of for instance L. T. Hobhouse ([1911] 1994) 
and William Beveridge (1942; 1944; 1945). In our day and age, however, this is a political 
outlook which in Western Europe has been put forward more frequently by social democrats 
– and not quite as often by members of Liberal political parties.  
1.3.2 Liberalism 
Berlin and Popper are nevertheless part of a liberal tradition in political theory. By the 
middle of the twentieth century, when Berlin and Popper were at their most active as 
political philosophers, the general perception in Western Europe was that liberal parties were 
a centrist force in politics, situated between the often larger conservative and social 
democratic parties. This was also the case in Britain, their adopted country, where the once 
dominant Liberal Party had been surpassed by the Conservative Party and Labour. 
Increasingly, however, liberal ideas and principles of government were at the same time fast 
becoming a shared inheritance among most major political parties.  
This meant that while liberal parties grew smaller in size, their most central ideas and 
principles became ever more influential, and uncontroversial, in the democracies of Western 
Europe. During World War II and the early stages of the Cold War, when Berlin and Popper 
were at their most active as political theorists, words such as ‘liberal’ and ‘liberalism’ also 
became terms used to describe all proponents of liberal democracy, and not merely members 
and supporters of Liberal political parties. For these reasons, Berlin, Popper and many others 
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could claim to be liberals, without at the same time making their purely partisan allegiances 
clear to their immediate audiences. 
Berlin claimed to be a liberal quite simply because he rejected the alternatives to 
liberal democracy. In an article co-authored with Bernard Williams, he argues against the 
view, presented by George Crowder, that his value pluralism leads away from liberalism 
(Berlin and Williams 1994; Crowder 1994). Contrary to this, Berlin and Williams suggest 
that liberalism is a political option open to everyone, including adherents of value pluralism: 
“[I]t is from social and historical reality that we are likely to be instructed in liberalism’s 
strengths, and to be reminded of the brutal and fraudulent simplifications which, as a matter 
of fact, are the usual offerings of its actual enemies” (Berlin and Williams 1994:309).  
 The crucial claim Berlin makes is that typically liberal values do not form a 
consistent whole or resolve themselves into an all-encompassing synthesis. Berlin suggests 
instead that liberal values, perhaps most strikingly epitomised by the French revolutionary 
slogan “liberté, égalité, fraternité”, must be moderated against each other. It is especially 
the relationship between liberty and equality that receives his critical scrutiny. He rejects, for 
instance, the view that equality is the paramount liberal value, as is the view expressed in 
Richard Wollheim’s companion essay to one of Berlin’s articles, both entitled “Equality”: 
My own opinion is that the principle of Equality can be regarded as the fundamental 
principle of Liberalism. We have seen already how the principle of Democracy can 
be interpreted as a special instance of it. And the principle of Liberty is made 
superfluous by it. For the substance of every claim that men should be free in a 
certain matter could be rendered by claiming that in this matter they have equal 
rights. (Wollheim 1956:300; for a more recent rendition of this view, and one which 
is critical of Berlin’s political and moral theories, cf. Dworkin 2000; 2001; 2001a) 
It follows that when the pursuit of equality comes into conflict with other human 
aims, be they what they may – such as the desire for happiness or pleasure, or for 
justice or virtue, or colour and variety in a society for their own sake or for liberty of 
choice as an end in itself, or for the fuller development of all human faculties, it is 
only the most fanatical egalitarian that will demand that such conflicts invariably be 
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decided in favour of equality alone, with relative disregard of the other ‘values’ 
concerned.  (Berlin 1956:319) 
Even if we were to grant that value pluralism does not necessarily lead directly to liberalism, 
one would certainly have to grant that this type of ethical theory would add a quite 
distinctive ‘flavour’ to one’s political theorising (cf. e.g. Berlin 1990:1-19; 2000:1-23; 
2002:3-54; 166-217; cf. also Lamprecht 1921). This is perhaps most evident in Berlin’s 
lecture On the Pursuit of the Ideal, which he gave in Italy in 1988: 
Both liberty and equality are among the primary goals pursued by human beings 
through many centuries; but total liberty for wolves is death to the lambs, total liberty 
of the powerful, the gifted, is not compatible with the rights to a decent existence of 
the weak and the less gifted. (…) Equality may demand the restraint of the liberty of 
those who wish to dominate; liberty – without some modicum of which there is no 
choice and therefore no possibility of remaining human as we understand the word – 
may have to be curtailed in order to make room for social welfare, to feed the hungry, 
to clothe the naked, to shelter the homeless, to leave room for the liberty of others, to 
allow justice or fairness to be exercised. (Berlin 1990:12) 
Of course social and political collisions will take place; the mere conflict of positive 
values alone makes this unavoidable. Yet they can, I believe, be minimised by 
promoting and preserving an uneasy equilibrium, which is constantly threatened and 
in constant need of repair – that alone, I repeat, is the precondition for decent 
societies and morally acceptable behaviour, otherwise we are bound to lose our way. 
(Berlin 1990:19) 
Popper claims, in his 1954 lecture “Public opinion and liberal principles” (1984:169-172; 
1994a:155-157), that liberalism could be defined as a ‘group of theses’. These positions are 
also found in several of Popper’s other works, for instance in The Open Society and its 
Enemies (Popper [1945] 1966; [1945] 1966a). The lecture itself was originally presented 
before a meeting of the self-avowedly liberal Mont Pèlerin Society, which later has become 
known, in some academic circles at least, as the global hothouse of neoliberal ideology 
(Plickert 2008; Mirowski and Plehwe 2009; Mont Pèlerin Society, no date).  
 Initially, Popper gives us the liberal perspective on the state: “The state is a necessary 
evil: its powers are not to be multiplied beyond what is necessary. One might call this 
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principle the ‘Liberal razor’” (Popper 1994a:155). The liberal will not claim, like the 
anarchist presumably does, that the state is an unnecessary evil which we might just as well 
remove entirely. Rather, the liberal claims that the state is an indispensable guardian of 
human liberty and welfare. At the same time, liberals will also view the state as a latent 
danger to individual freedom and happiness. The upshot of this ambivalence is that liberals 
will tend to view any infringements on individual liberty with scepticism, and yet at the 
same time view many such infringements as a necessary feature of human societies.  
 The second component of liberalism is its commitment to democracy. In Popper’s 
vocabulary, democracy is simply a mechanism under which “the government can be got rid 
of without bloodshed” (Popper 1994a:156). Presumably, this amounts to a defence of a quite 
limited democracy, where the minimal requirement is that the citizens of a state can 
peacefully dismiss their political leaders in free and fair elections. This does not, however, 
exclude the possibility of more comprehensive or inclusive forms of democratic governance 
under particularly favourable conditions.  
 The third factor in Popper’s liberalism is gradualism and traditionalism, which makes 
him reject revolutionary creeds and ideologies:  
Institutions alone are never sufficient if not tempered by traditions. (…) Should we 
prevent a pianist from practising, or prevent his neighbour from enjoying a quiet 
afternoon? All such problems can be solved in practice only by an appeal to existing 
traditions and customs and a traditional sense of justice; to common law, as it is 
called in Britain, and to an impartial judge’s appreciation of equity. All laws, being 
universal principles, have to be interpreted in order to be applied; and an 
interpretation needs some principles of concrete practice, which can be supplied only 
by a living tradition. And this holds more especially for the highly abstract and 
universal principles of Liberalism. (Popper 1994a:156-157)    
In other words, the establishment and preservation of a set of traditions – a political culture 
and a ‘moral framework’ – is indispensable in order to make liberal democracy work:  
Among the traditions we must count as most important is what we may call the 
‘moral framework’ (corresponding to the institutional ‘legal framework’) of a 
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society. (…) This moral framework serves as the basis which makes it possible to 
reach a fair or equitable compromise between conflicting interests where this is 
necessary. (…) Nothing is more dangerous than the destruction of this traditional 
framework, as it was consciously aimed at by Nazism. In the end its destruction will 
lead to cynicism and nihilism, i.e. to the disregard and the dissolution of all human 
values. (Popper 1994a:157) 
Popper then goes on to say that liberals would be, at least when they reside in liberal 
societies, a gradualist force: 
Principles of Liberalism may be described (at least today) as principles of assessing, 
and if necessary of modifying or changing, existing institutions, rather than of 
replacing existing institutions. One can express this by saying that Liberalism is an 
evolutionary rather than a revolutionary creed (unless it is confronted by a tyrannical 
regime). (ibid.) 
1.3.3 Utopianism 
It is a rather striking parallel that both Berlin and Popper attempt to justify their own 
respective commitments to liberal values and principles by referring to theories they put 
forward in other areas of philosophical investigation. Another parallel is the type of liberal 
political theory they put forward. They are what one might call cautious liberals, whose 
liberal commitments to a significant degree are diluted with pragmatic and gradualist 
attitudes. Nowhere is this gradualism more apparent than in their shared rejection of 
Utopianism (cf. especially Berlin 1990; Popper [1945] 1966:157-168).  
Utopianism is, according to both, the belief in the ‘perfectibility of human society’, 
or what one might call the “evanescence of imperfection” (Oakeshott 1962:5) in human 
affairs. They both lump together a substantial portion of Western political thought in this 
category – from Plato’s minutely regulated Republic of philosopher-kings, to more modern 
ideologies, especially the more doctrinaire variants of Marxism and Fascism.  
 Berlin rejects Utopianism because it is directly opposed to his pluralism (cf. Berlin 
1990:1-19; 20-48; Davis 2001). Utopianism is, according to Berlin, the belief that human 
society might be made perfect, which presumably must include the end of conflict and 
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discord. Value pluralism, on the other hand, is the belief that the goals which human beings 
ought to pursue are many and in a state of “perpetual rivalry” (Berlin 2002:216), making the 
idea that human societies might be made perfect a ‘metaphysical chimera’. To Berlin, 
Utopian political theories, and their corresponding ethical theory of value monism, are 
moreover the most dangerous ideas mankind has ever thought up: 
One belief, more than any other, is responsible for the slaughter of individuals on the 
altars of the great historical ideals – justice or progress or the happiness of future 
generations, or the sacred mission or emancipation of a nation or race or class, or 
even liberty itself, which demands the sacrifice of individuals for the freedom of 
society. This is the belief that somewhere in the past or in the future, in divine 
revelation or in the mind of an individual thinker, in the pronouncements of history or 
science, or in the simple heart of an uncorrupted good man, there is a final solution. 
This ancient faith rests on the conviction that all the positive values in which men 
have believed must, in the end, be compatible, and perhaps even entail one another. 
‘Nature binds truth, happiness and virtue together by an indissoluble chain,’ said one 
of the best men who ever lived [i.e. the Marquis de Condorcet], and spoke in similar 
terms of liberty, equality and justice. (Berlin 2002:212; cf. also Berlin 1990; 
Condorcet [1793] 1971) 
Utopian political ideas receive, also, a thorough denunciation from Popper in connection 
with his attempt to discuss and criticise the faults he claims to have discovered in the 
philosophical systems of Plato, Hegel, and Marx in The Open Society and its Enemies. 
Running through this entire edifice is the attempt to defend political incrementalism, or 
‘piecemeal social engineering’, against Utopianism and historicism, or the belief that history 
follows specific patterns over which humanity has little or no influence: 
Inherent in Plato’s programme there is a certain approach towards politics which, I 
believe, is most dangerous. Its analysis is of great practical importance from the view 
of rational social engineering. The Platonic approach I have in mind can be described 
as that of Utopian engineering, as opposed to another kind of social engineering 
which I consider as the only rational one, and which may be described by the name of 
piecemeal engineering.  The Utopian approach is the more dangerous as it may seem 
to be the obvious alternative to an out-and-out historicism – to a radically historicist 
approach which implies that we cannot alter the course of history; at the same time, it 
appears to be a necessary complement to a less radical historicism, like that of Plato, 
which permits human interference. (Popper [1945] 1966:157) 
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The fact that Berlin and Popper make a common enemy out of Utopian ideas and theories is 
indicative of their shared gradualist attitudes. They both entertain a presumption in favour of 
liberty and gradual change, meaning that reforms ought to be incremental and designed with 
a view of preserving human liberty rather than stamping it out. This twofold – and perhaps 
somewhat ambivalent – attitude is perhaps best captured in Berlin’s expression of an ‘uneasy 
equilibrium’ between competing goals, and Popper’s concept of ‘piecemeal social 
engineering’: Designing and reforming social institutions is an intricate undertaking, highly 
complex because of the wide variety of unintended consequences and competing objectives 
it must take into consideration. It is therefore, for both of them, of first importance to 
undertake such activities only in small and well thought through steps. 
 Individual liberty is an important ambition for both of them, but neither of them is 
willing to make it into a paramount or all-overriding consideration. John Gray famously 
described Berlin’s liberalism as ‘agonistic’, meaning that it was characterised by internal 
tensions and inconsistencies, making it a “stoical and tragic liberalism of unavoidable 
conflict and irreparable loss among inherently rivalrous values” (Gray 1995:1). Popper is, 
one might say, also espousing an ‘agonistic liberalism’, in that he also sees liberalism not as 
a complete blueprint for how all aspects of society ought to be organised. Like Berlin, he 
sees his version of liberalism as a set of principles that ought to guide an open-ended 
political process, in which individual interests are weighed against each other. 
Berlin and Popper are, to sum up, dedicated supporters of liberal goals and values. 
Their shared rejections of Utopianism, and their defences of individual liberty in the face of 
authoritarian and totalitarian ideologies, define their idiosyncratically cautious versions of 
liberalism. In addition, they view gradualism, prudence and moderation as political virtues, 
especially when it comes to designing and reforming social institutions. One can also in their 
works find a strong preference for egalitarianism, and a willingness to use the state to build a 
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more egalitarian society in which freedom and material resources are distributed more 
evenly and equitably than would otherwise be the case. In that way, they are both centrist or 
even left-leaning liberals, more closely related to social democrats than neoliberals, who 
demand a roll-back of the frontiers of the state, and the institution of an almost entirely 
unregulated market economy. All in all, they both promote a watchful, and above all a 
pragmatic, liberal political theory – and this makes them surprisingly similar in the concrete 
political attitudes they adhere to, in spite of the differences in both emphasis and substance 
one can find elsewhere in their respective theories. 
1.4 A note on method in political theory 
1.4.1 A discipline divided 
The present thesis could on the whole be seen as a piece of normative political analysis – or 
quite simply ‘political theory’. A central aim of the thesis is to present and compare some 
perspectives on how human societies ought to be organised. An aim such as this is of course 
closely related to the most central aim of political theory in general, namely to answer the 
basic question of how or along which lines human societies ought to be organised (cf. 
Thorsen 2008; 2011; 2011a).  
When trying to answer this basic question, it would of course be preferable to have a 
set of more or less clear-cut and widely agreed upon methods, parallel to the ones found in 
the more empirically oriented social sciences. Such methods could potentially guide us 
through the process from the formulation of normative research questions at a greater level 
of detail, through to the development of a definite answer to such questions, making the 
whole undertaking more structured than it would otherwise be.  
Political theory is, however, a field of research in which the ‘methods’ employed are 
rarely made explicit. Many political theorists – if not most – do not discuss research methods 
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at all. They simply start their discussions of how society ought to be organised, in the form 
of philosophical essays, most of the time without any overt discussion of or reference to a 
particular method or set of methods at all. Because of this, one widely used textbook dealing 
with Theory and Methods in Political Science acknowledges normative political theory as a 
central part of political science, itself divided into different traditions and approaches, but 
does not reveal to its undergraduate audience any methods for how to do normative political 
theory in practical terms (Marsh and Stoker 2010; Buckler 2010). Other textbooks concerned 
with political theory also remain largely silent on matters of research methods (cf. e.g. 
Beckman and Mörkenstam 2009; Malnes and Midgaard 2009).  
This widespread quietism is also indicated at the beginning of one of the very few 
books which tries to describe the various methods and approaches in political theory: 
Political theorists are often silent on questions of methods and approach. While 
scholars in other branches of political and social sciences expend great energy 
debating the right way to conduct research – arguing about the appropriate place of 
quantification, the nature of survey design, the ethical acceptability of particular 
investigative approaches, and the like – political theorists generally spend little time 
addressing questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’ in their work. Instead, they dive straight 
into their analysis, turning immediately to the task at hand; arguing, for instance, 
about the meaning and value of key concepts such as liberty, justice, and rights. The 
books that political theorists write thus rarely include much explicit reflection on 
method, even though such reflection is a standard expectation in other areas; even 
less frequently do they produce works explicitly concerned with research methods, 
although the shelves of libraries are crowded with such texts from related disciplines. 
(Leopold and Stears 2008:1) 
  
But political theory is not only a research discipline in which questions of method are rarely 
discussed or answered, but also a discipline divided between different traditions and 
approaches, as well as different views about what the most important questions of political 
theory actually are. This situation is richly illustrated in the same book: 
[E]ven within a single department such as ours [i.e. the Department of Politics and 
International Relations at the University of Oxford] there was little agreement about 
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what methods and approaches are best suited to the tasks of political theory today. 
Some colleagues conducted historical work, often using primary sources hidden away 
in archives, others analysed questions formally, employing methods borrowed from 
economics and game theory; still others combined techniques from analytical 
philosophy with those from empirical social science. Moreover, there was significant 
disagreement as to the proper object of study in political theory. Some felt that it lay 
in scrutinizing the meaning and value of key terms in our contemporary political 
vocabulary; others argued for the need to make concrete recommendations for public 
policy; others emphasized the importance of recovering lost traditions of thought and 
comparing them with the established norms of today. (Leopold and Stears 2008:2) 
 
These divisions do not, however, mean that this field of research is entirely without 
standards or criteria for distinguishing a successful argument from an unsuccessful one, even 
if political theorists tend to write their works in the form of philosophical or polemical 
essays without a clear-cut methodology. The result of these divisions within the discipline is, 
rather, that such standards or criteria are rarely discussed or made explicit, and that they are 
certainly not universally accepted by all academics working in the field of political theory. 
Instead, it is more fruitful to talk – in the plural – of different methods and different 
approaches which define which tradition or school of thought to which a particular political 
theorist belongs (cf. Almond 1990). What unites political theory is therefore not a particular 
method or approach to answering the research questions in the field, but rather the research 
questions themselves. Political theory is quite simply the sustained effort to answer questions 
relating to how society in general or particular political institutions ought to be organised.  
 One way of making the divisions in political theory explicit is to consider the 
different ways in which political theorists view the relationship between their own research 
discipline and other areas of enquiry. Is political theory an extension of moral philosophy, is 
it a part of social or political science, is it most fruitfully viewed – in part at least – as an 
historical discipline, or is it perhaps a broadly humanistic discipline related to literary studies 
or social philosophy? 
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Some political theorists view political theory as an extension of moral philosophy, or 
as moral philosophy applied to questions of how society ought to be organised. 
Consequently, they view it not as a part of political or social science, but as a ‘complement’ 
to the social sciences (McDermott 2008). Even if political theorists are quite often members 
of political science departments in universities, they are according to this perspective more 
properly thought of as moral philosophers working with problems of a political nature. Quite 
regardless of more or less accidental administrative divisions in universities, it is 
nevertheless thought that political theory is an integral part of moral philosophy and thereby 
of academic philosophy in general.  
An upshot of this perspective is that it is plainly difficult to describe a particular 
method for political theory. Like in other areas of philosophy, the main task of political 
theory is, according to this perspective, to explore concepts and ideas in a general way, and 
to evaluate the arguments of other philosophers in order to make them better and more lucid. 
Political theory is thus understood as a philosophical discipline, and the standard scientific 
approaches to problem-solving known from empirical social science are therefore not always 
thought of as appropriate or relevant. One must simply try to answer the questions posed in 
political theory as carefully and as systematically as possible, and one must try to root out 
possible objections to the answers given (Thorsen 2011a). One must also remain open to 
possible counter-arguments from other theorists, and write explicitly about the way one 
moved from the initial question to a final answer. That way, an honest conversation between 
theorists could take place over the research question one set out to answer in the first place, 
with little or no explicit reference to questions of method. This is at least an argument one 
could make following the methodological discussions of the well-known political theorist 
Brian Barry: 
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Both common experience of actual moral arguments and the record of Anglo-
American moral philosophy in the past couple of decades strongly suggest that it is 
neither necessary nor even desirable to precede the doing of something (…) by trying 
to establish how to do it. (…) We all know how to engage in moral arguments, even 
if we would be flummoxed by being asked whether or not we subscribe to moral 
realism, objectivism, subjectivism, prescriptivism, or what have you. It is, moreover, 
noticeable how little difference is made by people’s commitments to such general 
positions about the nature of morality when it comes down to arguing about some 
concrete moral question. (…) Thus, everyone proposes general principles, derives 
more specific principles from them, tests them by examples, argues from case to case 
by analogy, and so on. (Barry 1989:257-8; cf. also Malnes 1995:35-39) 
  
Others turn this vision of a relationship between philosophy, political theory, and political 
science on its head, and claim instead that political theory is an integral part of political 
science – albeit a part of political science quite distinct from other parts of that discipline. 
The distinction between political theory on one hand, and political or social science on the 
other, is primarily defined by the questions asked – whether one asks empirical questions of 
how society is structured, or if one instead asks normative questions of how society ought to 
be organised (Thorsen 2011; 2011a).  
The primary goal for political theory is not, according to this perspective, to become 
a philosophically rigorous investigation of what ought to take place under ideal 
circumstances. The ultimate goal of political theory is instead to understand the world we 
live in better, so that one in due course may find out how the world could be made a better 
place (Thorsen 2011; 2011a). Therefore, political theory must aim at political relevance, in 
the sense that one would like political theory to use the findings of social and political 
science to formulate proposals for reforming the society in which the political theorist lives 
(Miller 2008; Swift and White 2008).  
Even if one understands political theory to be a normative branch of social or 
political science dealing with questions of how society ought to be organised, the standard 
scientific approaches to problem-solving are still, however, not always all that appropriate. 
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As a political theorist one needs to understand both rather nonconcrete philosophical 
discussions of political issues, as well as the types of tremendously concrete research going 
on in the empirical social sciences. The ultimate goal is not, however, to contribute to either 
undertaking. Instead, the goal is to use both as sources of insight which might contribute to 
the formation of ideas about how human societies and political processes ought to be 
organised better in the future, and to act as a mediator between the world of philosophical 
principles and social science on one hand, and the world of ‘real politics’ on the other.  
In this, it seems that explicit methods are hard to come by. One simply has to do 
whatever it takes to arrive at morally and scientifically informed answers to political 
questions of the day, and then try influence the general public, politicians, and political 
processes. That way, public policies may become informed by the findings of both social 
science and moral philosophy to a greater extent than they were at the outset (cf. e.g. Swift 
and White 2008).  
A third perspective views political theory, in part at least, as an historical discipline, 
where the main goal is to root out the origins of different ideas about how society ought to be 
organised. The basic goal is to see things the way they were, or to see things the way past 
generations saw them, in the hope of finding out why people thought the way they did in 
earlier times, and to what degree and in which way they thought differently than most people 
or most political theorists do today (cf. especially Skinner 1989; 2002a). 
That way, one might come to see how (and to what degree) the basic concepts and 
modes of political thought we take for granted today are really the products of gradual and – 
to some degree at least – accidental historical and conceptual developments (cf. Farr 1989; 
Freeden 1996). We might also come to see that the way we think about politics today might 
have been different, and that there are fewer political ideas that are self-evidently true, than 
we may have thought at the outset. With a careful, historical study of political ideas and their 
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development through time, we may arrive at a more context-sensitive perspective on our 
own ideas about how political processes and society in general ought to be organised. 
Ultimately, we may end up with a more open-minded political debate in which we 
understand better the sources of political disagreements.  
This is arguably the approach to the basic problems of political theory in which it is 
most appropriate to describe a research method resembling anything found in other areas of 
academic research. It is a way of doing political theory which is closely allied to the history 
of ideas and historical research in general. In order to find out what kinds of political ideas 
people entertained in the past, one must be able to make sense of historical sources and be 
able to construct a narrative about the development of political ideas and the changing use of 
political words or concepts. Political theorists of this kind are therefore historians as much as 
they are philosophers or social scientists, and they employ standard historical methods in at 
least parts of their research.  
Traditionally, historians have not been particularly preoccupied with questions of 
method, but a renewed interest in research methods in other areas of historical research have 
also influenced the study of political ideas and their development through time (cf. e.g. 
Kjeldstadli 1999; Burke 2005). Now, we can see both a traditional and a more novel 
approach to the historical study of political ideas. While many historically oriented political 
theorists still tend to remain silent on the matter of method in their research reports, we can 
also see that some historians of political ideas now put a greater emphasis on questions of 
methodology (cf. e.g. Freeden 1996). It remains, however, that these methods largely 
correspond to the traditional methods used in the history of ideas, as well as general 
historical research (Skinner 2002a).  
 Political theory could moreover be viewed in a fourth and final way as a broadly 
humanistic discipline closely related to literary theory and social philosophy, or the study of 
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literature and the fundamental preconditions for human interaction. This is an approach to 
the basic questions of political theory found most of all in so-called ‘continental philosophy’ 
(cf. e.g. Pettit 1993; West 1993; Leiter 2004; 2009). If discussions of research methods are 
hard to come by in other approaches to political theory, one must look even further afield in 
the literature of the continental tradition, at least if one wants to find a simple recipe for 
doing ‘continental’ or ‘critical’ political theory similar to accounts found in books about the 
research methods of social and natural science.  
At most, one may find introductions to various schools of thought such as for 
instance the ‘critical theory’ of Jürgen Habermas or various ‘dialectical approaches’ to 
political theory inspired by Hegel and Marx (cf. e.g. McNay 2008; Leopold 2008). It seems 
therefore to be a general norm that researchers writing within these traditions of political 
theory rarely build on any overt methodology, giving their works a distinctly literary feel to 
them (cf. e.g. Pedersen 2010a; Thorsen 2011b). The goal in these traditions seems to be to 
develop grand narratives of cultural change and diagnoses of our time, and the downplaying 
of methodological discussions seems to follow from the general nature of the questions 
asked – not entirely unlike what we found in the other approaches to political theory. 
1.4.2 Towards a method for political theory? 
We may, potentially at least, see the beginnings of a methodology for political theory if we 
look more closely at the questions posed, for instance the basic question of how society 
ought to be organised. Clearly, such normative questions – questions which ask about what 
ought to be rather than what actually is – set political theory apart from mainstream social or 
political science:  
A distinction can be made between positive and normative political analysis. The 
difference between them is mainly one of different purpose. Whereas positive 
analysis has a descriptive and explanatory purpose, normative analysis has an 
evaluative purpose. To be sure, normative analysis often relies on empirical 
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knowledge, such as knowledge of how existing institutions distribute benefits and 
burdens. And perceptions of what is right and what is wrong also sometimes affect 
political decision-making. Normative analysis thus often relies on empirical 
premises, and perceptions of right and wrong can have profound effects on 
institutional design or political decision-making. But whereas the purpose of an 
empirical analysis is description and explanation, the purpose of a normative analysis 
is to assess the degree to which particular institutions, practices or decisions can be 
defended, from a moral point of view. (Semb 2000:11-12) 
 
There are two basic ways to begin the normative enterprise, one corresponding to the first 
approach discussed above in section 1.4.1, and the other corresponding, roughly, to the other 
three. The first way to begin a normative analysis of politics sees political theory as a 
philosophical discipline, and the other views political theory as an undertaking whose 
ultimate goal it is to describe how the way we structure our affairs today might be improved. 
In his book Spheres of Justice, Michael Walzer makes this division the starting-point of his 
own philosophical analyses of basic political concepts such as justice and equality:   
One way to begin the philosophical enterprise – perhaps the original way – is to walk 
out of the cave, leave the city, climb the mountain, fashion for oneself (what can 
never be fashioned for ordinary men and women) an objective and universal 
standpoint. Then one describes the terrain of everyday life from far away, so that it 
loses its particular contours and takes on a general shape. But I mean to stand in the 
cave, in the city, on the ground. Another way of doing philosophy is to interpret to 
one’s fellow citizens the world of meanings that we share. Justice and equality can 
conceivably be worked out as philosophical artifacts, but a just or an egalitarian 
society cannot be. If such a society isn’t already here – hidden, as it were, in our 
concepts and categories – we will never know it concretely or realize it in fact. 
(Walzer 1983:xiv)  
 
Walzer’s second approach to begin the philosophical or normative enterprise is, basically, an 
attempt to get away from potentially intractable philosophical debates, and instead focus on 
how to make the world we live in more characterised by justice and equality. In light of this, 
one commentator has suggested that a “successful normative analysis is one that provides us 
with the most accurate interpretation of a set of shared meanings of the phenomenon to be 
studied”, and that it is an important task for the political theorist to “describe the practices 
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and institutions that relates to the subject matter, and, more importantly, to discern people’s 
beliefs about those practices and institutions” (Semb 2000:13).   
This points in the direction of a close alliance between political theory and social or 
political science. In order to improve the political arrangements by which we are surrounded, 
one must first know how these arrangements came about in the first place, how they are 
justified or grounded in various views about how our political affairs ought to be structured, 
and how and why our surroundings may come to approve or disapprove of suggestions for 
how to improve them. Only then could one begin to make normative arguments with a 
reasonable chance of success. Ultimately, one may be able to present a normative argument 
which goes all the way from a description of a political problem, via the formulation of how 
things ought to be and how thing might be improved, to a successful implementation of a 
reform proposal which aims to repair the identified problems, and thereby actually improve 
the political system under which we live. 
A particularly embarrassing problem in normative political theory is, however, the 
lack of any widely recognised standards of success for a given normative argument. It is 
therefore not much one can say, at least at a general level, about the ‘methods’ employed in 
political theory or philosophy (Kymlicka 2002:5-7). There is simply not at present a general 
agreement as to when a reasonable or rational person should be convinced by any one 
normative argument about how our political and social affairs ought to be structured (cf. 
Thorsen 2011a). Most of the efforts in political theory have consequently sought refuge 
within a larger political ideology or a tradition for normative political thought. Such 
traditions are in turn wrought with tacit assumptions often only discernible with great 
difficulty to the outsider, and often supplied with their own – often largely implicit – 
standards of argumentative excellence.  
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This state of the discipline could probably be traced back to the obstinately 
intractable problem of what truth-functional properties a normative sentence might take on. 
As for descriptive propositions, it seems implausible to claim that these could be completely 
indeterminate – they are, at least for all practical purposes, either true or false (cf. e.g. Taylor 
1998). But in what sense could normative propositions be either true or false? In this 
question controversy has seeped in, making it an additional challenge to devise future 
methodological standards for political theory, or indeed for any type of normative enquiry, 
which would have a potential for becoming widely recognised (cf. Beauchamp 2001:57-98; 
Malnes 2001; Thorsen 2011a).  
It could of course be claimed that normative, political analysis is a hollow practice, 
and that one instead could and should participate in more fulfilling or productive tasks. It is 
however likely that only few people would condone such a position, at least if they are 
genuinely interested in improving the political arrangements under which we live. Instead, 
normative enquiry and evaluation of political affairs is a common phenomenon, both in 
academic debates and outside them. I will therefore in this study not attempt to justify the 
whole enterprise that is political theory, which is a task that might easily reach quite 
deterring proportions (cf. though Vincent 2004; Smits 2009:1-17).  
The most basic aim of normative political analysis is quite simply to modify and 
improve our preceding beliefs and intentions, by developing some of them further and 
discarding others. That way, one might be able to identify, establish, and defend values and 
principles which ought to guide our answers to questions relating to how society ought to be 
organised (Smits 2009:3-4). A primary assumption is that it is possible to resolve if not all, 
then at least some of the difficult problems and conflicts we tend to think of as moral or 
political, by way of calm and rational enquiry and deliberation (Thorsen 2011). The question 
as to when enough has been said in order to justify any given political institution or 
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arrangement remains, however, effectively in dispute. Instead, we must be contented with 
merely tentative methods and norms of argumentative success.  
One such norm is of a formal nature and concerns itself with the mode of 
presentation of the normative theory we wish to describe and perhaps defend. A theory 
should be as complete as possible, in the sense that it does not leave vital parts of itself in the 
dark. Raino Malnes (2001) has suggested comprehensiveness and acuteness as virtues when 
it comes to presenting and systematising normative theories. This means, respectively, that 
as many ideas and arguments as possible which are relevant to the problem at hand are given 
due consideration, and that such relevant ideas and arguments are discussed in light of each 
other and according to their relative importance. In the study presented below, I will try to 
live up to these virtues because they are preconditions for clarity in any systematic enquiry, 
normative or otherwise, and that the flouting of these virtues seems necessarily to hurt all 
arguments by leaving natural questions unanswered. In this, they constitute a rudimentary 
methodology – a methodology that is unfinished, but inevitable if one is to make sense of 
normative political theory.   
Another guiding norm which has gained some prominence in our day and age is 
constituted by the idea that an acceptable normative argument or theory should be in tune 
with our considered convictions or judgements about related matters. John Rawls, the 
modern instigator of this idea, has given this ideal the name “reflective equilibrium” (cf. 
Rawls 1971:46-53). The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy defines reflective equilibrium as a 
“state in which all one’s thoughts about a topic fit together; in which there are no loose ends 
or recalcitrant elements that do not cohere with an overall position” (Blackburn 2008). We 
naturally aim at greater levels of coherence in our beliefs, since holding contradictory or 
mutually exclusive beliefs would be intolerable for any person claiming to be rational. That 
any given normative theory coheres with our prior convictions and beliefs must, at least 
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tentatively, be considered as an argument in favour of that theory. Conversely, if a normative 
theory, ethical or political, conflicts with our preceding sense of right and wrong or our 
‘moral intuitions’, that in itself is an indication that the theory ought to be revised or perhaps 
abandoned altogether (Audi 1997).  
But moral and political theory should not, either, be in the business of judging 
theories solely on the degree to which they lend support to our considered convictions about 
what ought to take place, or how society ought to be organised. Instead, moral and political 
theory might be considered to be what Rawls (1971:49) calls a ‘Socratic’ mode of enquiry, 
in which influence between general theories and considered convictions, or tentative answers 
to isolated questions of a normative nature, runs both ways. We may therefore, on closer 
inspection, want to discard some of our considered convictions if they turn out to be 
inconsistent with a normative argument or theory we find particularly attractive. A state of 
reflective equilibrium is thus achieved whenever our normative theories and considered 
convictions have been modified in light of each other, so that the theory is now in tune with 
the considered convictions we have not yet discarded, and vice versa.   
A central goal of moral and political theory may thus be described as the search for 
inconsistencies between the normative theories we (or perhaps someone else) adhere to, and 
our considered convictions about what ought to take place, or how society ought to be 
organised. If we find such inconsistencies, we may proceed to the next stage, in which we try 
to decide which beliefs we ought to modify in order to achieve a state of reflective 
equilibrium. We may start our discussion of an inconsistency with a ‘narrow reflective 
equilibrium’ as our goal, and discuss whether we should revise or reject the normative theory 
in question, or if we instead should revise or reject the preceding considered convictions of 
ours, which we find to be in conflict with that theory (cf. e.g. Kymlicka 2002:6).  
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We might however also aim at a state of affairs which is sometimes called ‘wide 
reflective equilibrium’, in which we also take into consideration various ‘background 
theories’ which may act as a standard to judge whether or not the normative theory in 
question is the best available theory (cf. Rawls 1974; Daniels 1979; 1996; 2011). 
Background theories form what one perhaps may describe as an elusive category, but they 
may for instance include basic theories which we take more or less for granted, such as 
theories of human nature or general theories about how human societies work. Such theories 
may be hard to make explicit, but if we rely on them, as we normally do, we have at least the 
outline of a procedure for deciding whether we should abandon or revise a normative theory 
in light of considered convictions which come into conflict with it, or whether we instead 
should revise those convictions in light of the theory we have formulated.  
The answer is simply that we should prefer those normative theories and those 
isolated ideas of ours about what ought to take place which form a more or less harmonious 
body of thought together, and which at the same time fit together with our background 
theories about how human beings and human societies work. A state of ‘wide reflective 
equilibrium’ is thus achieved whenever we have rooted out the inconsistencies which may 
arise between normative theories and isolated convictions about what ought to take place on 
one hand, and between normative theories and various ‘background theories’ on the other.  
This is at least the beginning of a practical theory about which normative theories and 
convictions we should build our future policies on, and which of them we instead should 
abandon or revise (cf. especially Daniels 1996:333-352). But even if it is the beginning of a 
method for political theory, we are nevertheless some distance away from a method which 
gives us a straightforward procedure for how to do political theory in practical terms.  
We may, however, delve even deeper into the matter if we consider what use we may 
have for a normative mode of enquiry such as political theory. Clearly, some of the problems 
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that are usually dealt with under the heading of normative political theory are more 
susceptible to the development of practical research methods than others. We may as 
political theorists for instance want to assess a given political arrangement in light of some – 
more or less settled – normative theory or conviction. If we then, for the time being at least, 
move past discussions of a more foundational or philosophical nature, we may move closer 
to a kind of political theory with a more limited and practical purpose. We may for instance 
put aside philosophical discussions of what democracy actually is or whether or not 
democratic decision procedures are better than its alternatives, and instead move on to more 
practical discussions, for instance of how some specific institution or practice might be made 
more democratic, in accordance with a settled or traditional conception of democracy.  
In order for political theory to become more practical in this way, political theorists 
may need the assistance of the social sciences in the form of various types of empirical 
research, or they may want to use concepts and categories developed by empirically oriented 
social scientists. Political theory itself will, however, at the same time become a more 
applied research discipline aimed at the assessment of existing political institutions or policy 
arrangements. Political theory of this kind will still be a characteristically normative 
discipline within social science, but it will also form a joint venture with empirical social 
research (cf. Thorsen 2008; 2011).  
Political theorists might even use normative questions at a greater level of detail as 
points of departure for empirical research of their own, in order to address and clarify the 
normative problem at hand. That way, they may move from normative discussions to 
empirical research, and back again, until they have reached a set of conclusions which are 
both of a normative and an empirical nature about the problems with which they are 
concerned. For instance, they may want to know how one can make society more 
democratic, or how one can develop better strategies for a sustainable development of human 
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societies. Potentially, this kind of more practical political theory may be guided by 
methodological standards – or at least ‘rules of thumb’ – to a greater degree, especially its 
more empirical components (cf. especially Lafferty 2002; cf. also Lafferty 1981; 2002a). At 
least, it would if we compared it with the kinds of political theory which are more 
preoccupied with the philosophical exploration and discussion of rather abstract political 
ideas and concepts.  
1.4.3 The methods employed in this thesis 
Alongside my work with this thesis, I have found it useful to reflect on who and what 
normative political theory is for, and what basic questions this field of enquiry is supposed to 
answer (cf. Thorsen 2008; 2011; 2011a; 2011b). Any type of normative political analysis 
undoubtedly rests on the assumption that critical evaluations of whole polities or individual 
policies make sense. It is therefore difficult to sustain the view that political theory is a field 
of research entirely divorced from practical politics, and from discussions of concrete 
proposals for political reform in the society in which the theorist lives.  
The political theorist may ultimately serve as a mediator between social scientists 
who try to describe how society actually works on one hand, and moral philosophers who 
develop ideas about which principles ought to guide human actions on the other. The 
political theorist may also, however, serve as a mediator between academic debates in 
general, and politicians and the general public who decides which way society as a whole 
ought to structure itself, or how humanity ought to move forward into the future.  
The present thesis does not start from scratch. Instead, it will focus its discussions 
around of the thoughts and theories of Berlin and Popper, whose theories I use as a point of 
departure, in order to make these theories more lucid and better suited to give answers to 
political problems of the twenty-first century. Hopefully, the thesis will become a politically 
relevant contribution to political theory which will give sound answers to its basic questions 
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(cf. section 1.2 above). It will hopefully not merely become a free-floating philosophical 
investigation of abstract theories and concepts, but rather a piece of normative political 
analysis which will successfully assess some more concrete views of how human societies 
ought to be organised, and develop some of these views further.  
In my ambition to be politically relevant, and not lose myself in historical details and 
unwarranted abstractions, I have found it useful to reflect on Bernard Williams’ distinction 
between the ‘history of ideas’ (akin to the kind of historically oriented political theory 
described above in section 1.4.1) and the ‘history of philosophy’, first outlined in his study 
of Descartes (Williams 1978; cf. also Williams 2006). The present study, especially the first 
four chapters, could favourably be perceived of as a contribution to what Williams there 
refers to as the ‘history of philosophy’. It is, basically, an attempt to interpret and develop 
further the thoughts of other philosophers, rather than a purely historical and descriptive 
investigation. The study could therefore, on the whole, be thought of as an independent 
contribution to political theory. I am for this reason happy to employ Williams’ words as a 
description of my own study of Berlin and Popper: 
This is a study in the history of philosophy rather than in the history of ideas. I use 
those labels to mark the distinction that the history of ideas is history before it is 
philosophy, while with the history of philosophy it is the other way round. In any 
worthwhile work of either sort, both concerns are likely to be represented, but there is 
a genuine distinction. For the history of ideas, the question about a work what does it 
mean? is centrally the question what did it mean?, and the pursuit of that question 
moves horizontally in time from the work, as well as backwards, to establish the 
expectations, conventions, familiarities, in terms of which the author could have 
succeeded in conveying a meaning. (…) [W]hat we are moved to, as historians of 
ideas, is an historical enquiry, and the genre of the resulting work is unequivocally 
history. (…) The history of philosophy of course has to constitute its object, the 
work, in genuinely historical terms, yet there is a cut-off point, where authenticity is 
replaced as the objective by the aim of articulating philosophical ideas. (…) [T]he 
new work is broadly of the same genre as the original. (Williams 1978:9-10) 
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The final part of this thesis will follow in the footsteps of the historical-cum-philosophical 
discussions displayed in the next four chapters. I will here present and assess a body of 
political ideas that are usually – but not always accurately – described as neoliberalism, 
which includes among other things the political and economic thoughts and theories of 
Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, and Robert Nozick. In this, I will make use of my own 
interpretations of Berlin’s and Popper’s political theories in order to discuss critically some 
of the basic ideas of the group of theorists that are often gathered together under the heading 
of neoliberalism.  
I will also, unfortunately merely in outline, employ Williams’ ‘history of 
philosophy’-approach combined with a version of Rawls’ and Daniels’ ‘wide reflective 
equilibrium’, when I in this part of the thesis try to compare neoliberal political theories with 
the liberal theories presented by Berlin and Popper, in order to see whether neoliberal policy 
recommendations will hold up to scrutiny, when viewed from the perspective of the kinds of 
liberal theories developed by Berlin and Popper. The ultimate aim of the thesis will therefore 
become, as mentioned above in section 1.2, to use Berlin’s and Popper’s political theories as 
a point of departure in order to construct the beginnings of what one may call a liberal 
alternative to neoliberalism, or a political theory which takes neoliberalism seriously as a 
genuine expression of liberalism, but which nevertheless emphasise other parts of the liberal 
tradition than the so-called neoliberals tend to do. 
 This approach clearly has both its strengths and its weaknesses. One of its strengths 
lies in the way in which its normative reflections are presented as an extension of 
interpretive debates about the political thought of Berlin and Popper, as well as existing and 
on-going debates in political theory about how one should view neoliberalism in light of 
other liberal theories. Another of its strengths lies in its ambition to formulate politically 
relevant answers to how, and in light of which principles and political ideas, one ought to go 
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about creating a better society in the future. Its weaknesses follows largely from the fact that 
it is a theoretical work about politics, and from the fact that political theory as a research 
discipline has very few and only – at best – sketchily developed methodological standards, 
which are readily available for consultation to researchers working within the discipline. 
Like the vast majority of other works in political theory, the present thesis therefore remains 
largely quiet about the methods employed, and tries instead to contribute more or less 
directly to on-going debates within political theory about how human societies and political 
systems ought to be organised, and how the political theories of individual thinkers ought to 
be interpreted.  
From the viewpoint of traditional and empirical social science, which is used to 
viewing research methods as practical recipes or guidelines for how to do a specific type of 
empirical research, this may be viewed as a very serious weakness. It is, however, a 
weakness this thesis shares with the vast majority of research efforts in political theory. 
There are of course reasons why political theorists for the most part tend to remain quiet on 
the question of which methods they employ. It is, to employ John Rawls’ term, a Socratic 
research discipline without settled methods, concerned mainly with a collaborative effort to 
answer quite general normative questions, and with critical discussions of possible answers 
to these questions.  
Seen as a whole, the study has quite formidable exemplars in the works of Berlin and 
Popper themselves – in spite of the fact that neither of them ever wrote explicitly and 
systematically about the research methods they employed whenever they wrote essays and 
books about the political thought of others. They also tried to build on the thoughts of other 
philosophers, even if they were for the most part preoccupied with pointing out that these 
‘great men’ often made ‘great mistakes’ (cf. Popper [1945] 1966:vii). In fact, almost all of 
their most important works in normative political theory consist mainly of philosophical and 
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polemical essays which tend to be built around historical analyses of other, older thinkers – 
as well as their often critical evaluation of well-established political theories.  
Popper’s The Open Society and its Enemies (Popper [1945] 1966; [1945] 1966a) 
consists for instance of a comprehensive critique of the political thought of Plato, Hegel, and 
Marx. They are considered by Popper to be among the greatest philosophers and theoretical 
sociologists to have ever lived, but also the perpetrators of momentous intellectual mistakes, 
and the instigators of surprisingly widespread misapprehensions. But even if his scathing 
indictments of the three thinkers have an immediate utility as a warning to future generations 
about what Popper perceive of as past errors, I consider his attempts to forge a broadly 
liberal and above all a democratic alternative to their theories – scattered throughout his 
books, essays, and lectures – as his most important contribution to political theory. The same 
approach, in which the author’s own liberal theory is presented next to an extended critique 
of its alternatives, is also found in Berlin’s many essays (cf. e.g. Berlin 1990; 2002). In them, 
an impressive inventory of theorists and philosophers are presented, often with the aim of 
contrasting them to Berlin’s own perspectives in epistemology, ethics, and political theory.  
For this reason, my line of attack is – in part at least – somewhat different compared 
to Berlin’s and Popper’s style of writing, in that I take as my point of departure arguments 
from philosophers whose overall theories are ones towards which I find myself mainly 
sympathetic. This is not to say, however, that I will remain uncritical of their political 
theories. It is, rather, my position that they have many significant things to say, but also that 
their arguments need elaboration and clarification if they are to hold up to closer scrutiny, 
and at the same time remain relevant in today’s world and our close future. 
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PART I:  ISAIAH BERLIN 
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2. Isaiah Berlin – pluralism, liberty, and realism 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will give an overview of Isaiah Berlin’s philosophical and political ideas. I 
will start with pluralism, as it is the most fundamental of the ideas commonly associated 
with him. I will then move on to describe his ideas about positive and negative liberty, 
political realism, and practical problem-solving in politics. Finally, I will present some 
preliminary conclusions about the connection between pluralism and Berlin’s political 
theories. The discussion leads up to a question: What, if any, political conclusions can be 
drawn from Berlin’s pluralism? 
The next chapter will deal more thoroughly with criticisms of Berlin’s moral and 
political theories, as well as the broader implications of his political thought. The general 
idea behind this chapter and the next is that Berlin’s pluralism provides us with premises for 
a moderate and liberal point of view, broadly construed as a political creed that permits 
several different specifications of itself. This creed is above all marked by a belief in liberal 
democracy, combined with a ‘conservative’ taste for incremental reform and a ‘social-
democratic’ notion that individual liberty, power, and the resources needed to meet one’s 
potential should be distributed evenly. 
Berlin was most definitely a “fundamentally unsystematic” political philosopher (cf. 
Cherniss 2006:xxi). In part, this is due to his wide interests as well as his style of writing. 
More than occasionally, he sacrificed theoretical stringency for the sake of literary elegance 
and an appreciation of the complexities of human affairs. His essays are therefore often both 
lively and enlightening, but frequently also in need of elaboration and interpretation, 
especially on more technical and philosophical problems, which Berlin tended to address 
only fleetingly. It is also quite often necessary to read his essays closely if one is to discover 
Berlin’s political recommendations, which are often given as brief asides in the text. 
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Berlin was not the kind of political theorist who tried to construct and defend a wide-
ranging philosophical system. There is instead an inborn empiricism – described by Berlin as 
‘deeply and uniquely English’ – ingrained in his somewhat scattered thoughts about politics 
and ethics. His empirical attitude was furthermore mixed with a sceptical ‘Russian’ 
fascination for radical political ideas, which led him to become a thoughtfully moderate 
voice in political theory. He was a philosopher who tried very hard to understand political 
thinkers with whom he disagreed, and to explain the specific nature of these disagreements. 
His defence of incrementalism and personal freedom was for this reason always combined 
with a strong word of warning against the authoritarian temptations which often lie at the 
end of abstract and far-reaching modes of political thought (Berlin 1998:255-9).  
But even if he was not a very theoretical philosopher, his influence and presence is 
felt in many contemporary debates in ethical and political theory. At the same time, just 
because he was not as theoretically rigorous as many political philosophers are today, his 
works display a greater appreciation of the complexities of human life. For this reason, his 
works were often more directly relevant for politics when they first came out, at least 
compared with today’s academic political theory, and many of his essays remain so long 
after they were originally written.  
 There are two fundamental ideas which lie at the heart of Berlin’s thought, namely 
liberty and pluralism (Crowder 2004). Berlin started a debate about what ought to be meant 
by words such as liberty or freedom, which continues to this day (Miller 2006). His most 
famous essay, Two Concepts of Liberty, and its division between negative and positive 
liberty, is still the natural starting-point for this debate. Berlin did not, however, discuss his 
division between positive and negative liberty further, except only in passing. With his 
defence of what he called pluralism, he also made a lasting impact on debates in ethical 
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theory, and the political consequences of this way of thinking about morality is a recurring 
theme in many of his later essays. 
 In addition, Berlin’s way of doing normative, political analysis is centred around a 
conception of realism; one simply cannot expect to be able to construct a politically relevant 
normative analysis of politics from theoretical premises alone, without the aid of concrete 
and locally embedded historical and sociological knowledge. At the same time, people who 
want to change the world for the better need to possess a quality he called political judgment, 
an elusive character trait without which any sustained political effort is almost certainly 
doomed to failure or to lose its way (Berlin 1996; Hanley 2004).  
Berlin also advises against the view that political theory should conclude in any sort 
of detailed guideline for how to organise every aspect of society, or how to make society 
perfect. But all-out relativism will not do, either. Instead, political theory should help to 
establish and maintain an ‘uneasy equilibrium’ between competing ends and considerations 
which we ought to uphold. Viewed in this way, morally sound political thought and relevant 
political action are activities which ought to inform one another. These activities should not 
be thought of as entirely separate from each other; political action is not entirely exempted 
from moral scrutiny, and political theory should not take up residence in cloud-cuckoo-land.  
2.2 Pluralism  
The idea perhaps most commonly associated with Berlin is pluralism. For Berlin, pluralism 
was primarily a name for his own perspective in ethics, which from the viewpoint of more 
traditional ethical theory must come across as a relatively eclectic position. In philosophy 
today, however, pluralism is mostly used as a common name for “any doctrine which 
maintains that there are ultimately many things, or many kinds of thing” (Craig 1998:463, cf. 
also Hall 1968; Rorty 1990; Rescher 1993; McLennan 1995). The word ‘pluralism’ is 
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therefore a term with a rather nebulous denotation, and one is consequently often in need of 
a more specific name for Berlin’s ethical theory than the one he used himself.  
It has therefore become more widespread to add a qualifying word, as in terms such 
as ‘ethical pluralism’ or ‘value pluralism’, in order to distinguish Berlin’s theory from other 
and often quite different theories which are also commonly called pluralism (cf. Gray 1995; 
Crowder 2002; Galston 2002). The tendency to separate clearly between Berlin’s pluralism 
and other theories called pluralism might however put up an artificial boundary between 
closely related systems of thought. Instead, I suggest here that other ‘pluralisms’ might in 
some instances serve as a background for a deeper understanding of Berlin’s ethical 
pluralism, as well as its political implications. 
It is more than likely that Berlin deliberately employed a known term when he 
described his take on ethics quite simply as pluralism. When Two Concepts of Liberty 
appeared in 1958, in which Berlin for the first time outlined his ethical theory at any greater 
level of detail, ‘pluralism’ was already a familiar concept in philosophy and political theory. 
It was usually employed to describe at least two rather prominent currents of thought, 
namely metaphysical and political pluralism. Perhaps Berlin even wanted his ethical ideas to 
be associated with these other theories? There is certainly common ground between Berlin’s 
pluralism and these other types of theories called pluralism, in that they all claim that the 
world is more complicated than some people think.  
Berlin’s pluralism basically claims that all the ideals and values we ought to maintain 
does not fit together quite as easily as one could want them to. Instead, Berlin claims that 
moral conflict is an ineradicable part of any human existence. In fact, Berlin states that the 
awareness of conflicts between values or goals competing for our attention is the starting-
point of political and moral philosophy. If not ends collided, there would surely be little need 
for political and moral theory – the questions usually asked in these fields of enquiry would 
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be either completely unintelligible or quickly reduced to problems of a ‘technical’ nature, 
which experts or computers could resolve for us (Berlin 1961; 2002:166-217).  
 But perceived conflicts between ends is one thing, and ineradicable disagreement 
quite another. Might it not be the case that the apparent pluralism of ends is a temporary 
predicament which will wither away soon enough? Might not all our political and moral 
problems in the end dissolve as our understanding of the world and our place within it 
increases? Might not ever more careful analysis in the end transform moral and political 
philosophy into a ‘scientific’ discussion of means, as opposed to a ‘philosophical’ or 
‘political’ debate about different ends?  
The crucial turning point in Berlin’s analysis is that he develops value pluralism into 
a perspective on the nature of morality. Berlin believes that there will always be several 
different considerations pulling us in different directions. While this is a very strong 
proposition which has been controversial among moral philosophers, Berlin does not try to 
defend it. Instead, he treats it merely as a piece of common sense he does not care to 
examine critically, and which he uses as a point of departure for discussions about what we 
ought to do. Berlin’s value pluralism thus becomes an alternative to those theories which 
assume that all our problems and questions might in the end be supplied with one – and only 
one – correct answer, other answers being necessarily false (Berlin 1990:1-19). It is also, 
moreover, an alternative to theories such as moral relativism and scepticism, which claim 
that it does not really matter all that much which answers we give to pressing normative 
questions, and which answers we reject out of hand (cf. Berlin 2000:1-23).   
2.2.1 What is value pluralism? 
But what exactly is value pluralism? George Crowder (2002:2) defines it as a theory of 
philosophical ethics which states “that fundamental human values are irreducibly plural and 
‘incommensurable’, and that they may, and often do, come into conflict with one another, 
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leaving us with hard choices.” Compact as this sentence may be, it declares that value 
pluralism makes four distinct claims about morality and the nature of normative reasoning.  
First, and perhaps most importantly, value pluralism acknowledges that there are 
certain values whose pursuit is part of what Berlin identifies as the ‘essence of humanity’ or 
‘the human horizon’. That is, the pursuit of these values is an integral part of what it means 
to be human. If a human being shows no interest whatsoever in for instance liberty, equality, 
friendship, or justice, would she strike us as being just as much a real person as the rest of 
us? Would not such a person rather come across as a sleep-walker resembling a human being 
on the surface, but at the same time wanting a certain inner humanity?  
 These ‘fundamental human values’ are furthermore considered objective in the sense 
that they represent something of value regardless of what status they are accorded by 
individuals or particular cultures and societies. Value pluralism is, for this reason, opposed to 
moral relativism and scepticism, which in one way or another deny the existence of such 
objective values (Mackie 1977; Harman 1996). In Berlin’s short intellectual autobiography, 
My Intellectual Path (Berlin 2000:1-23), he states that value pluralism does not entail 
relativism, as some critics would have it (e.g. Podhoretz 1999), but rather that it is directly 
opposed to it. Human values are under Berlin’s understanding of them delimited by what he 
elsewhere calls ‘the human horizon’ (cf. especially Crowder and Hardy 2007:293-297). He 
emphatically claims that there is a limit to which ends humans may pursue and remain 
human, and therefore also a limit to which values may be deemed objective:   
I think these values are objective – that is to say, their nature, the pursuit of them, is 
part of what it is to be a human being, and this is an objective given. The fact that 
men are men and women are women and not dogs or cats or tables or chairs is an 
objective fact, and part of this objective fact is that there are certain values, and only 
those values, which men, while remaining men, can pursue. If I am a man or a 
woman with sufficient imagination (and this I do need), I can enter into a value-
system which is not my own, but which is nevertheless something I can conceive of 
men pursuing while remaining human, while remaining creatures with whom I can 
communicate, with whom I have some common values – for all human beings must 
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have some common values or they cease to be human, and also some different values 
else they cease to differ, as in fact they do. That is why pluralism is not relativism – 
the multiple values are objective, part of the essence of humanity, rather than 
arbitrary creations of men’s subjective fancies. Nevertheless, of course, if I pursue 
one set of values I may detest another, and may think it is damaging to the only form 
of life that I am able to live or tolerate, for myself and others; in which case I may 
attack it, I may even – in extreme cases – have to go to war against it. But I still 
recognise it as a human pursuit. (Berlin 2000:12, emphasis added)  
The second claim value pluralism makes is that these objective values are irreducibly plural, 
in the sense that they cannot be collapsed into one another until one is left with only one 
ultimate or paramount end, such as happiness or welfare, as Aristotle and Bentham claimed. 
This is a rejection of the assertion, found both in ancient Greek and mediaeval Western 
philosophy that ‘The Good’ is a single, unified phenomenon, and that there in fact exists a 
summum bonum, or ‘the highest good’, to which all other ‘goods’ are subordinate (cf. 
Lamprecht 1920a:562). The claim that there is only one most ultimate end, which overrides 
all others, is by Berlin described as ‘monism’. Monism and relativism are the opposite 
numbers of pluralism, in that they both deny one of the most central claims of value 
pluralism. But while Berlin does not take relativism at all seriously, and considers it to be a 
position with almost no plausibility whatsoever, he is all the more serious when it comes to 
arguing against value monism in ethics: 
The enemy of pluralism is monism – the ancient belief that there is a single harmony 
of truths into which everything, if it is genuine, in the end must fit. The consequence 
of this belief (which is something different from, but akin to, what Karl Popper called 
essentialism – to him the root of all evil) is that those who know should command 
those who do not. Those who know the answers to some of the great problems of 
mankind must be obeyed, for they alone know how society should be organised, how 
individual lives should be lived, how culture should be developed. This is the old 
Platonic belief in the philosopher-kings, who were entitled to give orders to others. 
There have always been thinkers who hold that if only scientists, or scientifically 
trained persons, could be put in charge of things, the world would be vastly 
improved. To this I have to say that no better excuse, or even reason, has ever been 
propounded for unlimited despotism on the part of an élite which robs the majority of 
its essential liberties. (Berlin 2000:14) 
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The third claim value pluralism makes, still according to Crowder, is that these plural and 
objective values are in some instances incommensurable with each other, as they cannot be 
ranked, in the abstract, according to one common measure or principle. The exact nature of 
this incommensurability is, however, a dividing issue among theorists concerned with value 
pluralism. Berlin himself employs this concept, originally taken from mathematics, only 
fleetingly and not without a certain degree of recklessness. In so doing, he leaves much room 
for diverging interpretations of value pluralism and its consequences (Seung and Bonevac 
1992; Crowder 2002:49-54; cf. also Levi 1986; Stocker 1990; Richardson 1994).  
 John Gray (1995) and John Kekes (1993) suggests, for instance, that 
incommensurability ought to be understood as a strict form of incomparability between 
values, and consequently that we rarely have any good reasons for choosing one value over 
another, when and if they come into conflict with each other:  
The basic idea of incommensurability is that there are some things so unalike as to 
exclude any reasonable comparison among them. Square roots and insults, smells and 
canasta, migrating birds and X-ray seem to exclude any common yardstick by which 
we could evaluate their respective merits and demerits. That this is so is not usually 
troublesome because the need to compare them rarely arises. But it is otherwise with 
values. It often happens that we want to enjoy incompatible values, and so it becomes 
important to compare them in order to be able to choose among them in a reasonable 
manner. If, however, incompatible values are also incommensurable, then reasonable 
comparisons between them become problematic. (Kekes 1993:21) 
What Kekes is effectively saying, is that whenever conflicts between two ends or values 
arise, values which have been declared equally objective and fundamental, there is no way of 
resolving the conflict: One is forced to ‘plump’ for one or the other solution, without any 
good reasons to support the decision made. It is interesting, however, to observe that this 
kind of ‘plumping’ is actually criticised by Berlin, as an illustration of the abdication of 
reason, and of reasoned choice between competing ends. It may be that some choices 
between values are troublesome and ‘tragic’, and that they make this kind of ‘plumping’ 
occasionally unavoidable, but it seems exaggerated, to me at least, to suggest that all choices 
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between ultimate values are so intractable that they warrant the kind of blind Dezisionismus 
which Gray and Kekes seem to indicate (cf. Lukes and Berlin 1992; Hardy 2004).  
 Crowder (2002:49-54), on the other hand, suggests instead that incommensurability 
between values ought not always to be viewed in this manner. Instead, he argues in favour of 
a more relaxed understanding, under which it is merely thought that some values are 
‘unrankable in the abstract’, but not necessarily so in every particular instance of a choice 
between values. This is, as it turns out, a perspective which Crowder develops after having 
been reproached by Berlin and Bernard Williams for having articulated attitudes similar to 
those of Gray and Kekes. The critique levelled by Berlin and Williams against Crowder’s 
initial argument is therefore applicable to Gray and Kekes as well:  
In his talk of ‘underdetermination by reason’, Crowder seems unsure which of two 
quite different views about potentially conflicting values he is ascribing to the 
pluralist: that it is not a requirement of reason that there should be one value which in 
all cases prevails over the other; or that in each particular case, reason has nothing to 
say (i.e. there is nothing reasonable to be said) about which should prevail over the 
other. Pluralists – we pluralists, at any rate – see the first of these views as obviously 
true, and the second as obviously false. (Berlin and Williams 1994:307) 
Berlin and Williams are in effect saying that a pluralist must admit a certain amount of case-
by-case reasoning into his way of thinking about morality (cf. especially James 1891:341-
354). Values cannot be ranked ‘lexically’ or in the abstract, at least not without a sense of 
genuine loss (cf. Rawls 1971:42-44; 1993:197-199), but there may be considerations arising 
from the particular situation in question, which warrant the reasoned choice of one value 
over its possible alternatives: 
The kind of ranking that becomes a problem because of incommensurability is 
abstract ranking, or ranking irrespective of context. (…) Impartial justice may be an 
overriding principle for a trial judge but not for someone with a friend in trouble. (…) 
Value incommensurability seems to imply a particularist approach to ethics, one that 
requires us to decide value-related questions by attending to the particular 
circumstances of the case rather than to the guidance of abstract rules.  
(Crowder 2002:53; cf. also Williams 1978a; 1979; 1985) 
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Fourth, it is said that values are sometimes incompatible with each other. By this it is meant 
that the values which have already been deemed as objective, irreducibly many, and 
sometimes ‘incommensurable’, are also in some cases in a state of “perpetual rivalry with 
one another” (Berlin 2002:216). This feature of value pluralism issues in a particular way of 
doing political and moral philosophy, in which perfect or ideal solutions are thought of as 
‘conceptually incoherent’, and that the solutions we do come up with are, at their very best, 
temporary and provisional: 
Liberty and equality, spontaneity and security, happiness and knowledge, mercy and 
justice – all these are ultimate human values, sought for themselves alone; yet when 
they are incompatible, they cannot all be attained, choices must be made, sometimes 
tragic losses accepted in the pursuit of some preferred ultimate end. But if, as I 
believe, this is not merely empirically but conceptually true – that is, derived from 
the very conception of these values – then the very idea of a perfect world in which 
all good things are realised is incomprehensible, is in fact conceptually incoherent. 
And if this is so, and I cannot see how it could be otherwise, then the very notion of 
the ideal world, for which no sacrifice can be too great, vanishes from view  
(Berlin 2000:23)  
2.2.2 Value pluralism before Berlin 
After his initial formulation of ethical pluralism in published form, in his two articles 
Equality and Two Concepts of Liberty (Berlin 1956; 1958), Berlin put down a significant 
portion of his research efforts in the history of ideas into tracing the origins of his 
perspectives on morality. What he found was an astonishing collection of notables from the 
history of political and ethical thought, including Machiavelli, Montesquieu and John Stuart 
Mill, whom under Berlin’s reading become value pluralists in spe, or theorists moving 
towards, but not completely reaching, an outright value pluralist conclusion (Berlin 1979:25-
79, 130-161; 2002:218-251). He also finds ancestry to his own theory in the thinkers he 
collectively denotes as the ‘Counter-Enlightenment’, the critics of the eighteenth century 
French Enlightenment, among which Vico, Hamann, and Herder are counted among the 
most important contributors (Berlin 1979:1-24; 2000). 
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 There is however also a third group of precursors to Berlin’s pluralism, and one that 
Berlin does not acknowledge in his works, which constitute the most accurate anticipation of 
his theory. Most notable among these are Sterling Lamprecht (1920; 1920a; 1921) and A. P. 
Brogan (1931), who anticipate Berlin’s theory and vocabulary to an astonishing degree. 
Other, less precise, but perhaps better known forerunners include William James (1891; 
1897), John Dewey (cf. especially 1908; 1921; 1927) and Max Weber ([1917] 1982, [1919] 
1992; [1919] 1992a). It is of course possible, and even likely, that all three developed their 
theories independently of each other, as neither Brogan nor Berlin acknowledge Lamprecht’s 
earlier articles, but it remains that the three authors share extraordinary similarities in 
vocabulary and substance.  
 Berlin supports the claim that he was unaware of Lamprecht and Brogan’s work 
when he in a letter to his friend Jean Floud stated that pluralism was “[t]he only truth which I 
have ever found out for myself”1. But of course one cannot preclude in a definite way the 
possibility that Berlin read either Brogan or Lamprecht at an early stage and then later forgot 
about them:  
Berlin provided his own (somewhat peculiar) genealogy of pluralism. He traced the 
rebellion against monism first to Machiavelli, and depicted Vico and Herder as 
decisive figures. Yet he acknowledged that Machiavelli wasn't really a pluralist, but a 
dualist; and other scholars have questioned his identification of Vico and Herder as 
pluralists, when both avowed belief in a higher, divine or mystical, unity behind 
variety. (…) Ethical pluralism first emerged under that name, however, in America, 
inspired by William James's pluralistic view of the universe. John Dewey and 
Hastings Rashdall both approximated pluralism in certain writings (Dewey 1908, 
Rashdall 1907); but pluralism was apparently first proposed, under that name, and as 
a specifically ethical doctrine, in language strikingly similar to Berlin's, by Sterling 
Lamprecht, a naturalist philosopher and scholar of Hobbes and Locke in several 
articles (e.g., 1920, 1921), as well as, somewhat later, by A. P. Brogan (1931). The 
dramatic similarities between not only Berlin and Lamprecht's ideas, but also their 
language, makes it difficult to believe that Lamprecht was not an influence on Berlin. 
                                                 
1 Letter from Isaiah Berlin to Jean Floud dated 5.7.68, quoted in Ignatieff (1998:246). 
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However, there is no evidence that Berlin knew Lamprecht's work; and Berlin's 
tendency was more often to credit his own ideas to others than to claim the work of 
others as his own. (Cherniss and Hardy 2006)  
Regardless of whether he ever read Lamprecht’s three essays or Brogans single article and 
later forgot it or not, there is more than considerable overlap between the ethical theories of 
the three authors. Due to this fact, I find it fruitful to view them as complementary theorists 
of value pluralism, in which Berlin’s broader historical and conceptual analyses adds texture 
to the sketchier, but perhaps at places more systematic theory of value pluralism supplied by 
Lamprecht and Brogan. 
 Lamprecht, the earliest of these three authors, develops his ‘ethical pluralism’ 
primarily on the foundations laid out by William James’ ‘epistemic pluralism’, combined 
with a growing disenchantment with various attempts to reduce all human morality into one 
and only one supreme maxim or value. What he rebels against is not “pragmatism in any of 
its positive doctrines”, but rather what he describes as “an unfortunate one-sidedness” in its 
tendency to value ‘control’ or ‘intelligent action’ above everything else (Lamprecht 
1920:513; cf. also Dewey 1918; Ryan 1995). Instead, he concludes, “[l]ife gains its meaning 
and its value only because through its course men can achieve a multitude of goods which 
not only lead on to further consequences, but are in themselves a joy and a delight” (ibid.). 
 This emerging uneasiness with value monism, and in particular its tendency to push 
the complexities of human existence into a rigid, theoretical scheme, is developed by 
Lamprecht into an alternative theory of morality in two subsequent articles (Lamprecht 
1920a; 1921). Lamprecht’s pluralism has thus two distinctive origins. One is the pragmatic 
view of ‘the pluralistic universe’ in which “the impossibility of finding any one metaphysical 
formula which will fit all reality” is acknowledged (Lamprecht 1920a:561; cf. James 1909). 
The other is what he thinks of as a pre-theoretical and ‘common-sense’ view of morality:  
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To the naïve mind, not yet befuddled by the intricacies of academic controversies 
over ethical theory, the moral life would surely not seem one simple path outside of 
which all else was bad, nor would the distinction between good and bad, or between 
right and wrong, seem sharp and exact. The moral life seems to be confronted with 
alternative possibilities of development towards different and sometimes inconsistent 
goods; it is full of dilemmas, ambiguities, loose ends, irresolvable choices. 
(Lamprecht 1920a:562) 
To Lamprecht, pluralism leads directly to an endorsement of personal freedom for everyone: 
“When we make our supreme choice [between conflicting values], we must, in so far as 
possible, without endangering all such choices, be willing to let others make theirs” 
(Lamprecht 1920a:566). In other words, he shares Berlin’s view that ethical pluralism entails 
a measure of negative liberty for all. His second article culminates on a note characterised by 
a cautious optimism, if we replace the ‘absolutism’ of unexamined traditions and 
conventional moral theorising with a more ‘scientific approach’ which “would enable us to 
retain our standards without becoming bigoted, to learn to compromise when compromise 
alone is the highest morality” (Lamprecht 1920a:572; cf. Berlin 2002:212-217). 
 Lamprecht (1921) does not, however, explicitly align his pluralism with any detailed 
set of political beliefs, even if he lets his very favourable attitudes towards the then newly 
formed League of Nations shine through in his article. The ‘political implications’ he sees 
coming from his pluralism are not implications on the level of individual problems in 
practical policy-making, but rather a vague preference for provisional, broad compromises 
over struggle and discord. For Lamprecht, moderation and prudence are among the most 
important guiding lights in politics and political theory. The first principle for sound political 
thought and action is that one should not insist on the unshakable truth of one’s own 
prejudices. Instead, Lamprecht begs us to adopt a more cautious and compromise-friendly 
attitude in political deliberations. 
 There is, in addition, another precise anticipation of value pluralism in a single article 
by A. P. Brogan (1931), which captures some of the most central features of the pluralistic 
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disillusionment with ethical theory. Brogan’s contribution to the overall theory of value 
pluralism is that he is the first to clearly distinguish pluralism from its alternatives, which he 
calls ‘objective monism’ and ‘subjective pluralism’, and which could be identified as value 
monism and ethical relativism:  
 [B]oth the objective monist and the subjective pluralist offer you suspiciously easy 
and dogmatic doctrines. What you are asked to believe is just one sentence, though to 
be sure it is usually a different sentence for each philosopher. They say that the 
highest good is so and so, that goodness is pleasure or what not, that value is 
whatever you think or feel it is. As soon as this one sentence has been settled, all 
fundamental problems about value are supposed to be solved. Even if there were no 
fallacies back of the proofs for all of this, would it not seem too easy to be a plausible 
account of our complex world? At any rate it is to be confessed that an objective 
pluralism will be more difficult. It will call in all of the possible methods of analysis, 
including psychology and the modern logic of relations. It will study human 
valuations patiently and empirically, using not only the traditional statistical methods 
but also newer and more fruitful methods. It will perhaps seem more slow, but it will 
ultimately seem more sure, than the traditional methods. (Brogan 1931:295) 
It seems, therefore, that Berlin was not the first to work out a pluralistic theory about 
morality and fundamental human values. He does, however, supply this theory with some 
further reflections, and a richer historical narrative, describing its antecedents in early 
modern thought. Together with Lamprecht and Brogan, Berlin forms an ‘inner core’ of 
theorists advocating value pluralism.  
Today, value pluralism is perhaps not quite as unusual or novel as it was in the days 
of Lamprecht and Brogan. One might even claim that pluralism is a natural part of what one 
might designate as a sort of fuzzy, eclectic centre of ethical theory, together with for instance 
other moderating tendencies within more traditional perspectives, such as ‘broad 
consequentialism’ and ‘broad deontology’ (cf. Sen 2000). What pluralism shares with these 
other perspectives is, most prominently, the belief that no single consideration or simple 
algorithm might solve any conceivable moral problem or dilemma. These eclectic and 
intermediary positions all share a common ground which is not shared by what Sen not 
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entirely without bias calls ‘narrower’ conceptions of morality. In essence, the growth of 
pluralism and related perspectives in ethics contribute to increased realism and therefore also 
to the increased impact of philosophical ethics on everyday moral and political debates. 
2.2.3 Philosophical pluralism 
Does Berlin’s pluralism stop at value pluralism, as that theory has been described above, or 
could his perspectives on ethics be viewed more fruitfully as part of a broader and more 
general pluralistic outlook? Berlin was, naturally, aware of other uses of the term 
‘pluralism’, for instance in the quite general and ‘metaphysical’ sense, in which ‘pluralism’ 
describes the belief that there exists a plurality of different ‘things’ or ‘substances’, as 
opposed to monism, defined as the belief that only one substance, or kind of substance, 
exists (Hall 1968; Hamlyn 1984:109-112). This metaphysical pluralism is perhaps most 
memorably expressed by William James in his Hibbert Lectures, held at the University of 
Oxford in 1908 and 1909, and later published in his book A Pluralistic Universe:  
Everything you can think of, however vast or inclusive, has on the pluralistic view a 
genuinely ‘external’ environment of some sort or amount. Things are ‘with’ one 
another in many ways, but nothing includes everything, or dominates over 
everything.  The word ‘and’ trails along after every sentence. Something always 
escapes. ‘Ever not quite’ has to be said of the best attempts made anywhere in the 
universe at attaining all-inclusiveness. The pluralistic world is thus more like a 
federal republic than like an empire or a kingdom. However much may be collected, 
however much may report itself as present at any effective centre of consciousness or 
action, something else is self-governed and absent and unreduced to unity.  
(James 1909:321-322) 
There is, according to metaphysical pluralists like James a misplaced desire for unity and 
order in much of the ideas and theories produced by mankind. Especially philosophers and 
scientists who hunger for an orderly and uncomplicated world in which everything makes 
perfect sense, and in which everything is somehow connected with everything else, have a 
tendency to oversimplify matters. It is perhaps a natural desire to want to view the world as 
an orderly place, but this inclination might lead us to accept unwarranted abstractions and 
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generalisations, as well as duplicitous ‘grand theories’ or ‘ultimate solutions’ to the problems 
plaguing mankind.  
It is indeed likely that Berlin was aware of, and perhaps even drew on parts of this 
tradition of philosophical or metaphysical pluralism when he gave his views in moral theory 
the name ‘pluralism’ rather than something entirely different. Berlin wrote only a handful of 
philosophical essays which were not in some way had moral or political philosophy as the 
main focus, and did not in any of his published texts give any sort of detailed discussions of 
purely metaphysical problems. He did however espouse a general “anti-reductionist, anti-
simplifying attitude” whenever his discussions touched on issues from other fields of 
philosophy (Williams 1978:xviii), for instance in his essay Logical Translation (Berlin 
1978:56-80), or in essays discussing topics from the philosophy of social science, such as 
The Concept of Scientific History (Berlin 1978:103-142). It might even be said that the kind 
of unreasonable, Utopian rationalism which Berlin criticises in several of his more famous 
essays is just as much a criticism of monism in metaphysics and epistemology as it is a 
denunciation of monism in ethics and politics (cf. e.g. Berlin 1990:20ff; 2002:166-217).  
Taken together with the ‘political’ pluralism discussed in the next section below, it is 
likely that ‘metaphysical’ pluralism form a frame of reference which would have been 
readily available for Berlin, and which Berlin might have even alluded to when he discussed 
his perspectives on morality under the heading of pluralism. Pluralism would have been a 
familiar term when Berlin first developed his value pluralism, and Berlin could have easily 
emphasised more clearly the distinctions between his theory and other ‘pluralisms’ – if that 
was something he wished to do. Instead, Berlin’s version of ethical pluralism sits well within 
a more general pluralism, and that metaphysical and ethical pluralism is a product of a 
common ‘temperament’ emphasising a cautious empiricism against a more idealistic 
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approach to philosophy and the study of the world and mankind (Berlin and Polanowska-
Sygulska 2006:119ff). 
2.2.4 Political pluralism 
Berlin must also have been aware of the fact that he was using a term which was and is 
relatively widely circulated in political theory, as a name for certain views advocating 
decentralisation and diversification of economic and political processes. In essence, the 
political pluralist will claim is that there ought to be several sources of political authority and 
economic power, and not just one. In light of that conviction, he will claim that there ought 
to be room for voluntary associations freely formed by individual citizens working together 
in order to realise a common goal, and not just one, all-powerful state, or only one way of 
organising the economy, for instance an all-encompassing market economy.   
 This type of ‘political pluralism’ was in fact a quite common perspective among 
several influential political philosophers during the first half of the twentieth century. In 
Britain we find that socialist political theorists such as Harold Laski and G. D. H. Cole, who 
were perhaps the best known figures of British political thought in Berlin’s youth, held 
views which are often described as forms of political pluralism (cf. Hirst 1989; Stears 2002). 
It is however the American political scientist and theorist Robert A. Dahl who most clearly 
defines “the fundamental axiom” of political pluralism, in its most general sense:  
Instead of a single center of sovereign power there must be multiple centers of power, 
none of which is or can be wholly sovereign. Although the only legitimate sovereign 
is the people, (…) even the people ought never to be an absolute sovereign; 
consequently no part of the people, such as a majority, ought to be absolutely 
sovereign. (Dahl 1967:24) 
Used in this ‘political’ sense, pluralism could basically be thought of as the view that 
political and economic power ought to be devolved to, and divided between, several 
independent organisations and branches of government. As a reference book indicates, 
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political pluralism makes six “general propositions” which are “integral to the political 
theory of pluralism”: 
 (1) individual fulfilment is assured by small government units, for they alone are 
representative; (2) the unrepresentative exercise of governmental power is frustrated 
when public agencies are geographically dispersed; (3) society is composed of a 
variety independent religious, cultural, educational, professional and economic 
associations; (4) these private associations are voluntary insofar as no individual is 
ever wholly affiliated with any one of them; (5) public policy accepted as binding on 
all associations is the result of their own free interaction; and (6) public government 
is obliged to discern and act only upon the common denominator of group 
concurrence. (Kariel 1968:164) 
Political pluralism took, at least in academic circles, roots in the United States, and was most 
prominently expounded by liberal theorists such as John Dewey, who imported some of their 
attitudes against unitary sovereignty from British political thought (cf. Dewey 1927; 
Nicholls 1974). Later still, pluralist ideas of decentralisation and diversification have been 
elaborated by Dahl in several of his books about democracy (e.g. 1956; 1971; 1985; 1986; 
1989). In recent times, the interconnections between political and ethical pluralism have 
been emphasised by William Galston, who sees Berlin’s defence of negative liberty and 
value pluralism as two of the three main ‘sources of liberal pluralism’ alongside political 
pluralism (Galston 1999; 2002; 2005). Another proponent of political pluralism, and one 
who also quite closely approximate Berlin’s moral pluralism, is Michael Walzer (1983; 
1990; 2005), who has continued the liberal and social-democratic tradition of political 
pluralism from Dewey and Dahl.  
 It is not entirely clear whether or not Berlin alluded to this tradition within political 
theory, when he in Two Concepts of Liberty and later works describing his own theories and 
perspectives on politics and ethics as a form of ‘pluralism’. It is more than likely, however, 
that Berlin knew very well that ‘pluralism’ was a concept which already had a fairly specific 
meaning in political theory. It should be noted, moreover, that Berlin operates more or less 
seamlessly between political and moral theory, and that one possible interpretation of Two 
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Concepts is that he alluded to political pluralism as well as value pluralism. In conclusion, 
one might say that his theory of value pluralism is distinct from political pluralism, but 
certainly not in contradiction with it. One might even make a strong case, given Berlin’s 
outspoken anti-authoritarianism and his strong emphasis on personal freedom, for the view 
that value pluralism not only entails a measure of negative liberty and an opposition to 
authoritarianism, but that it also indirectly supports the more positive view that society ought 
to be organised along the lines laid out by political pluralism.  
2.3 Liberty, realism and the uneasy equilibrium 
2.3.1 Positive and negative liberty 
In political theory, Berlin’s most influential idea is his view that there are two opposing 
concepts of liberty at work in many political debates. In an early essay, he portrays one 
concept of liberty which is typically ‘liberal’, and another which is ‘romantic’ in its nature 
and modern origins (Berlin 2006:155-207). The liberal concept of liberty focuses on the 
relationship between individuals and political and economic authorities, and describes liberty 
as the absence of restraints on the individual. A person is free if she is not hindered by other 
human beings or the various institutions they have set up. The romantic concept of liberty, 
on the other hand, depicts liberty as the ability a person has to manage her own life, and to 
actually succeed in controlling her external environment, often in concert with other 
members of some collective entity to which she belongs. Interestingly, the collective and 
positive conception of freedom is also often a centrepiece of many otherwise different anti-
liberal and totalitarian ideologies (cf. Holmes 1993; Sørensen 2010). In Two Concepts of 
Liberty, Berlin sets out to distinguish more clearly between this liberal and negative 
conception of liberty and the more romantic and positive account (Berlin 2002:166-217): 
The freedom which consists in being one’s own master, and the freedom which 
consists in not being prevented from choosing as I do by other men, may, on the face 
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of it, seem concepts at no great logical distance from each other – no more than 
negative and positive ways of saying much the same thing. Yet the ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ notions of freedom historically developed in divergent directions, not 
always by logically reputable steps, until, in the end, they came into direct conflict 
with each other. (Berlin 2002:178-9) 
The realisation that there are several possible and potentially competing conceptions of 
political liberty was initially developed by liberal theorists in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century. Most prominent among these is perhaps Benjamin Constant, who with 
his lecture, De la liberté des anciens comparée à celle des modernes, differentiated an 
‘ancient’ form of liberty from a ‘modern’ one, which to some extent coincides with Berlin’s 
account of positive and negative liberty (Constant 1819; 1988:309-328). One could, perhaps, 
perceive of Berlin’s arguments as a generalised, conceptual analysis building on the same 
basic categorisation put forward by Constant. The ‘ancient’ and ‘modern’ conceptions of 
political and personal freedom is therefore in some ways the very basis for Berlin’s more 
general account of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’  liberty: 
In the ancient world, particularly among the Greeks, to be free was to be able to 
participate in the government of one’s city. The laws were valid only if one had had 
the right to take part in making and unmaking them. To be free was not to be forced 
to obey laws made by others for one, but not by one. This kind of democracy entailed 
that government and laws could penetrate into every province of life. (…) In the 
modern world (…) we proceed on the assumption that there is a frontier between 
public and private life; and that, however small the private sphere may be, within it I 
can do as I please – live as I like, believe what I want, say what I please – provided 
this does not interfere with the similar rights of others, or undermine the order which 
makes this kind of arrangement possible. This is the classical liberal view, in whole 
or part expressed in various declarations of the rights of man in America and France, 
and in the writings of men like Locke, Voltaire, Tom Paine, Constant and John Stuart 
Mill. (Berlin 2002:283-284) 
Negative liberty is thus understood as freedom from coercion. It is a concept of liberty which 
defines it negatively as the nonattendance of man-made obstacles in the lives of individual 
human beings. This is at the same time what makes the notion of negative liberty a liberal 
conception of liberty, as negative liberty would demand that the state limits itself as well as 
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other entities from entering a more or less clearly defined ‘private’ area in the lives of its 
individual citizens. Positive liberty is, on the other hand, freedom to do or become whatever 
one wants to. Liberty is defined positively as the occurrence of a state of affairs in which a 
person is ‘his own master’. The notion of positive liberty is intimately linked to the concept 
of autonomy, in the sense most closely related to its Greek origins, as the ability one has to 
give oneself the laws which one is obliged to uphold and abide by (from αὐτόνομος, meaning 
‘self-legislating’ or ‘independent’ (cf. Liddell and Scott 1891:117)): 
The ‘positive’ sense of the word ‘liberty’ derives from the wish on the part of the 
individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, 
not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of 
other men’s, acts of will. (…) I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a 
thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to 
explain them by reference to my own ideas and purposes. I feel free to the degree that 
I believe this to be true, and enslaved to the degree that I am made to realise that it is 
not. (Berlin 2002:178) 
As long as this relatively benign conception of positive liberty is maintained, it is, under 
Berlin’s understanding of it, a reasonable conception of liberty, which is to be counted 
among fundamental human values right alongside its negative opposite number. The 
problems arise, however, when the prospect of ‘self-mastery’ is bent out of shape because it 
is thought that ‘real’ or ‘true’ liberty consists of a ‘higher self’ defeating the ‘empirical self’ 
and imposing its will on the whole organism. This positive concept of liberty is especially 
dangerous if society as a whole is thought of as an organism, as several prominent political 
thinkers have suggested it should. This notion is found prominently in Plato’s Nόμοι (“The 
Laws”), where he describes the disorderly city as being at war with itself, between its higher 
purpose and the multitude of interests put forward by its individual citizens. The good, well-
ordered, and liberated city is therefore one which is able to procure a “victory of oneself over 
oneself” (cf. Plato 1980, e.g. 626e). This idea has been elaborated by Berlin in Two 
Concepts:  
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[T]he real self may be conceived as something wider than the individual (as the term 
is normally understood), as a social ‘whole’ of which the individual is an element or 
aspect: a tribe, a Church, a State, the great society of the living and the dead and the 
yet unborn. This entity is then identified as being the ‘true’ self which, by imposing 
its collective, or ‘organic’, single will upon its recalcitrant ‘members’, achieves its 
own, and therefore their, ‘higher’ freedom. (Berlin 2002:178) 
Once I take this view, I am in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or 
societies, to bully, oppress, torture them in the name, and on behalf, of their ‘real’ 
selves, in the secure knowledge that whatever is the true goal of man (happiness, 
performance of duty, wisdom, a just society, self-fulfilment) must be identical with 
his freedom – the free choice of his ‘true’, albeit often submerged and inarticulate, 
self.  (Berlin 2002:180) 
Positive liberty is, according to Berlin’s account of it, more easily subverted into its opposite 
than the negative conception of freedom. It is therefore potentially authoritarian, and may be 
used, as it has been in the past, to legitimise massive government repression. In its stead, 
Berlin suggests that ‘a measure of negative liberty’ should lie at the heart of any conception 
of the relationship between man and society deserving the name of freedom. Human well-
being and happiness may very well be dependent upon a sense of self-mastery, and mastery 
of one’s external environment. Nevertheless, negative liberty ought not to be sacrificed 
entirely in order to achieve a further increase in positive liberty. This is especially the case if 
one’s understanding of positive liberty rests on the view that the true recipient of liberty is a 
group of people, like a nation or a class, and not the individual members of such groups.  
That is also why Berlin’s conceptual divide casts a ray of light over modern politics: 
Because authoritarian movements and governments – both to the left and to the right – often 
build on a warped conception of positive liberty, they can claim to promote ‘real’ or 
‘material’ liberty while at the same time abolishing ‘licentiousness’ or ‘bourgeois freedoms’. 
It is entirely possible to erect a totalitarian state even in the name of liberty itself. This is also 
Berlin’s most important word of warning, that we must not sacrifice too much of our liberty, 
negatively understood, in order to achieve a sense of self-mastery over our common destiny. 
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With an exclusively positive understanding of what liberty is, however, we will always stand 
the risk of destroying liberty for liberty’s sake. This risk will only decrease if we keep in 
mind that liberty also has a negative and individual component, and that liberty also consists 
of admitting others the right to be left alone, at least to some extent.  
This does not mean, however, that Berlin did not see positive liberty as a 
fundamental value alongside other values such as negative liberty, equality, justice, and 
happiness. His defence of ‘a measure of negative liberty’ against the potentially authoritarian 
interpretation of positive liberty should not be interpreted as an endorsement of laissez-faire 
economic policies. Instead, his defence of negative liberty should be read in light of his 
pluralism. Any conception of personal freedom which remains true to Berlin’s pluralistic 
starting-point needs to take both positive and negative liberty into account. Berlin himself 
says as much in his introduction to Four Essays on Liberty, written about a decade after the 
original publication of Two Concepts (Berlin 2002:30-54). In several later essays, also, 
Berlin repeatedly warns against interpreting his defence of negative liberty as an 
endorsement of libertarianism or similar ideas. What he wants is ‘equality of liberty’ and 
‘equality in liberty’, and not, to use a rather telling metaphor of his, total liberty for wolves at 
the expense of lambs and others who may stand in their way. 
Even in Two Concepts itself, Berlin speaks favourably of policies which limit the 
negative liberty of some, in order to reduce “glaring inequality or widespread misery”, as 
long as the policy-makers are clear on the fact that they are reducing the commercial liberty 
of the well-off (Berlin 2002:172). Libertarianism would be just as much an error, viewed 
from the standpoint of the kind of pluralism Berlin describes in Two Concepts, as every 
other doctrine which attempts to put one goal ahead of all others, even if that paramount goal 
is negative liberty. Instead, the view Berlin wants to convey is one in which negative liberty 
is indeed acknowledged as a fundamental human ideal and an indispensible feature of a 
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decent and democratic society, but also a goal which often come at the expense of other 
goods. In essence: Negative liberty for the individual is not everything that matters, but it 
does matter, and everyone should be accorded a measure, perhaps even an equal measure, of 
freedom from man-made obstacles. 
2.3.2 Realism in politics and political theory  
Another principal component of Berlin’s political thought, apart from his analyses of the 
concept of political liberty and his pluralism, is his perspective on the nature of politics. To 
Berlin, the defining feature of successful politicians is that they possess a quality which he 
alternately describes as a sense of reality, realism, or political judgment (cf. Berlin 1996:1-
53; 2000:134-142). This quality moves successful politicians to seek out practical solutions 
and what Berlin calls an ‘uneasy equilibrium’ between the many competing values they 
ought to promote, and not to go searching for a Utopian ‘final solution’ to every conceivable 
political problem (cf. especially Berlin 1990:1-19). One can, in light of this, see a 
fundamental empirical generalisation lying behind many of Berlin’s writings on political 
matters: Politicians and political theorists inspired by Utopianism have almost invariably 
failed in their grand thoughts and social experiments, whereas their more ‘realistic’ opposite 
numbers have at least occasionally managed to liberate, emancipate, feed or enlighten 
mankind, or to realise whatever goals they had set for themselves in their political vocation: 
Robespierre, Joseph II of Austria, Lenin did not on the whole succeed in translating 
their ideas into reality. Bismarck, Lincoln, Lloyd George, Roosevelt, on the whole, 
did so. Austria in 1790, France in 1794, Russia in 1920 did not correspond to the 
great reformers’ dreams. Germany, England, America, at the relevant periods, did not 
fall nearly so short of what their more practical statesmen attempted. It might be said 
that these latter were less ambitious, that what they wanted was not so widely 
different from what existed; but this would not be true. The differences made by 
Bismarck or Roosevelt were of a vast extent, and affected the fortunes of mankind to 
a radical degree. (Berlin 2000:138) 
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Berlin’s political thought is in many ways centred on his conviction that practical politics is 
a complicated undertaking. Politics is most adequately described as an art or a craft which 
lacks any clear and concise general rules, laws, or algorithms for politicians and others to 
follow and carry out under any eventuality. Statesmanship is perhaps in some favourable 
circumstances helped by the methods and findings of political science, but it is not in itself a 
branch of science or reducible to the application of scientific principles and methods (cf. 
Hanley 2004). What Robespierre, Joseph II and Lenin so characteristically lacked was not 
primarily access to scientifically based knowledge, even if they did show quite a 
considerable lack of understanding for the nature of the human material with which they 
dealt, but rather an elusive form of practical wisdom, what Aristotle at places called 
φρόνησις (phrónēsis), and which Berlin called ‘political judgment’: 
What is it to have good judgment in politics? What is it to be politically wise, or 
gifted, to be a political genius, or even to be no more than politically competent, to 
know how to get things done? (Berlin 1996:40) 
Obviously what matters is to understand a particular situation in its full uniqueness, 
the particular men and events and dangers, the particular hopes and fears which are 
actively at work in a particular place at a particular time. (…) In the realm of political 
action, laws are far and few indeed: skills are everything. What makes statesmen, like 
drivers of cars, successful is that they do not think in general terms – that is, they do 
not primarily ask themselves in what respect a given situation is like or unlike other 
situations in the long course of human history (which is what historical sociologists, 
or theologians in historical clothing, such as Vico and Toynbee, are fond of doing). 
Their merit is that they grasp the unique combination of characteristics that constitute 
this particular situation – this and no other. What they are said to be able to do is to 
understand the character of a particular movement, of a particular individual, of a 
unique state of affairs, of a unique atmosphere, of some particular combination of 
economic, political, personal factors; and we do not suppose that this capacity can be 
literally taught. (Berlin 1996:45) 
To a great extent, Berlin’s views on the nature of politics and political action are directly 
derived from his pluralism, which denies that all good things entail each other. With it, he 
also rejects the thought that moral and political deliberation could be seen as the carrying out 
of a simple algorithm, which will always produce a single answer to every question of a 
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normative or practical nature. He also denies that politicians and political theorists ought to 
seek out and attempt to realise Utopian, final solutions to all problems and imperfections in 
human societies (cf. e.g. Berlin 1990:1-48; 2002:166-217).  
 Berlin’s pluralism issues in the view that one has to add context to moral and political 
deliberation and evaluation if such activities are to be profitable, and that successful political 
action in turn depends on such context-sensitive considerations. To be a successful politician 
– or for that matter a successful human being – one would need to look at the intricacies of 
each particular problem at hand, in an attempt to devise practicable solutions to the problems 
which have forced themselves upon one’s perception of the world. Politics ought to be 
understood as the art of practical problem-solving, and not as the more sweeping activity 
which consists of moulding the world anew according to one’s own ideas.   
 But Berlin’s admiration for ‘practical men’ – he writes in particular about Churchill, 
Roosevelt, and Weizmann – is also developed further into a view on how one ought to go 
about conducting profitable studies of human societies, and in particular political theory 
(Berlin 1961; 1978:103-172; 1998:1-65). For Berlin, political theory does not have to be, 
and indeed ought not to be, an abstruse or highly technical form of enquiry, but should 
instead preserve close ties to practical political problem-solving (cf. especially Berlin and 
Williams 1994). Construed in this way, it is Berlin’s sincere hope that political theory, or 
more generally the study and criticism of political ideas, might become a discipline which 
will help us to develop better societies, and to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past.   
 In Berlin’s view, ideas are powerful instruments for political action, which are not to 
be taken lightly. It is ideas which form the points of departure for any political endeavour, 
those which translate themselves into catastrophe, as well as those which ultimately 
contribute to the progress of humanity. It is, therefore, the responsibility of those that 
concern themselves with the careful analysis of political concepts and ideas to remain 
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constructive and politically relevant by avoiding ‘the pursuit of the ideal’, by rejecting 
deceitful simplifications and unwarranted abstractions, and instead concentrate one’s best 
efforts on the immediate amelioration of real political problems. This is precisely what 
Berlin does, also, when he attempts to erect a left-liberal alternative to the various totalitarian 
ideologies of his day. The central aim is to preserve a “logically untidy, flexible and even 
ambiguous compromise” (Berlin 2002:92), a compromise which will provisionally 
guarantee, among other things, a measure of liberty, equality, and common decency. 
2.3.3 The uneasy equilibrium 
Like for so many of his generation, the great wars and ideological storms of the twentieth 
century shaped Berlin’s political and moral views in a profound way. What began as 
seemingly benign intentions – national solidarity, ‘true progress’, and ‘real liberty’ – ended 
disturbingly often in total war and genocide (cf. Berlin 1990:1-19; 2002:53-93). The cynical 
interpretation of our recent history, not entirely bereft of empirical support, claims therefore 
that we are almost always on the move from one catastrophe to the next. We have little hope 
of ever escaping the self-destructive pattern set out by our built-in inability to rise above 
self-interest or undue attachments to a particular ideology or a particular group of people. At 
the same time, the twentieth century was also the site of real and lasting human progress, and 
no time has ever seen more people being lifted out of poverty, slavery, and hopelessness.  
An underlying motive behind a great deal of Berlin’s political thought is the wish to 
expose the faults and shortcomings of the theories and great expectations that led to 
catastrophe, and which continues to do so, but also at the same time to inspire politicians and 
others to make wise choices for the future. Instead of fashioning detailed visions of what a 
perfect society might look like and what we need to sacrifice in order to get there, we should 
instead concentrate our best efforts around making the here and now a better place, so that 
we can leave the world in a better state than when we became parts of it.  
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His scepticism of Utopianism comes from his interpretations of human history. Here, 
Berlin contends that once the attainment of a perfect state of affairs is made a goal for 
political action, one has already embarked on a psychologically ‘slippery slope’ which will 
very easily lead to an instrumentalisation of all other possible considerations. When the 
perfect society is presented as being within humanity’s reach, people will, according to 
Berlin, do things they otherwise would not even contemplate: “For if one really believes that 
such a solution is possible, then surely no cost would be too high to obtain it: to make 
mankind just and happy and creative and harmonious for ever – what could be too high a 
price to pay for that?” (Berlin 1990:15) 
A second reason behind his rejection of Utopianism is more theoretical, and 
originates in his pluralism. If conflicts between fundamental moral values are of a permanent 
nature, then perfection in human affairs becomes an incoherent notion; we might well 
enough choose other values than the ones we normally decide to pursue, but it is impossible 
to realise all values at the same time. “We are doomed to choose, and every choice may 
entail an irreparable loss” (Berlin 1990:13): 
No society can include within itself all forms of life. We may indeed lament the 
limited space, as it were, of social worlds, and of ours in particular; and we may 
regret some of the inevitable effects of our culture and social structure. As Berlin has 
long maintained (it is one of his fundamental themes), there is no social world 
without loss: that is, no social world that does not exclude some ways of life that 
realize in special ways certain fundamental values. (Rawls 1993:197) 
Berlin stood for a balanced interpretation of Enlightenment values (Jahanbegloo 1992). 
While he acknowledged the validity of these values, and indeed the necessity of upholding 
them in order to create a more decent society, he also recognised that these values have 
previously been distorted in such a way that the calls for them ended in totalitarianism and 
mass violence. Berlin was indeed committed to such values as rationality, liberty, and 
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equality, but he also warned against a total devotion to only one or a few of these ideals, or 
to base one’s political actions on a fraudulent or fallacious conception of these values.  
 There is on this view nothing wrong with the underlying values that have inspired 
such atrocious regimes as those of the Jacobins or the communists. On the level of abstract 
values, they are both genuine heirs to the Enlightenment (cf. e.g. Brinton 1928; Berlin 2004). 
The problem with these regimes lies not, therefore, in the values they claim to embody, but 
rather in how they conceptualise these values, what they are willing to sacrifice in order to 
achieve their goals, and in their analyses of what it takes to realise their ultimate intentions. 
These distorted variants of ‘the Enlightenment project’ are in Berlin’s works repudiated 
because they are willing to sacrifice too much of some of the things that one ought to value, 
in order to achieve bliss on other scores in some distant and vaguely specified future. 
When Berlin wrote about thinkers like Marx, Helvétius or Saint-Simon, his rejection 
of the idea that human misery now best ought to be compensated for in a future Eden is at its 
most passionate (Berlin 1996; 2002a). Berlin tempers, therefore, his commitment to 
Enlightenment values with an admiration for the historical sensitivity and embryonic value 
pluralism of ‘Counter-Enlightenment’ thinkers such as Vico and Herder (Berlin 1979:1-25; 
2000a). He does not, however, adopt their approval of unexamined traditions, and so remains 
committed to the diffusion of freedom, equality, and human enlightenment, no matter how 
uncomfortable these ideals must seem at first (Berlin 1978:1-11; 2002:36-52). 
Berlin sometimes used the epithet of ‘liberalism’ to describe his own political views. 
Berlin’s version of liberalism is, however, strongly characterised by his pluralism. Berlin’s 
liberalism is an attempt to balance, always provisionally and often precariously, between 
competing ends (Galipeau 1994). Among these ends one finds equality, justice, generosity, 
and common decency – in addition to liberty, both positively and negatively understood. 
Such balancing acts, whose aim it is to establish and maintain what Berlin describes as an 
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‘uneasy equilibrium’, are always limited in scope, limited to a particular society or to a 
particular policy area, because the peculiarities of a given situation will always influence 
which decisions one ought to make. The proper aim of political theory is therefore not to 
provide us with a detailed plan for ideal societies, but instead to try to solve, by way of 
careful analysis of various ideas and concepts, some of the dilemmas which beset the 
political issues and problems we are faced with in a given situation.  
Towards the end of his essay Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century, published in 
1950, he describes one such central balancing act between ends internal to his left-leaning 
liberalism, namely that between securing an adequate measure of individual liberty, as well 
as a decent standard of living for everyone. But even if the problem is common to a lot of 
situations, he characteristically calls upon the contemporaneous experiences of 
totalitarianism and global war which characterised ‘the age’ in which he wrote: 
The dilemma is logically insoluble: we cannot sacrifice either freedom or the 
organisation needed for its defence or a minimum standard of welfare. The way out 
must therefore lie in some logically untidy, flexible and even ambiguous 
compromise. Every situation calls for its own specific policy, since ‘out of the 
crooked timber of humanity’, as Kant once remarked, ‘no straight thing was ever 
made’. What the age calls for is not (as we are so often told) more faith, or stronger 
leadership, or more scientific organisation. (…) What is required is a less mechanical, 
less fanatical application of general principles, however rational or righteous, a more 
cautious and less arrogantly self-confident application of accepted, scientifically 
tested, general solutions to unexamined individual cases. The wicked Talleyrand’s 
‘Surtout, Messieurs, point de zèle’ can be more humane than the demand for 
uniformity of the virtuous Robespierre, and a salutary brake upon too much control 
of men’s lives in an age of social planning and technology. We must submit to 
authority not because it is infallible, but only for strictly and openly utilitarian 
reasons, as a necessary expedient. (Berlin 2002:92) 
To sum up, it might be said that Berlin speaks of a liberalism which is sensitive to the 
uniqueness of the various political problems it strives to supply with solutions. It is a 
cautious and tentative, but above all an irredeemably moderate form of liberalism which 
does not seek ultimate solutions but provisional compromises instead. This is perhaps most 
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directly expressed in his essay on Zionist Politics in Wartime Washington: “I was, and 
remain, an incurably sceptical liberal, a convinced gradualist” (Berlin 2004a:667).  
As a political theorist, Berlin strove always to be informed by historical knowledge 
and practical experience, even though he left room open for more principled discussions. His 
liberalism was not only moderate and tempered by the belief that ultimate values conflict. It 
was also a work in constant progress, flexible enough to absorb the shocks of unexpected 
upheavals, and impressionistic enough to accommodate the various and often changing 
social and political circumstances which often determine whether a piece of political reform 
is ultimately successful or not. He was perhaps not a systematic political thinker, but that 
only makes his political thought more interesting and, in the end, more politically relevant. 
2.4 Some preliminary conclusions 
Berlin’s many essays in political theory and the history of political ideas provide us with 
challenging reading material. This is so, not because they are particularly abstract or difficult 
to understand, but rather because they in many ways invite readers to reflect one more time 
about influential political ideas and fundamental human values. There is almost always a 
‘plea for difficulty’ behind his more political texts, which implore his readers to seek out 
more moderate conclusions than the ones provided by radicals of all political stripes, 
including neoliberals or economic liberals to which we will come back in the last part of this 
study. Often, his essays also require a close reading if one is to notice the many nuances of 
his arguments.  
On a few occasions, Berlin designated himself as a liberal, and this is also how he is 
treated in much of the literature (Galipeau 1994; Gray 1995; Crowder 2002). Reading Berlin, 
however, I am struck by the way in which the sum of his political beliefs could just as easily 
be described as amounting to a moderate form of democratic socialism, or perhaps even an 
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equally moderate form of conservatism. His liberalism speaks to people who are liberal in 
the widest conceivable sense – people who share a fundamental preference for democracy 
and personal freedom, but who often end up in disagreement over how society and especially 
the economy should be organised in order to secure representative government and liberty. 
Berlin sometimes described his political beliefs as a close approximation to Franklin 
D. Roosevelt’s New Deal programme for economic and political reform and redistribution of 
wealth and property. This should give us a fairly clear indication of what kind of liberal 
Berlin was. He was a liberal who wanted freedom in personal matters, but who rejected 
laissez-faire economic policies because of their tendency to favour the ruthless and the 
socially privileged. Berlin might be described as a liberal, but it was always the moderate 
liberalism of contemporary or slightly older Liberals such as John Maynard Keynes and 
William Beveridge, and decidedly not the more consistent ‘classical liberalism’ of for 
instance the ‘Austrian School’ in economics, represented by for instance Ludwig Mises and 
Friedrich Hayek.     
Berlin was, to a large extent because of his value pluralism, a left-leaning liberal. He 
believed not only in negative liberty, but in equality and social justice too. To paraphrase 
Berlin, a realistic political theory will not give us easy answers, but will instead supply us 
with a steady stream of thorny questions which will require local, temporary, and often 
logically untidy solutions. It is not to be expected that political theory will provide us with 
clean, tight, and exhaustive answers to every conceivable political question. This should 
however not deter us from contributing to social improvements. 
His outspoken defence of gradualism, realism, and thoughtful uncertainty in political 
matters is in many ways the reason why it is somewhat difficult to place his thought in an 
established category such as ‘conservatism’, ‘liberalism’ or ‘socialism’. In fact, he was in 
many ways all these things rolled into one. He was a passionate moderate who believed in 
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the corrigibility of the human condition, as socialists do. At the same time, he held the 
conservative view that mankind often fails in its attempts at improving its own lot, despite 
good intentions. On top of it all, or perhaps rather behind it all, lies his commitment to 
fundamental liberal ideas such as democracy, human rights, and individual liberty. And 
while liberty is not everything to a pluralist like Berlin, it is also the case that without liberty, 
everything else matters less.    
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3. Criticisms of Berlin’s political thought 
3.1 Introduction 
Berlin has been an influential voice in contemporary political theory. Ronald Dworkin, one 
of his most persistent critics, has even claimed that Berlin’s influence has been growing in 
recent years, and that his thought will continue to influence political theory in the future 
(Dworkin 2006). His influence is also felt in ethical theory, where moral pluralism is no 
longer the highly personal perspective it perhaps once was when Berlin touched upon that 
subject in Two Concepts of Liberty.  
 One of the more interesting criticisms of Berlin’s political theories comes from John 
Rawls. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls argues that moral pluralism or ‘intuitionism’ does not 
give us answers to crucial political questions in a clear and precise enough way (Rawls 
1971:34-40). Rawls’ critique of intuitionism remains perhaps the most challenging critical 
analysis of Berlin’s whole way of thinking about ethics and politics. The essence of Rawls’ 
criticisms against Berlin has also been reiterated by Ronald Dworkin (2000; 2001; 2001a; 
2006), who rejects value pluralism in a more outright way than Rawls does. As I see it, 
however, the critique launched by Rawls and Dworkin does not to take into account that 
politics is a complicated and at times morally hazardous undertaking, which ought not to be 
thought of as an exact science. Instead, normative political analysis ought to strive to become 
more realistic and relevant for practical policy-making, as opposed to a primarily academic 
discussion of political and public affairs (cf. section 3.6 below).  
Another important set of criticisms comes from among others John Gray (1991; 
1993; 1995; 2000), who claims that pluralism leads away from what he calls liberalism. Gray 
develops this critique in his book Isaiah Berlin from 1995, in which he claims that Berlin’s 
attempt to combine value pluralism with liberalism is largely unsuccessful. It is not however 
clear to what degree Gray’s own political thought, which one must assume he believes is a 
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better match for pluralism, is intended as a full-blown alternative to liberalism or liberal 
democracy. It is in many ways difficult to categorise Gray’s political thought. He is most 
certainly a pessimist, coming close to a position one might characterise as a radical form of 
cultural relativism. But it is not clear what his alternatives to liberal democracy actually are, 
and to what degree he really is as anti-liberal as he claims he is (cf. Newey 2007).  
I will also briefly discuss Berlin’s distinction between negative and positive liberty, 
and its enduring influence on debates in political theory. One question which initially caught 
the attention of philosophers was whether the distinction between negative and positive 
liberty ought to be replaced by a single concept of liberty which incorporates both negative 
and positive dimensions within itself (MacCallum 1967; Megone 1987; Nelson 2005; 
Christman 2005). With only one concept of liberty, so the argument goes, one would be able 
to bypass some of the problems or dilemmas described by Berlin, and we would instead be 
able to see more clearly how the two concepts of liberty are really unavoidably intertwined.  
In an opposite vein, it has been suggested that his two concepts should be 
supplemented with a third, ‘republican’ conception of liberty as ‘non-domination’ (Pettit 
1997; Skinner 1998; 2002). This ‘republicanism’ is based around the idea that individual 
liberty and security is dependent on the existence of a political system in which individual 
citizens can be sure of not being dominated by external forces. Another important set of 
criticisms claims that Berlin exaggerated the dangers of positive liberty. It is instead said that 
positive liberty is a more ‘material’ or ‘meaningful’ conception of personal freedom 
(Crocker 1980; Ramsay 1997). Instead of focusing on all these types of criticisms to the 
same extent, I will focus on the last sort of criticism below in section 3.4. 
I will therefore first describe and discuss the criticisms made by Rawls and Dworkin, 
before I move on to Gray’s pluralist critique of liberalism, and the idea that positive liberty is 
an important ideal. I will then discuss William Galston’s and George Crowder’s attempts to 
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develop Berlin’s political thought further. In the penultimate section, I will present some of 
my own views on his political thought, and especially his perspectives on personal and 
political freedom. The last section will conclude the present chapter as well as the previous. 
3.2 Rawls and Dworkin 
3.2.1 Rawls: Against intuitionism 
The first systematic criticism levelled against Berlin’s approach to normative political 
analysis comes from John Rawls. This assertion may be somewhat surprising, as Rawls does 
not to discuss Berlin’s essays or theories at any greater length. In addition, the few places 
where Rawls does in fact mention Berlin, he does convey a generally favourable attitude 
towards Berlin’s many aphorisms and assumptions (Rawls 1971; 1993). In later works, 
especially Political Liberalism, Rawls acknowledges ‘the fact of pluralism’ – the fact that 
people in modern societies have different ideas about what makes life worth living – and 
seems also to approach Berlin’s value pluralism.  
Nevertheless, much of the general idea behind Rawls’ Theory of Justice is rooted in 
his unwillingness to accept the provisional and logically untidy solutions to ‘problems of 
priority’ which Berlin applauded on several occasions (Rawls 1971, especially part I; Berlin 
2002). Rawls does not want to give up on moral and political philosophy quite as easily as 
Berlin is willing to do. Instead, Rawls wants to forge more logically uncluttered solutions to 
a wider range of problems in normative political analysis, especially problems of what is 
usually called distributive justice.  
At the beginning of A Theory of Justice, Rawls does not directly criticise Berlin, but 
he does assail pluralism or intuitionism for leaving us with too many unanswered questions. 
In Berlin’s place, other moral pluralists such as Brian Barry (1965), G. E. Moore (1903), 
Nicholas Rescher (1965), and W. D. Ross (1930) are criticised for their lack of willingness 
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to give more definite answers to questions concerning which values or principles ought to be 
put ahead of others. According to Rawls, intuitionist theories have two basic features, which 
correspond quite closely to the core principles of the position Berlin called pluralism: 
[Intuitionist theories] consist of a plurality of first principles which may conflict to 
give contrary directives in particular types of cases; and second, they include no 
explicit method, no priority rules, for weighing these principles against one another: 
We are simply to strike a balance by intuition, by what seems to us most nearly right. 
Or if there are priority rules, these are thought to be more or less trivial and of no 
substantial assistance in reaching a judgment. (Rawls 1971:34) 
The most immediate upshot of intuitionism – or pluralism – is that there are occasionally 
several morally acceptable answers to general questions regarding how and according to 
which principles society ought to be organised. Armchair political philosophy will therefore 
not always give us clear and definite answers to every question, but will instead sometimes 
supply us with numerous acceptable answers. The pluralist will therefore claim that there is 
sometimes a need to choose between equally legitimate values. Should one for instance give 
priority to a more efficient allocation of resources, which proponents of laissez-faire 
capitalism claim will arise in an unregulated market economy? Or should one instead aim for 
full employment and a more equal distribution of income, which many advocates of these 
ideals assert will require extensive public regulation of the economy? If both efficiency and 
equality are legitimate ends, which they in all likelihood are, how should one go about 
choosing between them? 
 The pluralist or intuitionist answer to the last question, and many others like it, is not 
at all clear from the outset. If both are legitimate ends, opposite priorities between them are 
at least possible choices to make within a pluralist framework. In order to avoid having to 
rely on purely arbitrary priorities, the practical pluralist will therefore demand more 
empirical knowledge about the wider effects of different priorities, before choosing between 
relatively abstract goals such as economic efficiency and equality (Okun 1975). If we move 
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further up the ladder of abstraction to Rawls’ level, where the most important choice 
between quite general values such as liberty and equality is situated, then the need for such 
empirical knowledge about the effects of different priorities in both the short and the long 
run will become even more apparent. This is perhaps the main reason why a practical sort of 
normative political analysis, in which the complexities of real-life political processes are 
taken into account, is so difficult to fit on the Procrustean bed of pure moral theory. 
And this is where Rawls and Berlin part ways. Rawls thinks that it is a problem that 
pluralism and intuitionism will leave us in a state of indeterminacy when we try to discuss 
practical political problems. Berlin, however, is perfectly happy to leave more practical 
questions aside to everyday political deliberations, after having described some of the 
ingredients of a minimally acceptable society (Berlin 1956; 1958). While Berlin is unwilling 
to devise exhaustive theories about what the outcomes of political processes ought to be, 
Rawls wants clear-cut and philosophically elegant answers. To Rawls, it seems that 
‘messiness’ and ἀπορία in ethics and politics is a problem no matter what, and that we 
should always try to devise ‘tidier’ and more definite solutions. An alternative way of 
dealing with indeterminacy is given by Berlin; we must rely not on our ability to construct 
impressing philosophical theories in which everything makes perfect sense, but instead try to 
be more realistic and rely on our capacity for moral and political judgment. That way, we 
may end up with solutions which may not be as uncluttered as philosophers would wish, but 
which at least offer practicable solutions to real problems at hand.  
Rawls wants, it seems, most of all to escape the uncertainties of moral pluralism and 
intuitionism. The preferred method to achieve this is to try to construct ‘rules of priority’ 
between values suspected of often coming into conflict with each other. That way, he can 
give more systematic answers to problems which may arise on greater levels of detail. With 
the help of a few rules which gives us a ‘lexical’ ordering of various values, the problems 
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and dilemmas arising from value plurality and incommensurability will quite simply wither 
away. The solution Rawls gives us is most certainly elegant and appealing. It consists among 
other things of characterising justice as “the first virtue of social institutions” ahead of other 
possible virtues and considerations, such as the overall welfare of society as a whole (Rawls 
1971:3). The term justice or fairness is then described as a finely tuned mixture of ideals 
more usually described by names such as liberty, equality, and equality of opportunity. This 
is summed up in his general conception of justice: “All social primary goods – liberty and 
opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect – are to be distributed equally 
unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage for the least 
favoured” (Rawls 1971:303). 
On the level of practical recommendations, Rawls’ theory of justice is probably not 
that different from proposals which Berlin would be willing to accept. Justice is certainly 
one of the most fundamental virtues a society could possess. Both also tend to view injustice, 
unwarranted repression, or glaring inequality, as the gravest shortcomings any human 
society might inflict upon itself. Both Rawls and Berlin want to organise society in a way 
which takes the demands for both liberty and equality seriously. Rawls’ rules of priority 
might even be considered a welcome addition to Berlin’s pluralism, at least as rules of 
thumb, because they reduce the clutter surrounding many debates over political values and 
how to make priorities between them. As an addition to Berlin’s analyses of liberty and 
equality, however, Rawls’ theory of justice seems not to sufficiently appreciate the 
complexities of practical politics – an appreciation of which made Berlin one of the more 
politically relevant political theorists of the twentieth century (cf. also section 3.6 below). 
Finally, is justice, as that concept is understood by Rawls, really the first (or most 
important) virtue, value, or principle for political reform and action? Is it always more 
important than other values? Could we not just as easily claim that there are many virtues, 
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and that none are always more fundamental than others? It is nevertheless the case that 
Rawls does not, however, make a compelling case for the view that moral pluralism should 
be abandoned. He is not, basically, at his most convincing when he argues against local and 
temporary, and indeed ‘intuitive’, solutions to problems of priority between different general 
values. This is however also attempted by Ronald Dworkin, who rejects Berlin’s moral 
pluralism in a more direct way than Rawls, and puts equality rather than liberty or justice at 
the top of his proposed hierarchy of values. 
3.2.2 Dworkin: Against pluralism 
According to Dworkin’s book Sovereign Virtue it is equality – or more precisely ‘equal 
concern’ – which is the most important virtue in politics. While he chooses not to copy, at 
least not exactly, Rawls’ concept of first virtues, there is a strong parallel between the views 
put forward by Rawls and Dworkin. Both of them claim that there is a strong presumption in 
favour of a single virtue against which human societies and institutions are to be judged, and 
in turn reformed if they do not meet the requirements of the proposed standard: 
No government is legitimate that does not show equal concern for the fate of all those 
citizens over whom it claims dominion and from whom it claims allegiance. Equal 
concern is the sovereign virtue of political community – without it government is 
only tyranny. (Dworkin 2000:1)  
Whenever a political community fails to do whatever it can to prevent inequality from 
occurring, it does not do enough to live up to this standard of equal concern. The more 
inequality, the greater the need to change society: 
For the distribution of wealth is the product of a legal order: a citizen’s wealth 
massively depends on which laws his community has enacted – not only its laws 
governing ownership, theft, contract, and tort, but its welfare law, tax law, labour 
law, civil rights law, environmental regulation law, and laws of practically everything 
else. When government enacts or sustains one set of such laws rather than another, it 
is not only predictable that some citizens’ lives will be worsened by its choice but 
also, to a considerable degree, which citizens these will be. In the prosperous 
democracies it is predictable, whenever government curtails welfare programmes or 
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declines to expand them, that its decision will keep the lives of poor people bleak. 
(Dworkin 2000:1-2) 
There is at this still early stage in Dworkin’s argument probably no open disagreement 
between him and Berlin. Berlin also makes, in his essay Equality, an argument for the view 
that equality is a precondition for a minimally civilised and decent society (Berlin 1956). 
Berlin would also agree with Dworkin that a society characterised by conspicuous inequality 
is in need of political and economic reforms. In a very straightforward sense, they are both 
egalitarians, in that they consider equality to be an important virtue of human societies. 
But Equality is also the first published text in which Berlin considers and presents his 
idea that there are several equally fundamental values which might sometimes come into 
conflict with each other, and that we consequently need to construct some sort of 
compromise between them. If we take equality too far, we will end up trading off too much 
of other values which are equally important. One will probably also end up with a political 
system where exaggerated demands for uniformity will threaten personal freedom and 
economic efficiency. It is therefore necessary to find a workable compromise between the 
ends we care about and indeed ought to care about. 
 And it is at this point that the two egalitarians end up in direct disagreement with 
each other, with Dworkin becoming one of the most articulated critics of pluralism (Dworkin 
2001; 2001a; 2006). Dworkin’s most prominent reason for rejecting pluralism comes from 
his dismissal of the quite common belief that there is an almost inevitable conflict between 
liberty and equality. Instead, he claims that one must define both liberty and equality more 
‘dynamically’ than Berlin and others have done in the past, and try to fit the two values 
together as the pieces in a jig-saw puzzle: 
Of course we can define the various political virtues in such a way that conflict is 
indeed inevitable. Suppose we define equality in the way that certain socialists did: 
equality means everyone having the same wealth no matter what choices he makes 
about work or leisure or consumption or investment. We can define liberty in the way 
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that John Stuart Mill and Isaiah Berlin have: someone’s liberty is his freedom to do 
whatever he might wish to do free from the interference of others. Then there will 
certainly be conflict between liberty and equality. (Dworkin 2001:253) 
There is perhaps a commonsensical appeal behind these rather simple definitions of equality 
and liberty. And while the definitions supplied by Dworkin are hardly indicative of how 
most socialists describe equality, or how Mill and Berlin defined liberty, they do convey a 
sort of everyday non-technical usage of such terms. He goes on: 
But why should we define them that way? Here are two other definitions which I 
want to put before you. (…) We can define equality dynamically, as I did in 
Sovereign Virtue. Equality is preserved when no one envies the package of work and 
reward than anyone else has achieved. (…) Your liberty is your freedom to dispose as 
you wish of property or resources that have been awarded to you under a reasonably 
fair system of property and other laws, free from interference of others, so long as 
you violate no one’s rights. (Dworkin 2001:253-254) 
With his definitions, Dworkin claims to have removed much of the conflicts between 
equality and liberty, which Berlin declared were evident to anyone but the intellectually 
immature (Berlin 1990:1-19). It is however an open question whether or not his new 
definitions capture how these concepts are understood in ordinary language and real-life 
political debates. If, however, they are too far removed from everyday usage, they become 
poor guides to people who see both liberty and equality as important ideals. What is clear is 
that it is possible to define both equality and liberty in ways which makes conflict 
unavoidable, just as much as it is possible to forge definitions which makes conflict between 
them less likely. The central question is whether we should try to construct definitions of 
values which minimise conflicts between them, or whether we instead should build on 
ordinary language, and try to think how we ought to confront situations in which different 
ideals will lead us in diverging directions. 
The disagreement between Berlin and Dworkin is a matter of how one is to deal with 
value conflicts rather than a real disagreement of whether human values actually come into 
conflict with each other. Dworkin’s solution might be characterized as holistic. He wants 
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human values to form a coherent totality, and is willing to supply ordinary value concepts 
with new definitions in order to remove conflicts between our various ideals. By contrast, 
Berlin’s solution is one of acquiescence: Given how values are ordinarily understood, they 
will occasionally clash, and we will have to choose between different ideals. Instead of 
trying to make value conflicts disappear by changing the definitions, we should think 
seriously about which priorities we want to make, and choose as best we can which way to 
move forward. It is, however, an open question whether or not everyday usage should be 
accorded the kind of privileged place Berlin is willing to give it, or if we should rather try to 
define better concepts about what we should ultimately value. 
3.3 Gray: Pluralism without liberalism 
Before the 1990’s there was, as far as I have been able to tell, little or no controversy over 
Berlin’s pluralism and its ability to supply its proponents with liberal political conclusions 
(Shklar 1989; Galipeau 1994). John Gray’s book Isaiah Berlin from 1995 is therefore a 
watershed in the literature commenting on Berlin’s moral and political thought. In it, Gray 
claims that moral pluralism will lead its proponents away from liberalism, to a position in 
which liberalism is merely thought of as one possible answer to the general question of how 
society ought to be organised alongside – one must assume – various illiberal ideologies.  
Gray shares this position with John Kekes (1993; 1997; 1998). Kekes suggests, while 
not commenting exclusively on Berlin’s thought as Gray does in his book, that pluralism 
leads to conservatism. It is however an open question if Kekes’ conservatism is as much 
‘against liberalism’ as he claims it is. Perhaps there are more affinities between it and the 
kind of moderate liberalism advocated by Berlin, than either of them would care to admit. In 
order to simplify matters, I will however not discuss Kekes’ thoughts about pluralism in 
detail, and instead focus this discussion around Gray. 
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 As a political philosopher, John Gray comes across as an exceptionally nomadic 
thinker (Lukes 1995; Ryan 2001; Horton and Newey 2007). In the early 1980’s he wrote two 
books about John Stuart Mill and Friedrich Hayek, focusing on their respective conceptions 
of liberty (Gray 1983; 1984). In them, he came across as mostly sympathetic to their 
markedly different, but still recognisably liberal political theories. Later, he gradually 
became ever more hostile towards liberalism in any shape or form, and set out to develop a 
‘post-liberal’ political theory which, as the name suggests, is meant to supplant what he calls 
‘fundamentalist liberalism’ (Gray 2000). 
 ‘Post-liberalism’ is, if one takes what Gray has written about it at face value, a rather 
heterogeneous political theory (Horton and Newey 2007). It contains elements of 
communitarianism and conservatism, combined with cultural relativism and green politics, 
as well as a rather furious hostility towards modernity (whatever that may mean) and in 
particular global capitalism. In Gray’s later works, the liberal tradition is, together with the 
rest of ‘the Enlightenment project’, repeatedly declared dead, all due to the alleged and 
sudden collapse of ‘the modern era’. It seems, therefore, that Gray has moved well away 
from his earlier liberal positions. It is more difficult to say exactly where he has ended up.  
On his own terms, despite all the blitz and clamour surrounding his recurring 
rejections of liberalism, Gray is however an interesting theorist of pluralism, developing 
what may be described as a more radical form of moral pluralism than anything Berlin ever 
subscribed to (Crowder 2007). Already in one of his earlier essays on the topic, this 
willingness to adopt a more drastic type of value pluralism has become apparent, adding a 
component of cultural relativism on top of Berlin’s moral theory. Gray does this by inserting 
that it is not only human values that are incommensurable with each other, but also that 
comparisons between specific cultures and ‘forms of life’ are futile: “Objective pluralism of 
the sort advanced here recognizes incommensurabilities among generic human goods and 
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evils as well as incommensurabilities between (and within) specific cultures or forms of life” 
(Gray 1989:292, emphasis added). He also adds the view, already rejected by Berlin and 
Williams (1994), that value incommensurability entails that we cannot give good reasons for 
choosing one value over another when such incommensurable values clash with each other. 
They are simply ‘incomparable by reason’ (cf. Gray 1995:142). 
 The problem with Gray’s indictment of Berlin’s liberal pluralism is that the 
argument builds on notions of pluralism and liberalism it is doubtful anyone before him, 
Berlin included, have entertained. Pluralism, in the more radical form Gray espouses, does 
not prescribe, according to Gray himself, which values or how many of them one ought to 
cultivate (Gray 1995:38-75). But rather than adopting the approach formulated by Bernard 
Williams (1978) and probably supported by Berlin, namely that one should forge a flexible 
and temporary balance between as many values as possible, Gray suggests that one instead 
should simply adopt the values of the culture one is born into.  
Instead of commenting on Berlin’s thought, Gray has an entirely different agenda, 
namely to abandon his former political beliefs and enlist Berlin as a fellow-traveller in his 
flight from anything that reminds him of liberalism or ‘the Enlightenment’, which to Gray is 
equally obsolete after the supposed collapse of ‘modernity’ and the dawn of the ‘post-
modern’ epoch in human history. Liberalism is to Gray the political theory of the by now 
concluded modern era and, we are led to believe, thoroughly outmanoeuvred by the alleged 
breakdown of ‘the Enlightenment’ and its accompanying belief in the genuine possibility for 
progress (cf. Wheen 2004:187-190). His ambition is therefore to ‘rescue’ pluralism, which 
he evidently believes in (albeit a highly original rendering of it), from the dead hand of 
liberalism and modernism. 
Gray (1995:152) asks, commenting on the last paragraphs of the Two Concepts of 
Liberty, “if diversity comes into conflict with liberty, and the diversity is that of worthwhile 
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forms of life expressive of genuine human needs and embodying authentic varieties of 
human flourishing, why should liberty always trump diversity – especially if one is a value-
pluralist?” And indeed the way Gray frames this question is indicative of his less than 
indulgent reading of Berlin. What Berlin asserted was rather that pluralism would entail a 
“measure of ‘negative’ liberty” (Berlin 2002:216), and not that liberty would always be more 
important than other ideals.  
Gray’s question might however also be turned around to his own version of value 
pluralism: Why should, one might ask, diversity matter so much that it trumps out our 
concerns over for instance truth, equality, or liberty? If all four terms describe something of 
value, why should we always choose diversity? If an all-out concern for diversity forces a 
certain proportion of humanity to live in ignorance and slavery, because it is ‘part of their 
culture’, why should we not choose to live by other ideals than mere variety? This highly 
natural question is not answered, or even raised by Gray. His alternative vision of a world in 
which diversity is furthered by means of establishing a modus vivendi of limitless tolerance 
is not more closely matched to pluralism any more than the moderate liberalism Berlin and 
many others have preferred. If one assumes moral pluralism to be true, we live in a world in 
which values sometimes collide. In such a situation we are forced to choose, but it remains 
thoroughly unclear why we should not choose freedom, and instead enter yet another age of 
sharp divisions between nations, classes, and creeds. 
3.4 Formal and material freedom 
The third and final type of criticism discussed here comes from several theorists who 
maintain that a purely negative conception of liberty is insufficient (Crick 1966; Macpherson 
1973; Cohen 1979; Taylor 1979; Crocker 1980; Ramsay 1997; Meyer 2007). Typically, 
critics in this category start with the assumption that negative liberty is not enough if 
freedom is to be meaningful to most people. Instead, they claim that one should establish and 
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maintain what we might call an infrastructure of freedom, so that more people will have the 
opportunity to enjoy the freedom admitted to them. In essence, they suggest that negative 
liberty alone is of uncertain significance if it is not accompanied by a similar measure of real 
opportunities for everyone to make effective use of that freedom.  
It should be noted that these criticisms are not critiques of Berlin’s political thought 
as such. They are, rather, critiques of the view that less government intervention in the 
economy will always lead to more freedom for everyone. While it is simply out the question 
that Berlin ever held this absurd view, it is obviously the case that many other influential 
liberal thinkers have approached this exclusively negative perspective on personal freedom. 
Consequently, such liberals have suggested that the state, in the name of liberty, should not 
intervene in order to distribute freedom, and the opportunities to enjoy freedom, more evenly 
between people under its authority. 
Perhaps the most thoughtful criticism of this type comes from C. B. Macpherson, in 
his essay on Berlin’s Division of Liberty (Macpherson 1973:95-119). Macpherson 
disapproves of Berlin’s analysis in Two Concepts because of the sharp distinction made 
between liberty and what he calls ‘the conditions for liberty’. According to Macpherson, it is 
only direct coercion of one person by other human beings or the organisations they form 
which is counted as a denial of liberty by Berlin. Unintended coercion stemming from the 
way society and especially the economy has been organised is not a denial of freedom, but 
merely the absence of the conditions necessary to make effective use of one’s freedom. The 
economically underprivileged are in an unregulated market economy, under Macpherson’s 
reading of Berlin, formally speaking free to same degree as owners of substantial capital. 
The difference between the two groups lies elsewhere, in the differences of real opportunities 
they have for bettering their own lot. 
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According to Macpherson, there is a liberal bias in Berlin’s presentation of negative 
liberty, in which direct coercion is treated as an impediment to liberty, but not more subtle 
forms of impediments built into the market economy. In such economic systems, the 
economically underprivileged will often have no other choice but to sell their labour at a 
relatively low price in order to survive. They are not, however, strictly speaking coerced into 
an exploitative relationship with their employers, because they are not physically or legally 
barred from seeking their fortunes elsewhere. They are still free in negative terms, because 
they are, to paraphrase Anatole France, free to sleep under the bridges and beg in the street 
instead of selling their labour at a modest price.  
Macpherson suggests that this will not do, and that one instead would profit from 
treating all ‘extractions of liberty’ on equal terms, whether they are actually willingly put 
into force or if they are unintended consequences of the way the economy is organised. 
Regardless of how an impediment came about, it should be regarded as an extraction and 
denial of a person’s negative or ‘counter-extractive’ liberty. The upshot of Macpherson’s 
small revision of Berlin is that well-placed economic policies such as redistributive taxation 
or laws regulating the labour market could lead to a net gain of liberty. While such policies 
will limit the negative freedom of the well-off, their loss would be compensated by a larger 
net gain of freedom for those lifted out of poverty and despair.  
 A closely related form of criticism is found in Thomas Meyer’s book The Theory of 
Social Democracy (Meyer 2007; 2007a). At the beginning of his book, Meyer identifies two 
key problems in traditional liberal thought. The first is the conflict between property rights 
and personal freedom. If property rights are guarded too strongly, and property is distributed 
unevenly between members of a political community, then the result will most likely be a 
similarly uneven distribution of the ability one has to make the truly important decisions in 
one’s own life.  
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If one really believes that everyone deserves a measure of personal freedom, then one 
needs a more ‘fluid’ conception of property rights. The demands of property-owners to keep 
all of their property no matter the consequences for the community as a whole are in essence 
a demand for negative liberty. This demand must however be weighed against the 
countervailing demand that everyone should have at least an opportunity to live in freedom 
without the need to subject oneself completely to the will of others. The most fundamental 
difference between the two main categories of liberal democracy Meyer identifies, 
libertarian and social democracy, is to be found in how they tend to make opposite priorities 
between protection of property rights and personal freedom for all. 
 The second problem in liberal thought is according to Meyer found in the conflict 
between negative and positive liberty. In this, Meyer mistakenly treats Berlin as a 
spokesman for the libertarian view that negative liberty ought to be given absolute priority 
over positive liberty and other values. This priority will, according to Meyer, lead to a 
dilemma because it is not given in advance how negative liberty and other goods ought to be 
distributed. One could easily enough admit everyone the same degree of negative liberty. If 
one does not redistribute the resources and opportunities necessary to make proper use of his 
or her negative liberty to everyone, one will end up in a situation where only few people 
have the opportunity to make the truly important decisions in their own lives. It is therefore 
necessary, if freedom is to be a meaningful goal for most people, to give both positive and 
negative liberty equal weight and status.  
While these criticisms from the left are quite valuable, they all tend to misjudge large 
parts of Berlin’s analysis. Berlin did not after all say much about what we ought to 
understand by liberty, apart from cautioning against some purely positive conceptions, which 
he thought would be too easily subverted into a demand for individuals to submit to some 
sort of all-powerful state. For this reason, the authors who have suggested that his twofold 
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distinction between negative and positive liberty ought to be revised, concern themselves 
with a different problem than Berlin’s analysis of actual usage. Berlin did not either, as some 
of his critics have suggested, entirely reject positive liberty. Instead, Berlin was more 
inclined to say that we ought not to sacrifice all of our negative liberty in order to achieve 
some other goal. One could perhaps accuse Berlin for his failure to be perfectly clear about 
what he thought ought to be meant by liberty. To suggest, as Meyer does, that Berlin was a 
laissez-faire enthusiast amounts however to a misjudgement of what Berlin tried to caution 
against, namely the danger inherent in ascribing too much importance to one value at the 
expense of all others. 
3.5 Liberal pluralism 
3.5.1 Crowder: Pluralism and liberalism reconciled 
Berlin has however his share of supporters as well as critics in the recently published 
literature commenting on his political thought. These supporters have taken upon themselves 
the task of defending his theories from various attacks and criticisms. It is especially the 
claims made by Gray, that pluralism and liberalism lead away from each other, which is the 
subject of these defensive efforts. Most determined among these authors are perhaps George 
Crowder (2002; 2004; 2007) and William A. Galston (2002; 2005), who both try to 
systematise Berlin’s often scattered ethical and political theory. 
Crowder’s argument in favour of a combination of value pluralism and liberalism 
unfolds in four steps. In the first, liberalism is described quite generally as a political 
ideology centred around “four main values or principles”, namely “the equal moral worth of 
individuals”, “individual liberties and rights, limited government and private property” 
(Crowder 2002:22). This is not a particularly controversial understanding of what liberalism 
is. One could also see the contours of the familiar conflict between left and right within the 
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liberal tradition, where left-leaning liberals will tend to choose the first two values, and so-
called ‘classical liberals’ the latter two, whenever these four principles come into conflict 
with each other. In these debates internal to liberalism, Crowder places himself on the left 
wing of the liberal tradition (Crowder 2002:226-236).  
The second step in his argument consists of defining value pluralism (cf. section 
2.1.1. above). The crucial move he makes is undoubtedly his reinterpretation of value 
incommensurability. In this, he concludes that the context in which concrete choices between 
values take place will in most cases make it possible to arrive at a reasonably rational 
decision. It would then be possible to choose rationally between alternative policies or 
actions that embody different moral values, even if ‘lexical’ priorities or general 
comparisons between abstract values and ideals are rejected (Crowder 2002; 2007). 
As Crowder moves to the third and fourth stages in his argument, he also descends 
from the level of conceptual analysis to a more practical brand of political theory. The third 
step amounts, basically, to an acceptance of Berlin’s idea that anti-Utopianism follows from 
a pluralist outlook. According to Crowder, and it is difficult to see any possible counter-
arguments to his view, anti-Utopianism flows naturally from pluralism. If pluralism is true, 
then the idea of a perfect society in which all values are fully realised become a conceptually 
incoherent notion. There is, however, “a considerable gap between the dismissal of utopian 
politics and the endorsement of liberalism” (Crowder 2002:97).  
In the fourth stage of Crowder’s account, he makes three arguments for liberalism. 
The first argument he makes, ‘the argument from diversity’, is based on the idea that 
diversity and coherence, both counted among the fundamental values and frequently at odds 
with each other, are best realised in a liberal democracy which strikes a balance between the 
two (Crowder 2002:135-157). Conversely, Crowder believes it is unsound to sacrifice too 
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much “coherence” in order to achieve greater variety, a view he not entirely without justice 
attributes to Gray in his most ‘post-modern’ moments. 
The second argument is inspired by Charles Larmore and John Rawls, and focuses on 
their shared notion of ‘reasonable disagreement’ (Rawls 1993:54-58; Larmore 1996:152-
174). According to Crowder, reasonable disagreements could only arise when the idea of 
plural and potentially conflicting values has been accepted. Larmore himself even suggests 
that the concept of reasonable disagreement will not make sense under a “monistic view of 
the good life” (Larmore 1987:23). If we want to say that at least some collisions between 
different values are of a sort in which all sides in the argument are equally reasonable, then 
we must, so the argument goes, acknowledge the truth of value pluralism. 
The third argument intended to forge a link between pluralism and liberalism, the 
“virtue argument”, is based in what Crowder views as similarities between liberal and 
pluralist virtues. The “pluralist virtues” he emphasises – generosity, realism, attentiveness 
and flexibility – overlaps to a considerable degree with “liberal virtues” such as broad-
mindedness, moderation, personal autonomy and attention to local variation (Macedo 1990).  
Has Crowder succeeded in making a definitive argument for a combination of 
pluralism and liberalism? The answer must be one marked with a measure of ambivalence. 
On one side, he does supply the liberal pluralist with three compelling arguments in her 
favour. On the other side, however, he seems to underestimate the potential for combining 
liberalism with monistic ethical theories, as Dworkin tries to do. Finally, it is at best unclear 
why the more detailed doctrine of liberalism, with its priority of private property rights and 
limited government over personal freedom for everyone should follow from pluralism. 
Instead, one could perhaps say that pluralism is indeed compatible with liberalism, but also 
with other political ideologies that are compatible with modern democracy, unless liberalism 
is understood very broadly as a strong preference for liberal democracy and little else.  
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3.5.2 Galston: Liberal pluralism and practical politics 
Even if their basic conclusion is the same, namely that liberalism follows from an acceptance 
of pluralism, Galston’s version of liberalism, given in the book Liberal Pluralism, is 
different from Crowder’s. While Crowder thinks that personal autonomy is one of the most 
important liberal ideals, Galston rejects this and puts instead expressive liberty at the 
forefront (Galston 1995; 2002). The state should not, according to Galston, encourage 
autonomous behaviour among its citizens, but instead remain neutral in moral and cultural 
questions, and at most foster peace between the various ethnic or religious groups of which 
most contemporary societies consist.  
The state should guarantee everyone the right to express themselves freely, but 
should not force people to adopt the lifestyle of the majority culture. In essence, the state 
should guarantee everyone the possibility of becoming autonomous and passively prefer 
such an outcome, but it should not actively persuade people to break with their illiberal 
subculture. In some ways, Galston’s liberalism of peaceful coexistence forms a middle 
ground between Crowder’s liberalism based around an ideal of personal autonomy, and 
Gray’s ‘post-liberal’ political theory, which contends that both liberal and anti-liberal 
subcultures should be accorded equal status.  
Like Crowder, Galston starts off his arguments with definitions of the basic concepts 
to his theory, namely pluralism and liberalism (Galston 2002). The closest thing we come to 
a core of liberalism is, according to Galston, what he calls “the principle of expressive 
liberty”, understood as a “robust though rebuttable presumption in favour of individuals and 
groups leading their lives as they see fit, within a broad range of legitimate variation in 
accordance with their own understanding of what gives life meaning and value” (Galston 
2002:3). Protecting and improving a state of expressive liberty for both groups and 
individuals is in other words an important, but not always an overriding concern for liberals.  
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The main argument is fleshed out in three stages. In the first, he presents his 
definition of liberalism. The second stage is a sorting out of the various political and 
theoretical consequences stemming from an acceptance of both liberalism and pluralism 
(Galston 1999; 2002:28-78). The third and final stage describes the practical consequences 
of adopting Galston’s perspective, concentrated around policy areas in which expressive 
liberty collides with concerns for civic unity in the liberal state (Galston 1991; 2002:81-132).  
In defining liberalism, his quarrel lies primarily with those who assert that personal 
autonomy is the most central value in liberalism, most notably Joseph Raz (1986; Galston 
2002:9). Instead, a concern for diversity ought to be deemed equally important:  
Any liberal argument that invokes autonomy as a general rule of public action in 
effect takes sides in the ongoing struggle between reason and faith, reflection and 
tradition. Autonomy-based arguments are bound to marginalize those individuals and 
groups who cannot conscientiously embrace the Enlightenment impulse. To the 
extent that many liberals identify liberalism with the Enlightenment, they limit 
support for their cause and drive many citizens of goodwill – indeed many potential 
allies – into opposition. (Galston 2002:25-26)  
The next step in Galston’s argument is to devise a theory of liberal pluralism. There are 
“three sources” to his liberal theory, namely expressive liberty, moral pluralism, and finally 
political pluralism (Galston 2002:28-38). Expressive liberty is the starting-point of his 
liberalism, but the principle is given a characteristically pluralist interpretation: “Although 
expressive liberty is a good, it is not the only good, and it is certainly not unlimited” 
(Galston 2002:29). For Galston, it is “concrete experience”, rather than elaborate theoretical 
conjecturing, which provides him with “the most compelling reasons for accepting some 
form of value pluralism” (Galston 2002:33). Most importantly, he rejects monism for being 
dependent on the unacceptable metaphysical dogma that the appearance of moral conflict 
will simply go away if we try hard enough. We must therefore substitute the monistic view 
with the more complicated but also the more truthful theory of moral pluralism.  
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The third ingredient in Galston’s liberal pluralism is political pluralism. The 
perspective adopted is one indebted to several writers all sharing the belief that the state 
ought not to be conceived as the only source of political authority (Hirst 1989). For this 
reason, the state should not try to envelope all other organisations under its own control. The 
very existence of non-governmental authority combined with the high costs at which 
political control of all aspects of society come in all modern societies is for Galston in itself 
an argument for maintaining a liberal political order in which some things are left beyond the 
reach of political control.  
The three building-blocks that form the basis of Galston’s liberal pluralism are neatly 
fitted together. Value pluralism, it is said, will lead to the view that there is a wide variety of 
worthwhile personal objectives and lifestyles (Galston 2002:37-38). It is the truth of value 
pluralism that makes liberal goals such as expressive liberty and political pluralism truly 
important. If there really is one and only one true answer to every normative problem, then 
why should we value the freedom to stray from the correct answers? Similarly, why should 
we want diversity or political pluralism, if it is really the case that there is only one type of 
good life? Without the support of value pluralism – without acceptance for the idea that there 
are several roads to happiness and meaningful existence – Galston suggests that the reasons 
for valuing liberty and political pluralism vanish from view.  
The kind of liberal and democratic constitution envisioned by Galston is one where 
numerous conflicting views are weighted against each other and power is spread out over 
several branches of government. The most important conclusion he reaches is that liberal 
pluralism will dictate that democracy must be limited by constitutional guarantees which 
clearly state that some areas of life are not subject to political authority and public scrutiny. 
Galston’s liberalism is not, however, an argument which describes a specific and detailed set 
of economic policies. It is rather an argument about how political institutions ought to be 
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structured. His argument, like Crowder’s, is therefore not as a decisive argument for 
liberalism, including liberal economic policies, even if it is a largely successful defence of 
liberal democracy, using moral pluralism as a point of departure. 
3.6 Pluralism and politics 
At the very least, there is no shortage of creativity or differences of opinion in the literature 
commenting on Berlin’s political thought. If one reads all of the authors presented above, 
one could easily come to the conclusion that almost any type of political ideology could be 
inferred from the assumptions about morality made by Berlin. I wish however to argue in 
favour of two ideas about how pluralism will influence the way in which we think about 
political issues. The first idea is that moral pluralism will not issue directly in an especially 
detailed political ideology. It seems to me that the arguments made so far put too much 
weight on pluralism. It is believed that pluralism entails one particular political theory 
covering a wider range of issues, but none of these attempts are particularly convincing. The 
second idea is that an acceptance of moral pluralism will nevertheless have quite distinct 
consequences when it comes to the question of how one best ought to go about deliberating 
about discussing and deciding more concrete policy issues. 
The argument Gray and other ‘anti-liberal pluralists’ have made, that an endorsement 
of moral pluralism leads away from liberalism towards various types of vaguely specified 
ideologies such as conservatism or ‘post-liberalism’, are insufficient at best. But it is also 
likely that pluralism does not lead to a very well-defined type of liberalism, which is the 
common assertion made by Crowder and Galston. An interesting indication of this is found 
in the fact that they endorse different types of liberalism. Crowder’ position is quite similar 
to what Galston has described as ‘Enlightenment liberalism’, which is a form of liberalism 
that has personal autonomy for everyone as one of its most important goals. Galston favours 
by contrast an older and in many ways less demanding form of liberalism, associated with 
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the period immediately following the upheaval created by the Reformation in northern 
Europe. This type of liberalism holds that domestic tranquillity and peaceful coexistence are 
more central ideals than personal autonomy and equality, especially in culturally diverse 
societies (Galston 2002).  
Much of the apparent disagreements in the literature could be reduced, at least 
potentially, if one separated more clearly between liberalism on one hand, and liberal 
democracy on the other. Liberalism is in many ways a highly contested concept with a wide 
variety of meanings which vary across time and space (cf. section 6.2. below). A simple 
illustration of this is found in the fact that words such as ‘liberalism’ and ‘liberal’ refer to 
different political phenomena at opposite ends of the political spectrum in the United States 
and Australia, which are Galston’s and Crowder’s home countries. What liberal ideologies, 
parties and movements actually have in common is a matter of debate, and one could 
perhaps more profitably view liberalism as a ‘widely extended family’ with only a few and 
quite general commonalities shared by most of its members (Waldron 1987; Ryan 1993). 
By contrast, liberal democracy is more easily defined in a way which is not subject to 
local variation. What follows from moral pluralism is not a detailed version of liberalism, or 
for that matter post-liberalism or any other particular ideology. What does follow from 
pluralism is a strong preference for liberal democracy, understood as a representative form of 
government which admits to all its citizens the measure of negative liberty Berlin in Two 
Concepts claimed was entailed by pluralism. At least, one may view liberal democracy as the 
form of government which comes closest to admitting everyone an adequate measure of 
negative liberty, especially if it is compared to other forms of government which have been 
tried from time to time.  
Liberal democracy is in turn not only compatible with both Enlightenment and post-
Reformation styles of liberalism, but also other ideologies which have made their peace with 
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liberal democracy, such as more moderate types of conservatism or socialism. It should 
come as no surprise that we find all of these ideologies in the more consolidated liberal 
democracies around the world. They are all political tendencies which will often disagree on 
for instance how we ought to distribute available resources, or how the economy in general 
ought to be structured. Such ideologies will nevertheless contain no ambitions to abolish 
democracy or civil rights already admitted to each individual citizen. In fact, they do not 
oppose the liberal-democratic constitutional order at all, and will in constitutional matters 
mostly disagree about how one could improve democratic institutions further.    
In essence, both liberal pluralists such as Crowder and Galston, or anti-liberal 
pluralists like Gray should take more seriously what Berlin actually says is entailed by 
pluralism. As it turns out, that is actually not that much apart from the by now legendary 
measure of negative liberty, which is to be admitted to everyone. A preference for liberal 
democracy, which is the only type of society which has truly tried to admit all of its citizen 
personal freedom and opportunities for political participation, is however not anything near 
what one today might call a complete answer to some of the more pertinent questions of how 
society ought to be organised. One might therefore say that pluralism is compatible with all 
of the more pervasive ideologies seen in most liberal democracies. It is not the case that 
pluralism is only compatible with liberalism, narrowly conceived as an ideology occupying 
the centre ground or the moderate right wing of the political spectrum in many democracies. 
We may therefore have to look elsewhere than in the basics of value pluralism if we are to 
find compelling arguments in favour of a particular political ideology or ‘package’ of more 
nitty-gritty economic policies. 
The second idea I will present here is that pluralism will have a definite impact on 
how political debates and normative political analyses are to be conducted, in spite of it not 
issuing directly in a complete ideology. In certain respects, pluralism is a less elegant theory 
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of morality than its monistic alternatives, making argumentation for or against a given set of 
political arrangements or policy decisions a more complex undertaking. For this reason, 
pluralism will lead to lowered expectations about political philosophy, and its ability to 
supply humanity with detailed guidelines for how to organise society in the best conceivable 
way. Instead, an acceptance of pluralism will lead to a renewed appreciation of the practical 
art of politics, and politicians who may not be able to give rigorous arguments to support 
their actions, but which nevertheless have made significant contributions to social and 
economic progress (Berlin 1996). In essence, pluralism will turn us away from lofty and 
highly generalised theorising, towards a more practical way of thinking about politics. 
It is in its ability to accommodate our sometimes mildly inconsistent views on ethical 
and political problems one can find pluralism’s strengths – strengths that compensate for its 
lack of simplicity and its inability to provide us with simple answers to hard questions. Its 
cumbersome nature might actually become an advantage as it leaves more room for 
flexibility and local variation in the practical implementation of more sweeping political 
decisions. In essence, the upshot of pluralism is not a specific ideology, but the will to install 
what Berlin called a sense of reality into the normative political analyses which goes on in a 
working democracy. If we accept pluralism, then we will also have to accept that other 
people might prefer to realise other ideals than the ones which we ourselves hold most dear. 
A general spirit of compromise, already indicated by Lamprecht, must therefore permeate 
normative political deliberations about how society ought to be structured.  
3.7 Conclusion 
I have found myself driven to several conclusions as I have surveyed the works of Berlin and 
what others have written about his moral and political thought. In the first place, it appears to 
me that Rawls and especially Dworkin are quite correct when they assert that no conclusive 
argument has been given in favour of moral pluralism. They remain therefore dismissive of 
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pluralists who say that we have to strike a balance between our various values and ideals by 
intuition and practical experience alone. Instead, they do not want to give up on moral and 
political theorising quite as easily as Berlin is willing to do. But neither of them supplies us 
with a decisive argument in favour of moral monism, even if they both claim that they have 
found a solution to the apparent conflict between freedom and equality. So the most 
fundamental issue raised by reading Berlin, namely whether or not pluralism is the correct 
description of our moral universe, remains unresolved. That being said, pluralism has the 
upper hand, as it corresponds more closely to ordinary everyday experience of pervasive and 
permanent conflict between different values.  
 I have not, moreover, been able to find any arguments which convincingly support 
the claim made by Gray, namely that pluralism and liberalism are incompatible doctrines. It 
is more likely that an acceptance of moral pluralism leads to an acceptance of liberal 
democracy similar to what is found in nearly all contemporary Western societies. Berlin’s 
moral and political theories are therefore not all that subversive, as Gray suggests they are at 
the beginning his book on Berlin’ political thought (Gray 1995). Most importantly, Gray 
seems to change the definitions of the basic concepts in the debate he started with his book. 
His version of moral pluralism is not identical to what Berlin understood by pluralism, and 
his definitions of liberalism makes it a more controversial doctrine than it actually is in our 
day and age. He makes no argument for extrapolating from the fact that his own version of 
pluralism is incompatible with some types of liberal thought, to the more general idea that 
liberal democracy is incompatible with moral pluralism. His attempts to present pluralism 
and liberalism as potentially opposing systems of thought come to nothing because of this.  
There is also an important set of criticisms of Berlin’s political thought coming from 
the political left, who claim that his concept of negative liberty disguises the fact that the 
absence of government intervention is by no means enough to secure personal freedom for 
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everyone. Instead, these critics maintain that liberty ought to be understood more positively, 
and that we as a society need to distribute freedom and opportunities more actively and 
evenly between ourselves. If everyone is to be have the measure of effective control over 
their own lives which we in ordinary language associate with people who are free, then we 
need, as a community, to limit the way in which some could use their accumulated social and 
economic power to control the lives of others.  
It is, however, far from certain that Berlin ever held the views which are sometimes 
attributed to him. He did not, to be sure, ever claim that positive liberty is unimportant, or 
that negative liberty is the only conception of freedom which really matters. Instead, he said 
something which comes across as less obviously controversial, namely that certain warped 
positive conceptions of liberty have been misused in the past by various authoritarian 
regimes, and that we should maintain that an ideal of freedom deserving its name also has a 
negative side to it. Berlin believed instead that both positive and negative liberty are 
important ideals and worthy goals, at least up until the point where they might come into 
conflict with each other and other values. 
Finally, we have Crowder and Galston, who have delivered persuasive arguments in 
favour of the idea that pluralism is compatible with some forms of liberal political thinking 
after all. But their more ambitious claims, that pluralism generates a positive case for one 
specific kind of liberalism, are ever so slightly more dubious. There is, however, in spite of 
the differences in their arguments, quite substantial overlap in the basic political outlook of 
the two authors, and in the values they wish to emphasise. One might perhaps say, therefore, 
that a generic liberalism, containing little more than a defence of liberal democracy, follows 
from pluralism, but perhaps not one specific interpretation of what liberalism actually is. 
The most prominent feature of Berlin’s political thought is however his interest in 
and attentiveness to real world politics and particularly the complex history behind much of 
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what goes on in contemporary politics. This attention serves not only to set him apart from 
many contemporary political theorists, but also as an inspiration for his moral pluralism and 
his moderate perspective on politics. It might very well be true, as Crowder and Galston 
claims, that there is within the boundaries of ‘pure theory’ some sustainable inference to be 
made from ethical pluralism to a specific type of liberalism. It is however doubtful whether 
such a theoretical argument might actually give us any extra tools to build better societies 
and better lives for those who inhabit them. 
Berlin’s historically informed and worldly approach to political theory stands in 
contrast to what have become the predominant approaches to normative political theory in 
our day. Political theory has in many ways become an academic exercise, general and 
abstract in character, touching only fleetingly with the outside world (Miller 2008). While 
much has been gained in stringency and concision of thought, a lot is lost in this retreat from 
the nitty-gritty world of practical politics (Swift and White 2008).  
The most important challenge for political theory as a field of enquiry in the coming 
years will be to become politically relevant again. What I wish to suggest is that we need a 
continuation of Berlin’s approach to political philosophy and intellectual history, adapted to 
today’s world. It is also evident that there is a manifest need to connect political theory and 
the empirical social sciences, both in order to install a better sense of reality in the former, 
and to add an ethical and philosophical dimension to the latter. Political theory must, in 
essence, once again dare to invoke its alternate names of public and practical philosophy. 
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4. Karl Popper – knowledge, openness, and democracy 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will first of all discuss a few selected topics from Karl Popper’s 
epistemology and philosophy of science. Of special interest to students of politics is perhaps 
his rejection of historicism, or the idea that the course of human history is, at least in outline, 
determined by a set of ‘inexorable laws’. I will then describe some of his most important 
moral and political ideas, particularly ideas about how we could create a more open and 
democratic society. The next chapter will present some of the remarkably different 
interpretations of Popper’s political theories. 
Popper was, at least compared to Berlin, quite visibly much more of a philosophical 
system-builder. His works often give the impression that his political thought somehow 
builds on his ideas about human knowledge. This is most perceptibly found in his most 
important work, The Open Society and its Enemies, which is a large monograph covering 
topics ranging from theoretical epistemology via the philosophy of science to ethical theory. 
It is in addition a rather imaginative history of western philosophy. The Open Society is 
however primarily a political book, which combines criticism of other thinkers with the 
exploration of Popper’s own political ideas.  
Popper gave his philosophical system, his general perspectives on science and 
political problems, the name ‘critical rationalism’. As the name suggests, critical rationalism 
is a kind of rationalism. Rationalism is, in Popper’s own vocabulary, the belief that it is 
possible for us to come to know more about the world we inhabit, if we make an effort to 
understand it better. Another and perhaps more descriptive name for rationalism, also used 
by Popper, is ‘epistemological optimism’. We see that Popper is using the word rationalism 
in an unusual sense, which includes both Cartesian rationalism and Baconian empiricism 
(Popper [1945] 1966a:224f; Markie 2004). Popper claimed to be both a rationalist and an 
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empiricist – he believed that we need both our creativity and our ability to experience the 
external world in order to produce new knowledge. 
Popper’s main opponent within the rationalist camp is an idea called ‘comprehensive 
rationalism’, or the belief that “any assumption which cannot be supported either by 
argument or by experience is to be discarded” (Popper [1945] 1966a:230). To Popper, our 
knowledge of the world is of a provisional nature, and should always be met with a measure 
of scepticism. It is not the case, according to Popper, that science leads to certain knowledge 
of the world. Accordingly, none of our beliefs ought in principle to be considered beyond the 
scope of rational criticism (Popper 1935; [1959] 2002; [1963] 2002a; Wiener Kreis 1929).  
The essence, if I may be so bold, of critical rationalism is therefore that it is a 
combination of epistemological optimism and the belief that we could and should criticise 
even our most cherished and seemingly self-evident beliefs. In fact, it is through this critical 
attitude towards what we think we know that our knowledge of the world increases. It is 
moreover through criticism and refutation of traditional beliefs, as well as the subsequent 
formation of new beliefs which better explains what goes on in the world, we come to know 
more than we did at the outset. 
 Of special interest to Popper is the interesting phenomenon that the theories of 
history and society which have informed and inspired the enemies of the open society have 
been poorly conceived. Popper’s criticism of Plato, Hegel, and Marx – among western 
philosophers the three main enemies of the open society in Popper’s grand narrative – goes 
therefore to the theoretical core of their political thought. Their political theories are founded 
on a philosophy of history which according to Popper is logically flawed. Consequently, 
their normative political theories and analyses have to be rejected as well. 
The Open Society, which for all intents and purposes is Popper’s magnum opus, is 
above all a powerful argument in favour of liberal democracy as well as economic planning 
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and redistribution, making it a potent testament of a new political outlook which in many 
ways came to the forefront of political discussions during the last World War. This new 
outlook was and could indeed still be described as fundamentally liberal, and was 
simultaneously formulated by leading Liberal thinkers and policy developers such as John 
Maynard Keynes and William Beveridge. Like other and earlier proponents of what may be 
described as ‘new liberalism’ or ‘organised liberalism’ such as L. T. Hobhouse and Eduard 
Bernstein one may also describe their common political outlook as a relatively moderate and 
unflinchingly democratic brand of socialism.  
Their shared ideas and policy proposals was however subsequently most 
systematically implemented in several countries under the auspices of social democratic 
rather than Liberal parties, and may because of its commitment to democracy and planning 
be described as a new brand of democratic socialism. In fact, Popper’s political theories and 
analyses bear a strong resemblance to modern-day social democracy, while Liberal parties to 
some extent have abandoned the interventionist ‘new liberalism’ of Keynes, Beveridge, and 
Popper, and have instead adopted more traditionally liberal or ‘neoliberal’ policies.    
The most fundamental political goal for Popper is however to open up society, or to 
move it from a closed, tribal society to an open society which is more conducive to the 
growth of human knowledge. A key feature of the open society is that it is open to criticism, 
and that it tries to accommodate the free exchange and expression of ideas. Popper mentions 
several mechanisms which might help to open up a society – and among the most important 
are education, democracy, and legislation defining and defending individual rights and 
liberties, including freedom from want.  
The better society is a society where we eliminate our false beliefs instead of each 
other. We must therefore accept the basic tenet of fallibilism: “I may be wrong and you may 
be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth” (Popper [1945] 1966a:225). If we 
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accept and adopt that attitude, it will affect almost everything we do, especially when we 
consider how society ought to be organised, or what we ought to do in order to improve our 
own lot. That way, Popper may be fruitfully described as both a social democrat and a 
liberal; he was a liberal because he wanted a generous measure of personal freedom and 
democracy, but he was also a social democrat because he in addition wanted economic 
policies which would enable everyone to make effective use of the freedom and political 
rights admitted to them.   
4.2 Science and the growth of human knowledge 
4.2.1 Early problems 
Popper’s epistemology and philosophy of science, in his native German often collectively 
denoted as Erkenntnistheorie, was above all formed by his encounters with the Vienna Circle 
during a ten-year period from around 1925. By 1936, however, the ever increasingly violent 
nature of Austrian politics had led both Popper and many of the leading members of the 
Vienna Circle into exile. This decade was in many ways the formative years for Popper, 
during which he forged new perspectives on the fundamental problems of epistemology 
(Hacohen 2000). I choose not to treat his more recent discussions in epistemology at any 
greater level of detail, mostly because they primarily add detail to his earlier discussions. 
They also have little bearing on his political thought, which became more or less settled at an 
earlier date (cf. though Popper 1972; 1982; 1982a; 1983). 
One can see the influence of the Circle clearly in the way Popper adopts large parts 
of the vocabulary they developed. He also shares with them the idea that all sciences are 
basically the same activity, because they search for the truth and use the same principles to 
decide whether a given theory is trustworthy or not. He differs from the leading members of 
the Circle, however, in that he is not as adamant in his rejection of metaphysics or as 
interested in finding an inductive method as they were (Magee 1985; Popper [1976] 2002b).  
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The Vienna Circle, whose official name was Verein Ernst Mach, was named after the 
Austrian physicist and philosopher who claimed science was an activity striving to describe 
the world truthfully and economically (Mach 1905). Mach’s ideas made him the inspiration 
for a whole new generation of philosophers interested in epistemology. The Circle advocated 
a position called ‘the scientific outlook on the world’ (wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung), 
which said that if we would only let experience and logic rather than metaphysics guide our 
actions, it would be possible to build a better world for ourselves and our posterity. Less 
rhetorically loaded, their positions were also called ‘logical empiricism’ and ‘logical 
positivism’, emphasising that logic and positive experience are the basic building blocks of 
human knowledge (Wiener Kreis 1929; Jørgensen 1951; Ayer 1959).  
Popper was however hardly a card-carrying member of the Vienna Circle, but it is 
clear that he shared with its principal members a general epistemological optimism, as well a 
common idea about what the most important problems of epistemology actually were. It is 
thus only natural that it was in a series of pamphlets associated with the Vienna Circle that 
Popper’s first published monograph, the Logik der Forschung, appeared in the fall of 1934 
(Popper 1935; [1959] 2002). Popper was, in short, a sort of ‘loyal opposition’ to the Circle 
whose independent way of addressing these problems set him apart from the leading 
members of the Vienna Circle. 
A second source of inspiration for Popper was his disenchantment with Karl Marx’ 
analyses of society and the economy (Popper [1976] 2002b). Marx described his analyses of 
nineteenth century capitalism and his prediction that capitalism faced an imminent and 
violent collapse as a scientific theory or ‘natural law’. To Popper, however, it became ever 
more striking how Marxian analyses of contemporary society contradicted his own 
immediate experience. It was however the way in which his fellow communists in Vienna 
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tried every trick in the book to save these analyses from refutation that led him to the 
conclusion that Marxism was a far cry from the scientific status to which it pretended.  
The reverence with which Marxists treated their pet theories was to Popper strikingly 
different from the way even very successful theories like Newton’s laws of motion were 
discussed and criticised in the natural sciences. But it was also the callousness with which 
committed Marxists regarded human lives as expendable in the struggle to overthrow the 
present order of society, which led Popper to regard Marxism as a deeply immoral system of 
thought. These perceptions led him in turn to consider more closely how, and in what ways, 
pseudoscience differed from real science. This problem of demarcation, of how to separate 
scientific discussions from other types of communication, became the start of a life-long 
interest in epistemology. 
4.2.2 Two fundamental problems of human understanding 
Popper claimed in the Logik der Forschung that he had solved what he thought was ‘the two 
fundamental problems of epistemology’, namely ‘the problem of induction’ and ‘the 
problem of demarcation’ (Popper 1935; 1979; 1979a; [1959] 2002; [1963] 2002a). His 
proposed solutions to these two problems are the cornerstones of Popper’s ideas of how the 
scientific enterprise works – or at least should work – and more generally how human beings 
come to know more about the world they inhabit.   
The problem of induction was originally put forward in 1748 by David Hume in his 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Later, it simply became known as ‘Hume’s 
Problem’. The basic idea behind the problem is that we do not have a procedure to make 
logically sound inferences from a greater number of statements about particular observations 
to general or universal statements (Hume [1748] 2007). From the observation of hundreds or 
even thousands of black ravens, for instance, one cannot in a logically valid way infer that 
all ravens all over the world are black. We cannot preclude that we will encounter a white, 
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purple, or striped raven around the next corner. Since we cannot conclusively prove that 
future observations will be similar to past and present observations, we cannot conclusively 
decide whether or not general hypotheses or theories are true or false. Nevertheless, the 
formation and criticism of such general theories is what science is all about. In Popper’s 
words, this problem of induction becomes the fundamental problem of epistemology:  
Wir können immer nur bestimmte Ereignisse beobachten und immer nur eine 
beschränkte Anzahl von Ereignissen. Dennoch stellen die empirischen Wissenschaften 
allgemeine Sätze auf, zum Beispiel die Naturgesetze, Sätze also, die für eine 
unbeschränkte Anzahl von Ereignissen gelten sollen.  Mit welchem Recht können 
solche Sätze aufgestellt werden? Was meint man eigentlich mit diesen Sätzen? (…) In 
anderer Ausdrucksweise: Können Wirklichkeitsaussagen, die sich auf Erfahrung 
gründen, allgemeingültig sein? (Oder beiläufig gesprochen: Kann man mehr wissen, 
als man weiß?) (Popper 1979:3) 
Inductive reasoning is nevertheless an indispensible part of how human beings confront the 
world they inhabit. We simply make inductive inferences all the time, and cannot – literally 
speaking – live without them. If we did not put our trust in inductive inferences which we 
have no logical reasons to trust, but which we have no other compelling reasons to distrust 
either, it would be hard to imagine how we could sustain ourselves over a prolonged period 
of time. The problem of induction is therefore centred on the idea that we are entirely 
dependent on inductive inferences which are not strictly speaking logically sound, in order to 
be able to deal with the world in a reasonably purposeful way. 
Popper’s solution to the problem of induction is to turn inductive arguments on their 
heads, and translate them into a type of deductive arguments. If we, for the sake of argument, 
hold general theories and hypotheses to be provisionally true up until the point where they 
have been shown to be incorrect, we end up with a set of guidelines, according to Popper, of 
how to decide which general statements could be considered trustworthy and actionable 
conjectures, and which statements we instead should count as refuted. The simple idea 
behind Popper’s manoeuvre is that we cannot infer from a plethora of similar observations 
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that the next comparable observation will be analogous to others made in the past. But we 
can say that the general theory has been proven wrong if enough observations contradicting 
it have been made. He called this manoeuvre ‘the hypothetico-deductive method’, or quite 
simply ‘the method of trial and error’. In essence, we ought to try as hard as we can to refute 
our best guesses, and then discard the ones which turn out to be mistaken. 
Generally speaking, a single counter-example is rarely enough to conclusively 
disprove a general hypothesis (Popper [1959] 2002:57f). But if our experience over time 
shows that the hypothesis is misleading, we have good reasons to replace it with a new 
conjecture. Instead of trying to infer general statements and theories from a set of particular 
observations, Popper wants us to specify the conditions under which a general statement 
must be rejected. If these conditions are met, the theory is refuted. At that point, the 
challenge becomes to construct a new theory more in line with our observations, and which 
also explains why previous theories have failed. That way, our provisional knowledge of the 
world grows when we try to construct theories which are more in harmony with our 
experience, and which explain why alternative theories have failed. 
Popper’s second fundamental problem of epistemology is called the problem of 
demarcation. How could we distinguish science, which is supposed to produce dependable 
knowledge, from pseudoscience, which might lead us astray both intellectually and morally? 
Since pseudoscience might look like science on the surface, even if it does not produce truly 
new knowledge and might merely supply us with new kinds of nonsense, we need a set of 
criteria which would clearly define what science is. What is it about for instance modern 
astronomy which sets it apart from astrology?  
Popper’s solution to the problem of demarcation is related to his way of solving the 
problem of induction. It is activities which strive to falsify their own assumptions and 
hypotheses, even their most cherished presuppositions, which are to be counted as sciences 
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(Popper [1959] 2002). Practices which for some reason hold some of its assertions to be 
above scrutiny stand conversely on the other side of line drawn by Popper, as fundamentally 
unscientific pursuits. Prototypical examples of pseudoscience are according to this criterion 
astrology and theology, but also dogmatic Marxism and some equally dogmatic types of 
psychoanalysis, because of their almost inherent unwillingness to criticise some of its own 
fundamental assumptions.  
This is not to say that science does not build on presuppositions which are hardly 
ever criticised. Rather, it is the way in which all of its assumptions are in principle, if not 
always in practice, open to criticism and refutation, which makes an activity scientific. While 
most scientific activities try to test hypotheses at a fairly high level of detail and specificity, 
scientists should always be open to new ideas which might potentially refute assumptions 
which undergird their entire field of research. For Popper, the revolution in theoretical 
physics around the turn of the century, when scientists such as Albert Einstein and Niels 
Bohr amended old ideas in their areas of research, stood as a model of this open and 
critically scientific frame of mind. It is, basically, not the employment of any specific type of 
method or technique which makes science scientific, but rather the open attitude with which 
new ideas and theories are met. And while this is an ideal which might be a far cry from how 
‘the scientific community’ actually operates on a daily basis, it is still an ideal which that 
community should try to emulate and take seriously.  
4.2.3 The poverty of historicism 
Popper claimed furthermore that there was a connection between his political thought, as it 
appears in The Open Society and later essays, and the theory of human understanding he 
developed in his other works. It is primarily his book The Poverty of Historicism, originally 
published as a series of articles in 1944 and 1945, which forges a connection between 
Popper’s epistemology and his political theories (Popper [1957] 2002c). In it, he shows how 
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totalitarian ideologies build on theories of human understanding which are worlds apart from 
the scientific attitude he tried to describe and hold up as an ideal.  
 In Popper’s vocabulary, historicism is the claim that the history of the world follows 
some unalterable and predictable patterns. One can, therefore, if one has discovered those 
patterns, become a prophet who will be able to describe what the future of humanity will be. 
Integrated in this mode of thought is the idea that our moral values and ways of thinking is 
bounded by the historical era in which we live. That way, criticisms of historicist theories 
could be brushed aside quite easily as a piece of temporal parochialism or ‘false 
consciousness’, as the more orthodox followers of Marxism are prone to do. Historicism is 
also closely connected to what Popper calls holism. For the holist, society is to be likened to 
an organism with a memory and a capability to act on its own, no matter who is part of that 
society at any given point in time. It is therefore not individuals, but different types of 
collectives which are the truly important actors on the stage of world history. Mere 
individuals are primarily thought of as expendable cogs in the machinery, or at the very best 
a cell in the vast organism that is society (Popper [1945] 1966; [1945] 1966a; [1957] 2002c).  
A particularly mature expression of historicism and holism is to be found in the 
works of Karl Marx, who openly build on the idea that he has discovered the ‘natural laws’ 
which guide human history. The final breakup of capitalist society and the transition to other 
and according to Marx better types of societies are (at least according to Popper) presented 
as unavoidable future events. People living in the here and now can at most facilitate or 
sabotage this transition, but they can never alter the course of history. Marx is perhaps at his 
most lucid in his preface to the first volume of Das Kapital, where he claims that the most 
we can do is to ‘soften the birth-pains’ of the new society, which eventually and inevitably 
will force the old society off the stage:  
Auch wenn eine Gesellschaft dem Naturgesetz ihrer Bewegung auf die Spur 
gekommen ist – und es ist der letzte Endzweck dieses Werks, das Ökonomische 
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Bewegungsgesetz der modernen Gesellschaft zu enthüllen – kann sie naturgemäße 
Entwicklungsphasen weder überspringen noch wegdekretieren. Aber sie kann die 
Geburtswehen abkürzen und mildern. (Marx [1867] 1975:15-16)  
In much the same way, albeit presented in a less systematic way than Marx did, fascists have 
claimed that human existence is inevitably defined by the struggle between stronger and 
weaker life forms. It is therefore only the well-disciplined Volk or the thoroughly obedient 
society which will be able to sustain themselves in the perennial struggle for survival (Hitler 
[1925/27] 1943:311-362; Mussolini [1935] 1968; cf. Ofstad 1971). The crucial ingredient in 
the fascist frame of mind is the willingness to think of various collectives, rather than 
individuals, as the truly decisive actors. From that idea, the distance to the idea that human 
beings might be superfluous and expendable is chillingly short. 
Historicism is according to Popper characterised by a dogmatic epistemology. The 
historicist will claim that some of the beliefs contained in his theory are unshakably true and 
therefore beyond the scope of rational criticism. That way, historicism is transformed from a 
theory claiming scientific status for itself, to a set of dogma which forms the foundation of a 
static view of the world. Popper later went on to demonstrate that historicist theories of 
society and human history were poorly conceived and unable to bear any intellectual fruit, in 
the sense that we will not learn anything new from these theories (Popper 1982a). Put 
briefly, he states that the course of “human history is strongly influenced by the growth of 
human knowledge”, an idea which ought to be fairly uncontroversial (Popper [1957] 
2002c:xi). But we cannot, says Popper, predict the future growth of our base of scientific 
knowledge, or the direction that growth will take. Therefore, we cannot scientifically predict 
the future course of human history, not even in outline.  
Consequently, there can be no “scientific theory of historical development serving as 
a basis for historical prediction” (Popper [1957] 2002c:xii). For historicism to be correct, one 
needs to reject epistemological optimism altogether, and instead adopt an attitude in which it 
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is thought that the totality of potential human knowledge have been revealed once and for all 
to some intellectual ‘authority’ at one point in time. This latter idea is so ludicrous to Popper 
that any theory which implicitly or explicitly builds on this assumption – that we cannot 
come to know more than some of us already know – must surely be a philosophical canard.   
4.2.4 From epistemology to political theory 
One important point of departure for Popper’s political thought is his rejection of dogmatic 
ways of thinking, and the ideologies which build on them. The idea that all human beings – 
even Plato or Marx – are fundamentally fallible, has in Popper’s book a set of significant 
political consequences. If we cannot know anything besides pure trivialities with absolute 
certainty, it follows that our answers to political questions might also be wrong, since our 
knowledge of political and historical processes is not exempted from the general uncertainty 
connected with any attempt to get to know more about the world.  
Fallibilism will, according to Popper, issue in a wish to limit the harmful 
consequences of the mistakes we make. That way, his critical rationalism leads him to an 
idea he has described as political protectionism, which entails that the state ought to protect 
individuals from avoidable harm (Popper [1945] 1966:111f). The immediate background for 
Popper’s shift to political theory was his fear that critical thinking itself was under threat 
from various authoritarian and totalitarian ideologies. Only liberal democracy can guarantee 
a favourable political environment for critical thinking. Those who want to see human 
knowledge grow and ignorance reduced, must do what is needed to secure and diffuse an 
open and democratic type of society. This is the positive side of Popper’s political thought; 
in addition to his critique of political theories which build on dogma, he is also led to the 
idea that liberal democracy is worth fighting for.  
His basic analysis is found in a small book of interviews called The Lesson of This 
Century. In it, he presents his idea that totalitarian challenges to democracy during the 
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twentieth century constituted a real and potentially global threat to individual liberty. It was 
of course not the case that Popper, the committed anti-historicist, thought that democracy 
would overcome the totalitarian ideologies because the natural laws of history would dictate 
such a turn of events. Quite the contrary, he claims that totalitarianism might have 
triumphed, making ‘the age of democracy’ a very short parenthesis in the annals of human 
history. If that happened, we could have witnessed a lasting annihilation of effective 
opposition to totalitarianism, and humanity would have plunged itself into a long period of 
stagnation comparable to the Middle Ages in Europe (Popper 1997). 
It is according to Popper only possible to maintain one’s ability for critical thought in 
societies which admits its citizens the freedom of conscience and expression – what Popper 
called the open society. Consequently, those who value knowledge and truth ought to work 
for the establishment and maintenance of open societies. It is moreover the case that closed 
societies has to build on the idea that some beliefs, for instance those contained in an official 
political ideology or religious doctrine, should not be criticised. It is, accordingly, a close 
connection between one’s epistemological attitudes, and which answers one gives to the 
question of how society ought to be organised. 
4.3 The morality of critical rationalism  
4.3.1 Negative utilitarianism 
Popper’s philosophical writings are uncharacteristically brief when it comes to issues of 
ethics and especially ethical theory. Popper never described a complete moral theory of his 
own, but he was nevertheless an intensely moral thinker who in part grounded many of his 
ideas in sincerely held ethical convictions. Especially discussions of abstract or foundational 
problems of ethics come across as relatively succinct in his works. It would therefore be a 
wild exaggeration to say that Popper was a particularly systematic moral philosopher. It 
might very well he did not find it worthwhile to put down a detailed and systematic sort of 
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ethical theory on paper. It is also likely that he found it exceedingly difficult to write 
coherently and truly interestingly about such matters. He is also concerned about the 
prospect of not being able to produce any new insights, and that his efforts would amount to 
just ‘hot air’ (Popper [1976] 2002b:225-230). 
As a result, the parts of his writings which discuss topics from ethical theory are not 
as exhaustive as his theories of human knowledge and his normative political analyses. It is 
primarily in The Open Society one can find some of his better known, but always rather 
epigrammatic evaluations of different modes of ethical thinking. Popper made however 
frequent appeals to his moral convictions whenever he tried to say clearly why he held the 
views he defended in normative political theory and epistemology. It is the potentially good 
consequences of critical rationalism, especially the possibility that a truly critical attitude 
will reduce the amount of violence and suffering in the world which appeals to him. 
Dogmatic thinking will according to Popper create unnecessary suffering and violence, and 
we should for that reason alone avoid it (cf. Popper [1963] 2002a:477-488).  
In political ethics, Popper’s most deep-seated beliefs could be summed up under the 
heading of ‘negative utilitarianism’. More conventional utilitarianism states, basically, that 
we ought to promote or maximise happiness for the greatest number of people. The doctrine 
of negative utilitarianism advocated by Popper turns this precept on its head, and claims 
instead that we should minimise the amount of avoidable human suffering. This is an idea, 
which according to Popper ought to lead us away from Utopianism, historicism, and 
irrationalism. Instead of trying to make society perfect, we should instead try to make 
‘piecemeal’ or incremental improvements to our own present lot. 
The fundamental maxim of negative utilitarianism – ‘avoid suffering and violence’ – 
is in addition more of a rule of thumb than a duty which Popper thinks ought always to 
determine our political actions. Many types of consequentialism, Popper’s negative 
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utilitarianism included, could be stated in a way which makes it a merely partial answer to 
what we ought to do and how we ought to organise society. It is not a complete ethical 
theory, but rather an integral part of Popper’s eclectic perspective on morality. Negative 
utilitarianism is also compatible with a commitment to the Kantian dictum that one should 
treat others as ends in themselves, and never merely as means to other ends. Negative 
utilitarianism is in one footnote to The Open Society for this reason thought of as one in a 
group of three important precepts for political action:  
Although my own position is, I believe, clearly enough implied in the text, I may 
perhaps briefly formulate what seem to me the most important principles of 
humanitarian and equalitarian ethics: 
(1) Tolerance towards all those who are not intolerant and who do not 
propagate intolerance. (...) This implies, especially, that the moral 
decisions of others should be treated with respect, as long as such 
decisions do not conflict with the principle of toleration. 
(2) The recognition that all moral urgency has its basis in the urgency of 
suffering or pain. I suggest, for this reason, to replace the utilitarian 
formula ‘Aim at the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number 
of people’, or briefly, ‘maximize happiness’, by the formula ‘The least 
amount of avoidable suffering for all’, or briefly ‘minimize suffering’. 
Such a simple formula can, I believe be made one of the fundamental 
principles (admittedly not the only one) of public policy. (…) 
(3) The fight against tyranny; or in other words, the attempt to safe-guard the 
other principles by the institutional means of a legislation rather than the 
benevolence of persons in power. (Popper [1945] 1966:235n6) 
Instead of describing how society as a whole should be organised, this negatively defined 
doctrine urges us to get down to business, and try to alleviate suffering whenever and 
wherever possible. From an ethical point of view, says Popper, there is no symmetry 
between happiness and suffering. Human suffering has a direct moral appeal – the appeal 
from one human being to his fellow man for help and assistance. The demand to increase 
happiness for those who are already well off does not carry with it the same sense of 
urgency. Instead of maximising happiness we should therefore instead focus our best efforts 
at reducing avoidable suffering for all, and try to distribute unavoidable suffering as equally 
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as possible. In this sense, negative utilitarianism issues in the idea that we should alleviate 
suffering in the here and now, and eschew dreams of total human happiness and fulfilment:  
The politician who adopts this method may or may not have a blueprint of society 
before his mind, he may or may not hope that mankind will one day realize an ideal 
state, and achieve happiness and perfection on earth. But he will be aware that 
perfection, if at all attainable, is far distant, and that every generation of men, and 
therefore also the living, have a claim; perhaps not so much a claim to be made 
happy, for there are no institutional means of making a man happy, but a claim not to 
be made unhappy, where it can be avoided. They have a claim to be given all 
possible help, if they suffer. The piecemeal engineer will, accordingly, adopt the 
method of searching for, and fighting against, the greatest and most urgent evils of 
society, rather than searching for, and fighting for, its greatest ultimate good. (Popper 
[1945] 1966a:158) 
Popper’s ideas about how ideas shape the development of human societies contribute to the 
political potency of negative utilitarianism. He concludes The Open Society with the idea 
that Utopianism and historicism – key ingredients in totalitarian ideology – has led to much 
avoidable human suffering. Gradualism and democracy will on the other hand lead to less 
suffering. From a moral point of view which emphasises the importance of avoiding human 
hardship and violence, it should be relatively easy to choose between these two alternatives.   
 It is especially the idea that the present order of society has to be overturned in a 
revolution, or that we need to break down society entirely in order to improve it, which 
Popper reacts against (Popper [1963] 2002a:477-488). Any such basket-turning event must 
by its very nature include the use of force against disbelievers, moderates and potential 
traitors to the cause. In addition, the attempt to create a new order according to some 
premeditated plan will almost certainly have large unexpected and often calamitous 
consequences. Revolution is therefore at best a risky solution to whatever problems we face 
in the here and now. If one truly wants to alleviate human suffering one ought therefore, at 
least in most cases, to adopt a more gradualist approach to practical policy-making. 
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4.3.2 The humanitarian theory of justice  
So what should we do next, if we accept Popper’s idea that we should let our political 
actions be guided by the need to reduce the amount of violence and alleviate suffering? What 
Popper ultimately calls for is a more ‘results-oriented’ way of thinking about politics. This 
immediately sets his political ideas apart from Marxism and other political theories soaked in 
historicism, which claims that the tidal wave of historical laws is almost entirely outside our 
control, and that the most we can do is to open the floodgates and wait for history to happen.  
Popper’s moderately consequentialist approach to political ethics also sets him apart 
from political ideas which tend to view the methods employed in achieving some political 
goal are more important than the actual results achieved. Both dogmatic types of socialism 
and equally dogmatic brands of liberalism are political theories which tend to put much 
emphasis on how things are done, and relatively little emphasis on concrete results. 
Adherents of such theories tend to focus for instance on the importance of either public or 
private ownership. At the same time they come across as inattentive to what actually works, 
and if their reforms actually improve things. Negative utilitarianism points therefore in the 
direction of an empirical approach to politics, where one is open to new ideas, as long as 
they are compatible with a gradualist strategy of making the world a less awful place to live. 
Some social experiments are however always disallowed, namely those that demand that we 
should tear down everything and build something new from the rubble.  
Popper’s political ethics has however also a positive side. It is not only the avoidance 
and alleviation of suffering which is important to him. His so-called ‘humanitarian theory of 
justice’ appears as an aside in The Open Society, as an alternative to what Popper believed 
was Plato’s answer to the question “What does it mean to be just?”. This question was the 
point of departure in The Republic, which was described by Popper as “probably the most 
elaborate monograph on justice ever written” (Popper [1945] 1966:93). Popper, however, 
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thought that Plato’s answers to that question were totalitarian in theory and consequence. As 
an alternative, he therefore tried to describe a ‘humanitarian’ alternative: 
What do we really mean when we speak of ‘Justice’? I do not think that verbal 
questions of this kind are particularly important, or that it is possible to make a 
definite answer to them, since such terms are always used in various senses. 
However, I think that most of us, especially those whose general outlook is 
humanitarian, mean something like this: (a) an equal distribution of the burden of 
citizenship, i.e. of those limitations of freedom which are necessary in social life; (b) 
equal treatment of the citizens before the law, provided, of course, that (c) the laws 
show neither favour nor disfavour towards individual citizens or groups or classes; 
(d) impartiality of the courts of justice; and (e) an equal share in the advantages (and 
not only in the burden) which membership of the state may offer to its citizens. 
(Popper [1945] 1966:89) 
Plato, who is not a humanitarian in the sense in which Popper employed that term, meant 
almost exactly the opposite when he spoke of justice:  
The humanitarian theory of justice makes three main demands or proposals, namely 
(a) the equalitarian principle proper, i.e. the proposal to eliminate ‘natural’ privileges, 
(b) the general principle of individualism, and (c) the principle that it should be the 
task and the purpose of the state to protect the freedom of its citizens. To each of 
these political demands and proposals corresponds a directly opposite principle of 
Platonism, namely (a1) the principle of natural privilege, (b1) the general principle of 
holism or collectivism, and (c1) the principle that it should be the task and the 
purpose of the individual to maintain, and to strengthen, the stability of the state. 
(Popper [1945] 1966:94) 
There is a strong egalitarian inclination in Popper’s humanitarian theory of justice. It is clear 
from the brief quotes given above that Popper’s idea of justice goes well beyond mere 
formal equality. What his theory of justice demands is something more, namely that human 
beings should be treated – and treat each other – as equals. Privilege of class should for this 
reason be abolished. It is in short a stark contrast to Plato’s dream of a static and hierarchical 
society in which everybody know their place and perform their proper functions: 
Plato identifies justice with the principle of class rule and class privilege. For the 
principle that every class should attend to its own business means, briefly and 
bluntly, that the state is just if the ruler rules, if the worker works, and if the slave 
slaves. It will be seen that Plato’s concept of justice is fundamentally different from 
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our ordinary view as analysed above. Plato calls class privilege ‘just’, while we 
usually mean by justice rather the absence of such privilege. But the difference goes 
further than that. We mean by justice some kind of equality in the treatment of 
individuals, while Plato considers justice not as a relationship between individuals, 
but as a property of the whole state, based upon a relationship between its classes. 
The state is just if it is healthy, strong, united – stable. (Popper [1945] 1966:90, 
author’s own emphasis) 
It is not entirely clear from the outset, however, how detailed a programme for political 
action to which Popper’s theory of negative utilitarianism and his humanitarian theory of 
justice amounts. These theories, which form the very basis for his normative political 
analyses, do however point in the direction of a general commitment to liberal democracy. 
They also lead to a corresponding rejection of more traditional ways of organising society 
around privileges instead of equal civil and political rights, as well as a rejection of more 
novel types of political authoritarianism and especially totalitarianism. 
 The combination of equal rights and individualism also point in the direction of an 
active state. In The Open Society, it is clear that the author thinks of the well-designed 
democratic state as a guardian of freedom (cf. section 4.4.2 below). It is however all too 
clear to Popper that personal freedom, especially an equal distribution of such freedom, is a 
very fragile state of affairs which will require a vigilant state if it is to become a lasting 
feature of human society. He is therefore most certainly no proponent of laissez-faire 
economic policies, simply because experience has shown that such policies will lead to an 
unequal distribution of freedom – and in the end lead to much avoidable human suffering 
(Popper [1945] 1966:111).  
4.4 The politics of critical rationalism 
4.4.1 Rationality, freedom, and democracy 
Popper’s normative political theories begin with his conceptions of rationality and criticism. 
A natural point of departure is his views of how a society could encourage or discourage 
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science. He is particularly worried about the quite recent development of a new kind of 
closed society based around totalitarian ideologies which contain the belief that “the state is 
everything, and the individual nothing” (Popper [1945] 1966a:31). In such societies, it is 
often the case that science has been put under close surveillance by the state. To Popper, 
totalitarianism was a threat which, if it managed to undermine democratic institutions and 
replace them with a dictatorial system of government, could put science and indeed all kinds 
of critical thinking in jeopardy (Popper 1997).   
Popper is in several books and essays deeply worried about the prospects of securing 
a place for science in society. Knowledge cannot grow freely in totalitarian societies, 
precisely because science is an activity which needs a generous measure of intellectual 
elbow room in order to function properly. Science can only thrive in a society where it is 
possible to adopt a critical attitude towards all kinds of ideas, including the official ideology 
of the society surrounding the enquiring scientist. One can of course, at least in theory, 
conjure up the rather hazy image of enlightened despotism, or societies in which scientific 
but not political dissent can thrive. It is however – and this much was clear to Popper as well 
– a very short step from the idea that science ought not to be stifled to the idea that society 
ought to be governed in a democratic way.  
To Popper, nothing short of liberal democracy would be acceptable to the person who 
wants to encourage and take part in the collective pursuit of truth called science. The open 
society is in many ways an ideal which is outlined in the negative by Popper, in the sense he 
is more anxious to describe what the open society is not, rather than what it actually is. The 
open society is quite simply the opposite of the closed, organic, and tribal society. The 
closed society, on the other hand, is a society which sees itself as a nearly perfect, 
harmonious totality, where everyone knows his or her place within that society. It is a 
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society where criticism of the present order, or the direction in which society is heading, is 
strongly discouraged or even outlawed. 
The open society is however something more than the mere avoidance of a closed 
society. Popper’s idea of an open society is also a positive vision of a self-critical and 
democratic society, which above all is open to new ideas. It is a society which encourages its 
members to look for the truth. In many ways, the scientific ideal point directly in the 
direction of a society where everyone has the opportunity to investigate and solve whichever 
problems grab their attention. But the ideal goes further than that; it also demands that all of 
us should be free to criticise ideas put forward by others. 
That is why the ideal of an open society entails the establishment of democratic 
institutions. The government of open societies has to be responsive to rational criticism. If 
the government is not responsive, the society in question is not open in the Popperian sense. 
Holders of public office are no less human than anyone else, and occasionally they become 
emotionally attached to some of their pet ideas. It is therefore important that it is possible to 
remove them from office without having to resort to violence, if a majority of citizens 
become convinced that the government clings to erroneous theories and that other ideas 
produce better public policies and are generally speaking more appropriate.   
The Popperian vision of the open society is hesitant and gradualist down to its very 
core. It is open to bold new ideas, but only those ideas which may lead to gradual change can 
become public policy in a society which is already sufficiently open. The high costs which 
might potentially arise from committing society to radical political theories should according 
to Popper alone lead to the rejection of such theories. If one cannot rephrase one’s radical 
demands in terms of limited reform, the responsible member of society should withdraw 
such demands, precisely because of the high risks and unexpected consequences involved if 
such demands are implemented. 
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The name Popper gave to his preference for gradualism was ‘piecemeal social 
engineering’. To Popper, the idea of piecemeal social engineering was “the most central 
point in our analysis” (Popper [1945] 1966a:125). The idea carves out a clear alternative to 
thinkers like Plato and Marx, as Plato wants to arrest all change, and Marx wants to put 
society through a period of revolutionary upheaval – and only then arrest all change. The 
attitude to political reform embodied in the concept of piecemeal social engineering is by 
contrast open-ended, and accepts the idea that the further development of human societies is 
a never-ending undertaking, no matter how many small improvements one is able to bring 
about. The final goal is of no importance, the movement is everything.   
According to Popper, Plato sent political theorists on a wild goose chase which 
continues to this day. Plato made the question ‘Who should rule?’ into one of the most 
fundamental questions of normative political theory. This question is of minor importance, 
and creates according to Popper much confusion. Instead we should rather ask how we can 
organise society and its institutions in such a way that people holding erroneous beliefs do 
the least amount of damage if they come to power. With this novel approach to normative 
political analysis in hand, we are better suited to strike a more suitable balance between 
change and continuity – a balance which is essential if we want a world with less suffering 
and more protection of individual liberty than we have today:   
But if we approach political theory from a different angle, then we find that far from 
solving any fundamental problems, we have merely skipped over them, by assuming 
that the question ‘Who should rule?’ is fundamental. For even those who share this 
assumption of Plato’s admit that political rulers are not always sufficiently ‘good’ or 
‘wise’ (we need not worry about the precise meaning of these terms), and that it is 
not at all easy to get a government on whose goodness and wisdom one can implicitly 
rely. If that is granted, then we must ask whether political thought should not face 
from the beginning the possibility of bad government; whether we should not prepare 
for the worst leaders, and hope for the best. But this leads to a new approach to the 
problem of politics, for it forces us to replace the question: Who should rule? by the 
new question: How can we so organize political institutions so that bad or 
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incompetent rulers can be prevented from doing too much damage? (Popper [1945] 
1966:120-121, author’s own emphasis)  
4.4.2 Political protectionism and ‘planning for freedom’  
The humanitarian theory of justice, discussed below in section 4.3.2., leads to a particular 
‘view of the state’, namely that the state should be thought of as an instrument of protection 
against violence and other forms of oppression and exploitation, so that every person under 
its control can know both safety and freedom:    
What I demand from the state is protection; not only for myself, but for others too. I 
demand protection for my own freedom and for other people’s. I do not wish to live 
at the mercy of anybody who has the larger fists or the bigger guns. In other words, I 
wish to be protected against aggression from other men. (...) I am perfectly ready to 
see my own freedom of action somewhat curtailed by the state, provided I can obtain 
protection of that freedom which remains, since I know that some limitations of my 
freedom are necessary; for instance, I must give up my ‘freedom’ to attack, if I want 
the state to support the defence against any attack. But I demand that the fundamental 
purpose of the state should not be lost sight of; I mean, the protection of that freedom 
which does not harm other citizens. Thus I demand that the state must limit the 
freedom of the citizens as equally as possible, and not beyond what is necessary for 
achieving an equal limitation of freedom. (Popper [1945] 1966:109-110) 
We should notice how Popper’s idea of negative utilitarianism is intertwined with his idea of 
political protectionism, as well his ideas about which questions are most important in 
normative political theory. What matters is what the state does, and how competently it does 
it. It is only of indirect importance who controls the state. If the state successfully protects its 
citizens from violence and other forms of oppression, and otherwise succeeds in minimising 
suffering among all the people for which it claims responsibility, it is of minor importance 
how it does it. In practical terms, however, this principle will mean that the state’s use of 
force is put under some or another form of democratic control.  
Popper puts three different but interrelated ideas into his ‘protectionist view of the 
state’. Most importantly, the state should, as indicated by the quote above, protect its citizens 
from violence and insecurity. This entails, at least according to Popper, a second meaning of 
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protection, namely that the state should also limit the freedom of those who threaten the 
livelihood and freedom of others. The final meaning of protectionism is that the state should 
organise itself in a way which protects its citizens from avoidable evils in the future as well. 
This means that the state should minimise suffering which crop up if it is controlled by 
governments which hold on to erroneous theories.  
 An important feature of Popper’s line of thinking is the idea that politics is more 
fundamental than economic processes. This view is almost the exact opposite of the view put 
forward by Marx, who claimed that the state is an instrument of the ruling classes, which is 
defined in economic terms. Our lives are according to Marx shaped by the evolution of the 
economic system and economic class-relations. Political power comes only in third place, as 
a means of facilitating (or postponing) the inevitable development of the economy from a 
capitalist mode of production to a post-revolutionary mode. For Popper, on the other hand, it 
becomes important to insist that we should use political power to limit and control economic 
power in the here and now: 
A directly opposite view is implied in the position we have reached in our analysis. It 
considers political power as fundamental. Political power, from this point of view, 
can control economic power. This means an immense extension of the field of 
political activities. We can ask what we wish to achieve and how to achieve it. We 
can, for instance, develop a rational political programme for the protection of the 
economically weak. We can make laws to limit exploitation. We can limit the 
working day; but we can do much more. By law, we can insure the workers (or better 
still, all citizens) against disability, unemployment, and old age. In this way we can 
make impossible such forms of exploitation as are based upon the helpless economic 
position of a worker who must yield to anything in order not to starve. And when we 
are able by law to guarantee a livelihood to everybody willing to work, and there is 
no reason why we should not achieve that, then the protection of the freedom of the 
citizen from economic fear and economic intimidation will approach completeness. 
From this point of view, political power is the key to economic protection. Political 
power and its control is everything. Economic power must not be permitted to 
dominate political power; if necessary, it must be fought and brought under control 
by political power. (Popper [1945] 1966a:126; cf. also Berman 2006) 
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To Popper, political intervention in the economy is not only possible, but necessary if we 
want a society in which everyone can come to know freedom and security. Freedom will 
disappear, at least for many people, if it is not constantly redistributed by an active state 
which limits the inegalitarian results of economic activity: 
[T]he principle of non-intervention, of an unrestrained economic system, has to be 
given up; if we wish freedom to be safeguarded, then we must demand that the policy 
of unlimited economic freedom be replaced by the planned economic intervention of 
the state. We must demand that unrestrained capitalism give way to an economic 
intervention. And this is precisely what has happened. The economic system 
described and criticized by Marx has everywhere ceased to exist. It has been 
replaced, not by a system in which the state begins to lose its functions and 
consequently ‘shows signs of withering away’, but by various interventionist 
systems, in which the functions of the state in the economic realm are extended far 
beyond the protection of property and of ‘free contracts’. (Popper [1945] 1966a:125) 
Popper’s positive view of economic interventionism has its roots in a general ‘paradox of 
freedom’. The paradox of freedom simply states that “unlimited freedom leads to its 
opposite, since without its protection and restriction by law, freedom must lead to a tyranny 
of the strong over the weak” (Popper [1945] 1966a:44). Human beings should not only enjoy 
protection from physical violence, but from economic exploitation as well. There is however 
a sneaking suspicion of economic interventionism in Popper’s work. Not all kinds of 
intervention are necessarily beneficial. There is such a thing as too much intervention, and 
we might easily get to a point where the state has been entrusted with too much power.  
If the state gains too much power over the economy, some of our freedom may be 
lost. We must for that reason try to strike a balance between too many and too few acts of 
intervention. But there are some guiding lights along the way, whenever we set out to find 
the right quantity of intervention. Important points of orientation are found in negative 
utilitarianism and the humanitarian theory of justice. Economic interventionism is not 
desirable in and of itself, but only if leads to an increase in the freedom of individuals, or a 
decrease of avoidable human suffering. If a piece of regulation or economic interventionism 
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does not have the mentioned desired effects, then we should, ceteris paribus, of course 
refrain from implementing such a policy.   
To sum up, Popper’s protectionist view of the state entails an active state which takes 
the ideals of negative utilitarianism and the humanitarian theory of justice seriously. The 
state should minimise avoidable human suffering and distribute the burdens and benefits of 
citizenship equally. At the same time, state intervention should be used with caution, and 
only when it is absolutely necessary in order to ensure that we end up with the desired 
results. Popper called this last precaution a ‘liberal razor’, because the dictum would ensure 
that there would be no more intervention than necessary (Popper [1963] 2002a:471). We 
should plan for the future rather than leave things to chance, but always with individual 
freedom in mind when we do so. The ambition for government should always be to extend 
freedom and democracy to more people and new areas of society. At the end of the day, 
however, we have to find our way using the method of trial and error, so that we can steer a 
course between the two opposite perils of too much intervention and too much inaction. 
4.4.3 Organised liberalism from Bernstein to Popper 
The political theories espoused in The Open Society amounts to a position which could be 
described as ‘organised liberalism’. This term, which I have taken from Eduard Bernstein’s 
work Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie (“The 
Preconditions of Socialism and the Tasks of Social Democracy”), is used by Bernstein to 
describe the relationship between socialism and liberal democracy: 
Der Liberalismus hatte geschichtlich die Aufgabe, Fesseln zu sprengen, welche die 
gebundene Wirtschaft und die entsprechenden Rechtseinrichtungen des Mittelalters 
der Fortentwicklung der Gesellschaft anlegten. Daß er zunächst als 
Bourgeoisliberalismus feste Gestalt erhielt, hindert nicht, daß er thatsächlich ein sehr 
viel weiter reichendes allgemeines Gesellschaftsprinzip ausdrückt, dessen 
Vollendung der Sozialismus sein wird. Der Sozialismus will keine neue 
Gebundenheit irgend welcher Art schaffen. Das Individuum soll frei sein – nicht in 
dem metaphysischen Sinne, wie es die Anarchisten träumen, d. h. frei aller Pflichten 
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gegen das Gemeinwesen, wohl aber frei von jedem ökonomischen Zwange in seiner 
Bewegung und Berufswahl. Solche Freiheit ist für alle nur möglich durch das Mittel 
der Organisation. In diesem Sinne könnte man den Sozialismus auch 
organisatorischen Liberalismus nennen, denn wenn man die Organisationen die der 
Sozialismus will und wie er sie will, genauer prüft, so wird man finden, daß was sie 
von ihnen äußerlich ähnlichen feudalistischen Einrichtungen vor Allem 
unterscheidet, eben ihr Liberalismus ist: ihre demokratische Verfassung, ihre 
Zugänglichkeit. (Bernstein 1899:132; cf. Bernstein 1993:150; Steger 1997:120-150) 
It is not so much any particular passage in Popper’s works as the general direction in which 
the various arguments of The Open Society is going, which led me to think of Bernstein’s 
concept of organised liberalism. The combination of negative utilitarianism and Popper’s 
protectionist view of the state amounts to a powerful defence of liberal democracy. It 
appears, however, that Popper’s willingness to use the state in order to extend democracy 
and freedom to everyone could just as easily be described as a form of socialism, at least as 
that term has been understood by social democrats like Bernstein. 
 Popper, however, was not silent on which tradition of political thought he himself 
thought he belonged to. He claimed to have been a socialist, but only in the past tense. By 
the time of the inception and publication of The Open Society, he is apparently more 
comfortable describing himself as a liberal. But he was a left-leaning liberal of the kind who 
wants more rather than less government intervention. So much so that he could be described 
as a proponent of economic planning. Popper tried several times, particularly in lectures and 
essays written in the years after he wrote The Open Society, to distance himself from 
socialism, and to describe himself as a liberal instead. In his intellectual autobiography 
Unended Quest, for instance, he devotes much space to a description of his disenchantment 
with revolutionary Marxism, and his subsequent conversion to liberal democracy. In the 
same work, he says however that he took this conversion further, and left socialism 
altogether, and adopted attitudes more closely resembling economic liberalism: 
I remained a socialist for several years, even after my rejection of Marxism; and if 
there could be such a thing as socialism combined with individual liberty, I would be 
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a socialist still. For nothing could be better than living a modest, simple, and free life 
in an egalitarian society. It took some time before I recognized this as no more than a 
beautiful dream; that freedom is more important than equality; that the attempt to 
realize equality endangers freedom; and that, if freedom is lost, there will not even be 
equality among the unfree. (Popper [1976] 2002b:36) 
Both socialism and liberalism are however terms with multiple meanings, and it seems to me 
that Popper was a liberal only in the most inclusive sense of the word. He is most definitely a 
proponent of liberal democracy and personal freedom, but his economic policies, never fully 
developed in his writings, resembles democratic socialism more than economic liberalism. It 
is nevertheless interesting to note that Popper is neither the first nor the last to develop an 
eclectic mix of liberalism and socialism. In fact, it is more of a rule than an exception among 
moderates of either persuasion to imply that they belong to both traditions, and that they see 
no inherent conflict between liberal democracy and economic policies which are more 
usually advocated by socialists rather than liberals. 
Whereas socialists put economic policy at the centre, liberals tend to put a stronger 
emphasis on constitutional and cultural issues. Proponents of socialist economic policies 
could be either liberal or illiberal, in the sense that such policies could be combined with 
either type of attitude towards personal freedom and democracy. Conversely, right-wing 
liberals try to combine cultural and political liberalism with the idea that the state ought to 
leave the economy to its own devices. Left-leaning liberals, on the other hand, join together 
the same kinds of ideas with the idea that the state should become more actively involved in 
the economy in order to build a society characterised by ‘equality of liberty’. There is 
therefore much common ground between democratic socialism and moderate liberalism, as 
both political currents believe that everyone deserves freedom, and that the state should 
restore someone’s freedom whenever others have reduced it or removed it entirely.  
The main difference between political moderates is therefore often found in the 
question of how many spheres of society to which democracy should be extended. While 
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centre-right liberals are sceptical of too much politicisation of the economy, democratic 
socialists claim that the economy is an area ripe for more democratisation. It is quite obvious 
that the author of The Open Society belonged to the latter category. It is, however, not 
entirely clear if Popper changed his mind and moved to the right after the war. That is one of 
the most central bones of contention in the literature commenting on his political thought, 
and it is a topic to which I will return in the next chapter. But his alleged shift from socialism 
to liberalism may profitably be thought of as a change of terminology rather than substance.  
 Instead, it is clear that Popper was, at least from the inception of The Open Society 
and onward, part of a tradition of ‘organised liberalism’ which envelopes both moderate 
liberals and democratic socialists, and which contains elements of both traditions. That 
tradition of organised liberalism is itself not devoid of powerful defenders both among 
politicians and political theorists. Besides Bernstein and Popper, one should also include 
proponents of the so-called new liberalism in Britain such as L. T. Hobhouse and William 
Beveridge in this tradition of ‘organised liberalism’. Democratic socialists, again confined to 
Britain, such as J. A. Hobson and R. H. Tawney should also be mentioned. While they chose 
different political parties as their organisational base, it is easy to spot the many similarities 
in their political thought, and equally difficult to observe any fundamental disagreements.  
 Looking at the combined tradition of ‘new liberalism’ and democratic socialism, it is 
quite obvious that it influenced the author of The Open Society a great deal. It is a tradition 
marked by a love of freedom and an intense dislike for inequality – a combination which is 
all but omnipresent in Popper’s magnum opus. Of course, a tradition which emphasise the 
need for personal liberty as well the public provision of economic equality often need to 
make many hard choices (Pierson 2001; Berman 2006).  
That is where the need for politics comes into the equation. Proponents of organised 
liberalism share the belief that it is democratically elected political institutions which ought 
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to make these hard choices. In that sense, moderate liberalism and socialism is set apart from 
both traditional liberalism and neoliberalism (cf. chapter 6 below) as well as the main 
currents of Marxism. While the latter traditions tend to believe in the primacy of the 
economy over politics, moderates believe it is rather the other way around (Berman 2006; 
2009). They believe that democratically elected governments should determine how the 
economy should be structured, and that they should not leave the shaping society in the 
hands of the blind forces of historical laws or unregulated markets. 
4.5 Early conclusions 
As I noted at the beginning, it is easy to get the impression that critical rationalism is a 
system of thought in which various topics and discussions are intertwined to a considerable 
degree. It is at least apparent that Popper thought that there was and is a close connection 
between his theory of knowledge and his political thought. There is however some 
controversy among commentators as to what the precise nature of that connection actually is. 
Is for instance Popper’s political thought a sort of epiphenomenon which could be deduced 
from his other theories, and that it consequently ought to be revised if other political 
solutions is a better match for his epistemology? Or is it perhaps more fruitful to think of 
Popper’s political and epistemological thought as two sets of ideas which originate from the 
same source and reinforce each other?  
As we shall see in the next chapter, I find the latter interpretation to be more in line 
with the ideas put forward in Popper’s many books and essays touching on the basic 
questions of normative political analysis. Popper’s thought might be seen as a philosophical 
system in which the different parts of his thought overlap quite considerably. And it may be 
a philosophical system in which influence runs in all directions, and often in unexpected 
ways. There are, one might say, some common beliefs or attitudes which run through his 
political theories as well as his theories of human knowledge and his more scattered thoughts 
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about ethics and human morality, most prominently perhaps being his intense dislike – or 
hatred – of dogmatism and violence, coupled with his characteristically guarded optimism 
for the future. This guarded optimism issues in the idea that we might, in spite of it all, come 
to know more about the world than we did at the outset, and that we sometimes might 
succeed in creating and maintaining an open, democratic society. Neither of these two states 
of affairs, however, comes easy and without resistance. 
 Like Berlin, Popper used familiar ideological epithets rather infrequently. But 
whenever he did, he tended to claim that his political theories were part of a liberal tradition. 
And not unlike Berlin, he is a liberal primarily in a very general and inclusive sense of the 
word. He views liberalism first and foremost as a ‘practical’ political theory of how to build 
and maintain representative democracy, and not as a complete world view with for instance 
its own specific economic policies (cf. Sartori 1987). All through The Open Society, and in 
many of his later works, he is committed to the view that the state ought to take an active 
role in the economy in order to minimise avoidable human suffering and protect the rights 
and interests of all citizens. This, at least, is all but apparent in his presentation of ‘the 
protectionist view of the state’, in which he defends the combination of representative 
democracy and economic interventionism:  
Although the political theory which I call protectionism (...) is fundamentally a 
liberal theory, I think that the name may be used to indicate that, though liberal, it has 
nothing to do with the policy of strict non-intervention (often, but not quite correctly, 
called ‘laissez faire’). Liberalism and state-interference are not opposed to each 
other. On the contrary, any kind of freedom is clearly impossible unless it is 
guaranteed by the state. A certain amount of state control in education, for instance, 
is necessary, if the young are to be protected from a neglect which would make them 
unable to defend their freedom, and the state should see that all educational facilities 
are available to everybody. But too much state control in educational matters is a 
fatal danger to freedom, since it must lead to indoctrination. As already indicated, the 
important and difficult question of the limitations on freedom cannot be solved by a 
cut and dried formula. (Popper [1945] 1966:111; author’s own emphases) 
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His intense hatred for dogmatism and violence is, at least according to his own words, what 
leads him to reject authoritarianism in every shape and form. He is actually quite clear about 
the matter; we need democracy – even economic democracy – if science is to thrive and if 
avoidable suffering, especially political violence, is to be minimised.  
A key phrase in Popper’s ‘applied’ political thought is ‘planning for freedom’, and 
with that phrase he must have intended to say that we need a high level of public control 
over the economy, not for its own sake, but in order to secure personal freedom for everyone 
(cf. opening quotation in section 1.3.1 above; cf. also Crossman 1965). Planning, that is 
piecemeal and limited planning or ‘social engineering’, is necessary if freedom is to be a 
reality for more than a lucky few. Neither laissez-faire nor centralised all-encompassing 
planning will lead to a truly liberal and democratic society, or a society in which individual 
liberty is a prominent feature. All extremes are counterproductive, and moderation is the 
only way to favourable results. That is the central lesson from Popper’s political thought. 
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5. Analyses of Popper’s political thought  
5.1 Introduction 
Going over the literature primarily concerned with Popper’s political thought, one is struck 
by the fact that it mostly contains analyses rather than sustained criticism. The few analyses 
that have been published, however, contain obviously contrary interpretations of his political 
theories. This gives us several and mutually incompatible answers to the question of how we 
ought to understand Popper and his theories about politics, and which lessons we might draw 
from studying them.  
For many commentators, the main concern has been to place Popper’s political 
thought within a wider ideological context. The answers they have given are, to say the least, 
very different. Bryan Magee (1985) claims for instance that Popper described what the 
philosophical foundations of democratic socialism should look like. In this, Popper’s war-
time books become the pinnacle of his philosophical achievements, while his later works 
become mere footnotes and addenda. Jeremy Shearmur (1995; 1996), on the other hand, 
claims instead that Popper decisively rejected socialism and took up a more conservative and 
liberal position after the war. He also asserts that Popper should have moved even further in 
a liberal direction, towards what Shearmur calls ‘classical liberalism’, especially if Popper 
had taken his own epistemology more seriously.  
Magee says that the Popper he first met in the late 1950’s was “no longer a socialist” 
(Magee 1985:84). Popper’s later works tend after all to emphasise the importance of 
traditions and formal democracy, and make light of the need to regulate the economy. But 
that development in Popper’s thought may not be all that interesting, according to Magee. 
Even if he did adjust his political views, this does not diminish the force of his earlier 
arguments in favour of a state which protects its citizens from want and affliction. While 
Popper may have moved to the right in old age, he has still according to Magee described “as 
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no one else has ever done, what the philosophical foundations of democratic socialism 
should be” (ibid.). 
Shearmur’s stronger emphasis on Popper’s later thought opens the possibility for an 
entirely different interpretation. Shearmur argues that Popper soon after the war revised his 
ideas about economic planning and piecemeal social engineering (cf. Popper 2008). He 
applauds this relatively cautious move towards liberalism, which he finds remnants of in 
several of Popper’s later essays (Shearmur 1996:175-178). But Popper should according to 
Shearmur have taken his new ideas even more seriously, and embraced a much more drastic 
form of economic liberalism than Popper himself was willing to do. Ultimately, claims 
Shearmur, it is classical liberalism which is the political upshot of the core ideas and 
assumptions of critical rationalism, and not democratic socialism. 
Viewed in this way, Magee’s interpretation is a thesis from which Shearmur tries to 
create an antithesis (cf. Shearmur 1995). But there are other, more moderate interpretations 
which emphasise the eclectic nature of Popper’s political thought. Geoffrey Stokes says for 
instance that “contrary to widespread belief and Popper’s own declaration, his political ideas 
cannot be classified as liberal in any straightforward sense” (Stokes 1998:46). Instead, 
Stokes claims that Popper was an eclectic whose political thought is a personal mixture of 
liberalism, conservatism, and democratic socialism. There are also others, for instance Fred 
Eidlin, who emphasise the syncretic nature of Popper’s basic political analysis, and who 
claims that Popper is a social democrat whose political thought overlaps quite considerably 
with moderate liberal political theories, just like it does many other social democrats.  
 Another set of interpretations is found among thinkers closer to practical politics. 
Perhaps the most interesting of these is given in a book by the British local politician Roger 
James. What James proposes is that we should take Popper and his political thought more 
seriously, and ‘return to reason’ in order to make public policies more functional and 
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rational. Such ideas is also found in the writings of the former German Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt, who describe Popper as his ‘house chemist’, whose thought has inspired him to 
think in new ways about political problems put before him. In more ways than one, James 
and Schmidt add a sense of reality to Popper’s thought, and make a genuine contribution to 
the interpretation of Popper’s political theories, making his insights more immediately 
relevant to practical policy-makers.   
In the following chapter I will therefore first examine Magee’s interpretation of 
Popper’s political thought. I will then discuss Shearmur’s very different reading. The more 
moderate interpretations will be the focus of the third section of this chapter. Finally, I will 
discuss James and Schmidt’s ideas about how Popper’s political thought might be 
considered relevant for practical politics, before I end the chapter with a concluding section.  
In this conclusion, I emphasise the eclectic nature of Popper’s political theories. I 
reject the idea proposed by Magee and Shearmur that his political thought is an 
epiphenomenon and that his epistemology is somehow more fundamental. Instead, I suggest 
that influence runs both ways, and that both his theories of knowledge and his theories of 
politics are informed by his intense dislike for violence and human suffering. I also reject the 
idea that his thought fits neatly into any clearly identified ideological category. His positive 
attitude towards liberal democracy and economic planning makes it however much easier to 
describe him as a left-leaning liberal or social democrat. Consequently, I reject Shearmur’s 
idea that Popper could and should be viewed as a ‘classical liberal’, and his suggestion that 
Popper decidedly rejected the basic political ideas and evaluations of The Open Society 
relatively late in life. Always incurably moderate, Popper’s political thought defies efforts to 
make it a point of support for any rigidly defined political ideology. There are nevertheless 
no reasons to suppose that he ever entirely abandoned the defence of social democracy or 
‘organised liberalism’ contained in The Open Society.   
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5.2 Magee: Popper, the reluctant socialist  
In his introduction to Popper’s thought, Bryan Magee presents Popper’s ideas about 
knowledge, science, and politics as parts of a coherent, systematic philosophy. This 
philosophical system has moreover “a notably practical effect on people who are influenced 
by it” (Magee 1985:10, author’s own emphasis). It will lead us to think differently about our 
place in the world, and how we might come to know more about it. In particular, it describes 
a better way to solve many problems put before us in science, politics – and everyday life. 
Magee begins his book with a presentation of Popper’s life largely consistent with the 
narrative found in Unended Quest, Popper’s own intellectual autobiography. In it, Popper 
couples together a growing interest in epistemology with his changing political views during 
his late adolescence in Vienna (Popper [1976] 2002b). It is quite apparent that Magee views 
The Open Society and The Poverty of Historicism as the culmination of this intellectual 
development. There is, according to Magee, a strong connection between Popper’s 
epistemology and his moral and political theories. This connection is in turn richly illustrated 
in Popper’s two war-time books.   
In his account of Popper’s philosophy of science, Magee makes a distinction between 
Popper’s view and what he calls ‘the traditional view’ (cf. section 4.2 above). In science, it is 
according to Popper above all vital to remain open to constructive criticism. This scientific 
attitude is helpful in politics as well. After all, a “policy is a hypothesis which has to be 
tested against reality and corrected in the light of experience” (Magee 1985:75). Those who 
engage in politics ought therefore to remain open to criticism and try to get nearer to the 
truth by a common effort.  
In this exposition, Magee comes close to the view that Popper’s epistemology and 
philosophy of science is somehow more fundamental than his moral and political theories, in 
the sense that influence runs primarily in one direction from his theories of human 
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knowledge to his theories about how society ought to be organised. An alternative view, 
equally plausible, is the view that influences run both ways, and often in unexpected ways. 
Magee, perhaps in an effort to make Popper’s thought more accessible to wider audience, 
may have understated some of the complexities of his thought, and made Popper more of a 
systematic and uncomplicated thinker than he actually was.   
 The Open Society is above all a persistent defence of liberal democracy. Democracy 
is the only political system which actively supports open debate, and we find in Popper’s 
thought a strong preference for a type of constitution which tries to institutionalise open 
debate and political equality. A dictatorship will never become nearly as effective at solving 
problems as a well-functioning democracy, because dictators must necessarily restrict the 
flow of information in order to stay in power. It is clear, however, that Popper prefer a more 
ambitious form of democracy in which there is open competition between different political 
alternatives, and in which all citizens truly take part in the political process. 
 But while Popper certainly is a democrat, Magee wants to show that he is a social 
democrat as well. He is particularly interested in what Popper calls ‘the paradox of freedom’ 
(cf. section 4.4.2 above). Put simply, Popper states that too much freedom for the strong and 
the wealthy will destroy the freedom of the weak and the poor, and in effect lead to a 
plutocratic tyranny. The alternative is to let the state assume an active role in the economy. 
Only then can one at the same time make sure that individuals and corporations have fair 
access to the market-place, and also build good relations between workers and employers. 
Ultimately, one may even hope to achieve a state of approximate political equality, thus 
making democracy a reality, rather than a mere formality (cf. Dahl 2006).  
Formal equality of opportunity is not enough, because that will not stop the strong 
from exploiting the weak. Freedom must be curbed if it is to become a reality for all. 
Political protectionism is basically a theory which lends legitimacy to an active welfare state, 
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and to the view that the state ought to protect citizens from economic exploitation and 
physical aggression. This, of course, is directly opposed to the liberal doctrine of laissez-
faire. The conclusion must be, according to Magee, that Popper’s political thought is inspired 
by his epistemology, and also a philosophical foundation for a social democracy. 
Put simply, we should according to Magee view Popper as a reluctant socialist. The 
Open Society is a work which describes, according to Magee, what the philosophical 
foundations of democratic socialism ought to be. In other texts, however, he comes close to 
adopting the more pessimistic analysis of many liberals and conservatives, who thinks that 
the price of greater equality is a dangerous erosion of individual and economic liberty. It 
may be the case that Popper became more of a conservative liberal in his old age, slipping 
further and further away from his socialist roots. This development in Popper’s political 
affinities does not, however, in itself diminish the strength of his earlier arguments.  
In the book The New Radicalism it becomes clear that Magee wants to use Popper’s 
thought to justify social democracy or democratic socialism (Magee uses the two terms 
interchangeably), and defend it against Marxism on the far left and Toryism on the centre-
right and right wing of the political spectrum. Popper is very much present throughout this 
book, and is described as the chief influence on Magee’s own thought (Magee 1962:15). 
Magee’s position is that the Left in Britain has been burdened with a very ambiguous legacy, 
and that socialists must choose between the moderation and optimism of ‘the rational left’ on 
one hand, and the pessimistic traditionalism embodied in orthodox Marxism. As Popper did 
in The Open Society, Magee accuses Marxists of eclipsing their own activism with 
historicism and a longing for the totalitarian final solution to all problems plaguing mankind.  
Magee argues that socialists should abandon Marxism and the increasingly irrelevant 
watchwords of the past. Instead, the rational left should build on the left wing of liberal 
thought. Magee is particularly intrigued and influenced by thinkers who have claimed to be 
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both liberals and socialists, for instance John Stuart Mill and Bertrand Russell. But one can 
of course also see the influence from social democrats such as Tawney and Crosland, who 
wanted to build a democratic and generous society informed by science and open debate. 
Magee begs the Left to construct a more relevant political analysis focusing on 
contemporary problems. Progressives must abandon old categories which prohibits rational 
political action such as “capitalism” and “socialism”, and instead try to make society more 
democratic, and its inhabitants more able to make use of their freedom (Magee 1962:11ff). 
Popper is never far away in Magee’s analysis; we must approach political ideas in a more 
scientific way, and judge new policies on their merits, no matter where they come from. It is 
of course not the case that everything called socialism is morally or rationally acceptable, 
and one should therefore discuss all policy proposals in an equally critical manner. 
To care for the well-being of others is the moral foundation of political radicalism, 
says Magee, in much the same way in which Popper says that the care for fellow humans is 
the basis for negative utilitarianism. If one really cares about other human beings, one should 
try to alleviate avoidable suffering. This entails more economic equality and democracy – it 
entails a radical attitude to society, and a willingness to change it so that it suits better the 
needs of all people. 
Magee is like Popper concerned with both science and politics, and share with him a 
common way of looking at things. They also share a preference for societies which remain 
open to progress in the sciences, and societies which gives all citizens the freedom to express 
their own ideas, especially ideas which run counter to established beliefs. But freedom is 
best preserved in societies which try to overcome ‘the paradox of freedom’, by distributing 
freedom more equally. One must avoid conservatism, which discourage experimentation and 
free thinking. But one must also avoid superficially radical ideas, such as laissez-faire and 
left-wing authoritarianism, which in spite of their promises of the opposite lead to less 
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freedom and fewer opportunities for scientific and political progress. The answer must 
therefore be some form of active welfare state which encourages all to pursue, as long as 
they remain tolerant of others, their own ideas about what the good life is and entails.  
5.3 Shearmur: Popper, the enigmatic libertarian 
In his book on The Political Thought of Karl Popper and the short pamphlet Karl Popper’s 
Politics, Jeremy Shearmur sets out to analyse Popper’s political thought and the connections 
between it and his theories in other areas of philosophy. Shearmur contends in his book that 
developments in Popper’s philosophical thought after the war should have led to revisions in 
his political thought as well (Shearmur 1996:109ff). The central idea is that Popper’s various 
epistemological theories and ethical ideas ought to have led him resolutely away from 
anything resembling socialism, towards what Shearmur calls ‘classical liberalism’ (Shearmur 
1995; 1996). According to Shearmur, Popper should have pursued the parallels between his 
epistemology and his political thought even further than he actually did. This should have 
led Popper to conclude in favour of classical liberalism, far removed from the democratic 
socialism and the moderate defence of liberal democracy propounded in his war-time books.  
Shearmur begins his analysis by describing the strong radical tendency in The Open 
Society (Shearmur 1996:23-30). Shortly after the publication of that book, however, Popper 
began according to Shearmur to display a new sceptical attitude towards economic planning 
and central control. This move towards economic liberalism becomes according to Shearmur 
ever more apparent in Popper’s later essays and correspondence, even if he all through his 
life maintained some radical ideas of economic policy (Shearmur 1996:30-36; Popper 2008). 
Popper was certainly not at any point a proponent of all-out laissez-faire, but if one is to 
survey Popper’s political thought in its entirety, one must nevertheless, still according to 
Shearmur, take his increasing sympathy for economic liberalism more seriously, at least 
more seriously than Magee is willing to do.   
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 There is however also a normative side to Shearmur’s analysis of Popper’s political 
thought. Popper entertained a strong preference for relatively moderate economic policies all 
through his life, and only barely shifted his emphasis on some issues as time went on. One 
might still say, as Shearmur does, that he ought to have been a so-called classical liberal 
instead. There is, according to Shearmur, tensions between much of Popper’s political 
thought and his other theories, tensions which have led him to the conclusion that portions of 
Popper’s political thought ought to be revised. It is clear that Shearmur views Popper’s 
epistemological theories as the most fundamental element of critical rationalism. One 
cannot, according to Shearmur, view Popper’s politics entirely separate from his theories of 
human knowledge. One must always take into consideration what it is possible to know, 
whenever one tries to construct relevant moral and political theories. Shearmur’s reading of 
Popper’s political theories is accordingly an attempt to view them in light of his 
epistemology, as some sort of epiphenomena or product derived from his theories of human 
knowledge (Shearmur 1996:5).  
Shearmur envisages a one-way relationship between epistemology and politics in 
Popper’s thought. The guarded optimism which runs through his epistemology is reflected in 
his political thought. But there are strong influences from ethics as well. The Kantian 
influence on Popper is very much apparent in the way Popper extols individual liberty as a 
way of respecting the human capacity for reasoning (Shearmur 1996:109ff). Political 
institutions are in this justified only if they promote a critical and rational approach to 
problem-solving. Through the art of piecemeal social engineering, we might come up with 
solutions to new problems. Such solutions must, however, undergo critical scrutiny, so that 
decision-makers can spot errors in them, and ultimately repeal counterproductive policies. In 
that way, Popper’s philosophy of science is mirrored in his political thinking.  
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  A central theme in Shearmur’s analysis of Popper’s political thought is the changes 
he sees in Popper’s later epistemological thought. One such development is the critique of 
exaggerated epistemological optimism (Shearmur 1996:66-70). In several essays, Popper 
criticizes all kinds of extreme views in epistemology, including undue optimism (Popper 
1994b:185-209; [1963] 2002a:3-39). Popper presents in these essays an ever more hesitant 
kind of optimism. He rejects the idea that the truth is either permanently hidden, or (at the 
opposite extreme) that it is ‘manifest’ and always readily available for consultation.  
This, says Shearmur, marks a development in Popper’s thought after the war, which 
under Shearmur’s analysis has quite tangible conservative implications. It is, however, 
unclear how big this movement actually is, and if it affects Popper’s political thought in the 
way Shearmur claims it should. Nevertheless, we can see in parts of Popper’s later thought a 
new-found empathy for conservatism, when he talks about the necessity of traditions in order 
to maintain the most basic aspects of social life and public order (Popper [1963] 2002a:161-
182). This should, says Shearmur, lend support to the conclusion that Popper seriously 
thought, influenced by among others Michael Oakeshott and Friedrich Hayek, that the 
political theories of The Open Society ought to be revised in a more conservative direction. 
We should for instance acknowledge the purported fact that traditions are necessary and that 
they need to grow freely, even if it means that we in the short run must accept instances of 
economic exploitation and avoidable suffering.  
 Another development discussed by Shearmur is an alleged movement away from the 
‘methodological nominalism’ of The Open Society towards a position which Shearmur calls 
‘modified essentialism’. Now, this may come as a surprise to many readers who are used to 
viewing Popper as a relentless critic of ‘essentialism’ (cf. e.g. Berlin 2000:14). Shearmur 
says however that Popper’s thought became less hostile to essentialism, or the idea that we 
might find ‘ultimate explanations’ through the closer study of concepts and ideas (Shearmur 
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1996:124-131; cf. Popper [1963] 2002a:130-160). Modified essentialism will according to 
Shearmur add ‘structure and depth’ to our analysis of the social world, but it will also make 
it more difficult to understand and change it. It would make it much harder to develop and 
make use of scientific knowledge about human societies in the context of a mixed economy, 
which Popper in The Open Society argues is of immense importance and of great benefit to 
humanity. This is also further underlined by Popper’s new theory of traditions, which 
underlines Shearmur’s idea that economic planning is all but impossible to achieve in a 
democratic society (Shearmur 1996:130).  
It is Shearmur’s view that these new ideas should influence how a critical rationalist 
ought to think about politics (Shearmur 1996:110). Popper’s position may be that we need a 
market economy, but a market economy in which the state regulates quite extensively in 
order to protect its citizens from exploitation and avoidable hardship. Shearmur is however 
highly critical of such state intervention in the economy, and he is in this heavily influenced 
by Hayek, who says that we should be particularly sceptical of any attempt to regulate the 
economy (cf. Shearmur 1996a). According to Hayek and Shearmur, the problem with any 
conscious attempt by the state to minimise suffering is that it would involve some measure 
of a planned economy, and it will involve the attempt to centralise knowledge which might 
not be easily centralised.  
As said by Hayek and to some degree Shearmur, many of the problems identified by 
critics of the unregulated market economy might in fact be the price one has to pay to have a 
market economy in the first place. Poverty and inequality might seem unjust, but are actually 
inevitable in a market economy. Given that the unregulated market provides us with the best 
and most efficient way of allocating scarce resources, and that state intervention will 
probably only make things worse, one must simply accept such unfortunate side effects (cf. 
e.g. Hayek 1978:57-68).  
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There is also an ethical dimension to the kind of ‘classical’ liberalism which 
Shearmur thinks the committed critical rationalist ought to adopt. Just because someone 
believes strongly that society ought to be structured in a particular way, does not mean that 
one should put the contested issue in question up for a vote, which might involve the 
coercive imposition of that decision on the minority. That would be both immoral and 
probably ill advised. Coercion should only be used with the utmost of care, and only if no 
other solution is available. One should at least take care not to flout individual (negative) 
liberty in so doing, and refrain from establishing coercive institutions which might prove to 
be easily subverted and used as instruments of oppression. In this, Shearmur combines 
classical liberalism and conservatism in a characteristically Hayekian fashion. 
 Popper says, according to Shearmur, not enough about how political institutions 
should work, institutions which are supposed to transform his ideals of political 
protectionism and negative utilitarianism from theory to reality. Shearmur claims that the 
market is better at learning from mistakes than politicians, and points in the direction of less 
government and fewer fetters on the market economy. We should go, in other words, in the 
direction of classical liberalism or neoliberalism (cf. chapter 6 below). If we follow Popper, 
and admit that humans are fallible and that human knowledge is provisional, then we would 
want the diversity created by an unregulated market economy, so that everyone could learn 
from the mistakes they make – and from each other (Shearmur 1996:116-124). Quite 
regardless, it seems, of what the author of The Open Society claimed we ought to have 
learned from or experiences with the classical liberalism of the nineteenth century, under 
which it became all but apparent that a lack of governmental oversight of the economy 
directly led to much avoidable human suffering. 
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5.4 Popper, the incurable moderate 
5.4.1 Stokes: political eclecticism 
Like Magee and Shearmur, there are also others who conclude that Popper’s thought could 
be viewed as a coherent or harmonious philosophical system. But this does not necessarily 
mean that they all believe Popper’s political theories should follow from his allegedly more 
fundamental ideas in epistemology, as supposed by Shearmur. It is in fact entirely possible 
that Popper’s political views might have influenced his epistemology. Geoffrey Stokes 
(1998) explores this idea in a survey of Popper’s thought. We should, says Stokes, instead 
view Popper’s philosophy as a series of overlapping answers to related problems in 
epistemology, science, and politics.  
It is important for Stokes (1998:1) to emphasise that Popper’s epistemological and 
political thought is enmeshed together in a complex relationship where influences run both 
ways. Popper starts out, according to Stokes, with an intense disgust for all kinds of 
violence, and in particular politically motivated mass violence. But this leads him 
immediately to an equally intense antipathy for dogmatism and historicism, which he 
believes leads to such violence. At the same time it is clear that critical rationalism is a 
general approach to problem-solving, which should influence the way one deals with 
problems of all kinds. All types of inherited ideas and beliefs should be scrutinised, so that 
one may hope to devise better solutions in science and politics alike.  
 We find, says Stokes, many examples in Popper’s books of how his political thought 
influences his epistemology and philosophy of science. Throughout his works, Popper 
presents several attempts justify his general doctrine. The adoption of critical rationalism as 
a way of looking at things is in many ways the result of a radical choice not entirely based on 
arguments about which doctrine is the most truthful. Such a choice is also grounded in moral 
and political ideas about which ultimate goals one wants to see realised (Stokes 1998:16-18): 
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Thus I freely admit that in arriving at my proposals I have been guided, in the last 
analysis, by value judgments and predilections. But I hope that my proposals may be 
acceptable to those who value not only logical rigour but also freedom from 
dogmatism; who seek practical applicability, but are even more attracted by the 
adventure of science, and by discoveries which again and again confront us with new 
and unexpected questions, challenging us to try out new and hitherto undreamed-of 
answers. (Popper [1959] 2002:15) 
For Popper, it is in particular the goal of attaining ‘freedom from dogmatism’ which 
permeates his thought in many different areas of philosophy. His epistemology presupposes 
the existence of political institutions which guarantee the freedom of thought and expression. 
His whole philosophy is geared towards promoting the values of the open society (Stokes 
1998:46ff). It is moreover clear to Popper that scientific progress depends not only on the 
‘internal’ ability of the scientific community to accumulate knowledge, but also on an 
‘external’ competition between different ideas and theories. And such competition must be 
promoted politically if it is to last: 
Science, and more especially scientific progress, are the results not of isolated efforts 
but of the free competition of thought. For science needs ever more competition 
between hypotheses and ever more rigorous tests. And the competing hypotheses 
need personal representation, as it were: they need advocates, they need a jury, and 
even a public. This personal representation must be institutionally organized if we 
wish to ensure that it works. And these institutions have to be paid for, and protected 
by law. Ultimately, progress depends very largely on political factors; on political 
institutions that safeguard the freedom of thought: on democracy.  
(Popper [1957] 2002c:143)  
Stokes presents a widely accepted interpretation of Popper’s political thought, namely that 
Popper was first and foremost a proponent of liberal democracy (Stokes 1998:57). 
Democracy is important to Popper for two reasons. Democracy is vital because it encourages 
a free exchange of ideas, which leads to scientific progress and thereby to the growth of 
human knowledge. But democracy is equally important solely in political and moral terms, 
because it is the most effective way of ensuring effective protection against violence and 
economic exploitation of individuals (Stokes 1998:65).  
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Going through Popper’s political thought, Stokes finds much to support the idea that 
democracy, freedom, and equality are very important ideals to Popper. They are however in 
addition values which provide, when they inform the way in which the government is run, an 
infrastructure which makes critical thought and truly scientific discussions possible (Stokes 
1998:61). We can see that Popper perceives freedom of thought and expression as a 
precondition for the growth of human knowledge. Viewed in this way, it is obvious that the 
values of liberal democracy – individual freedom, equality, and toleration – permeate all 
aspects of Popper’s philosophy.  
We can also find, according to Stokes, a conservative supplement to Popper’s 
liberalism, emphasising personal responsibility and the importance of traditions – at least 
traditions which support science and democracy. Traditions may be necessary, or even 
indispensible, as they regulate important aspects of social interaction. This does not, 
however, preclude criticism of established traditions. We may need order and regularity in 
our lives, but we should nevertheless be free to evaluate whether or not our traditions are 
ripe for revision. It may therefore be that the conservative ideas presented in some of 
Popper’s later essays are noticeable but not particularly strong, and never quite as important 
as the democratic spirit which flows through all his works dealing with political questions.   
 One might even with Stokes claim that Popper’s political thought resembles social 
democracy more than anything else. In The Open Society, he demands that the state should 
intervene in the economy in order to protect its citizens from harm and exploitation. He does 
not explicitly go back on such ideas in later works, and it is odd to suppose that a person 
who is supposed to have become a conservative and so-called classical liberal does not do 
so. Instead, one could assume that Popper stands by his demand for political and economic 
reforms which would secure individual autonomy and protection against economic 
exploitation. He was a social democrat, and like other social democrats, he shared a liberal 
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suspicion that the state may become too powerful, as well as a conservative scepticism of 
revolutionary change and abrupt departures from traditional arrangements.   
Political and economic reform is after all possible and often desirable, but the goal 
behind such reforms must always be to secure emancipation through participation in 
democratic processes (Stokes 1998:68). That is the central lesson from Stokes’ interpretation 
of Popper’s political theories. The growth of government may however lead to a perilous 
concentration of power in the hands of politicians and public managers. At the same time, 
we see that Popper, because of his pronounced egalitarian and humanitarian impulses, rejects 
the idea that freedom is to be understood exclusively in negative terms, as the absence of 
state intervention. Ultimately, the dangers of a powerful state must be dealt with through the 
use of piecemeal approaches to political reform. In politics, we must move forward as we do 
in science, through trial and error – and through the acknowledgement of our own fallibility.  
Put briefly, it is according to Stokes difficult to place Popper’s political thought 
unambiguously in one of the familiar ideological categories of liberalism, conservatism, and 
democratic socialism. So eclecticism runs through Popper’s political thought. But it might 
also be said that Popper is eclectic in much the same way as most social democrats are. That 
is why Stokes (1998:70-73) in the end must admit that Popper’s thought closely resembles 
modern-day social democracy – of which Magee’s book on The New Radicalism is a typical 
example – and that the liberal and conservative nuances in his thought are not more 
pronounced than what one would find among other moderate and egalitarian democrats.  
5.4.2 Eidlin: Popper, the moderate socialist 
A final comment in the debate over Popper’s ideology comes from Fred Eidlin, who 
specifically – and much more directly than Stokes – attacks Shearmur’s interpretation (Eidlin 
2005:29). Shearmur’s main theses, that Popper became a liberal late in life and that he 
should have moved further to the right if he had taken his own epistemological ideas more 
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seriously, are both rejected by Eidlin. Instead, Eidlin says that Popper always “recognized 
and accepted the enormous difficulties facing the social engineer” (Eidlin 2005:45), and that 
governance in a sufficiently open society is an activity wrought with moral difficulties and 
pitfalls. That is, however, at best a very weak argument for sitting idly by and watch 
avoidable human suffering take place, which is apparently what Shearmur with his political 
theory of ‘classical liberalism’ is recommending.  
Eidlin claims, like Magee, that The Open Society is Popper’s most important work in 
political philosophy. And that book is certainly no defence of deregulation or ‘free-market 
liberalism’. Eidlin regards Popper’s other political texts as addenda to The Open Society. 
One can wonder, says Eidlin, why a person who allegedly changed his views from a 
moderately left-leaning position to free-market conservative liberalism did not bother to say 
so in subsequent editions of his perhaps most famous book. Not even in the ‘letter to Russian 
readers’, which Popper wrote as a preface to the first legal Russian edition in 1992, did he 
reject the positions presented in that book (Eidlin 2005:32; cf. also Popper 2008:394-401).  
Eidlin is unable to spot any clear inconsistencies between the epistemological and 
political parts of Popper’s philosophy. Eidlin also says that it is difficult to see any direct 
inconsistencies between Popper’s war-time books and his later thought, even if he elaborated 
some ideas, and expanded into some new topics, most notably the ‘body-mind problem’, in 
his maturity. Even the young Popper was for instance very well aware of the fact that we can 
achieve our most ambitious political goals only with great difficulty, and that any effort to 
produce political change will likely come with many unintended and undesirable 
consequences. That however is not, to reiterate, an argument for doing nothing, and certainly 
no argument for classical liberalism.  
While Eidlin (2005:45) admits that Popper’s views on public policy are “sketchy and 
theoretically underdeveloped”, he cannot see strong evidence in favour of the view that 
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‘classical liberalism’ is a political outlook which is ultimately compatible with Popper’s 
philosophy. Quite the contrary, the arguments against laissez-faire in The Open Society are 
still as valid today as they were then, and that proponents of such policies have not been able 
to devise convincing arguments to the contrary. According to Eidlin, however, it may 
actually be a positive aspect of Popper’s political thought that he refuses to discuss political 
matters in full detail. What Popper offers us is not solutions to particular problems, but a 
method which makes it possible for us to confront future and hitherto unknown problems. 
And that is, says Eidlin, exactly what we need. We have to give relevant answers to the 
question of what to do next, no matter how daunting the problems before us may seem.  
We can however learn from our mistakes, and try to come up with better solutions 
next time. In this, Shearmur makes the same mistakes as Marx did. Both claim that human 
actions are always bound by economic structures, and that we need to wait for the vast, 
impersonal forces which control the economy to provide solutions to our problems. 
Economic liberals and Marxists believe in the primacy of economics, and that political 
processes will not be able to steer economic processes. Popper and social democrats believe 
on the other hand in the primacy of politics, or the idea that real change could come about 
through a coordinated political effort (Eidlin 2005:42-46; cf. also Berman 2006).  
Popper is in this a democrat first and foremost. His idea of piecemeal social 
engineering is basically a method for political reform in a liberal democracy. And the fact 
that liberal democracies actually work, vindicates the piecemeal approach to political 
change. The burden of proof now lies with those who say that revolutionary upheaval is 
necessary, or those who say that we will profit most if we let the market economy solve our 
problems for us. This is perhaps where the continued relevance of Popper’s political thought 
lies; the doctrines which Popper criticised – historicism, essentialism, Utopianism and 
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holism – are still cherished beliefs today, and the fight for openness, freedom and democracy 
must therefore continue.   
5.5 Popper’s political thought in action 
5.5.1 James: Reason and public life 
Perhaps the most interesting contribution to the understanding of Popper’s political thought 
is given by the British physician and local politician Roger James (1998). James does not try 
to fit Popper’s thought under an ideological epithet. Instead he wants to get nearer to the core 
of Popper’s political theory, to Popper’s idea that we ought to prefer political reforms based 
on rational thought and concrete knowledge. We should take Popper and his political thought 
more seriously, and ‘return to reason’ in order to make public policies more functional. 
 James starts out by investigating the strange phenomenon he calls ‘the power of 
wrong ideas’. In politics we can see how people prefer to believe in ideas which are 
demonstrably false because they are pleasing to the politician who does not care to study the 
matter at hand in a critical manner. This leads to a situation where people literally get the 
wrong idea, and nobody questions the conventional wisdom. Needless to say, this leads to 
inefficiency and unreasonable conduct in public life; political processes will not reach their 
professed goals, and not deal with real problems.  
 James believes that a dose of Popper’s philosophy may ease the strangle-hold of 
wrong ideas. Failed policies, he contends, are for the most part caused by a few common 
delusions. These are simple mistakes which are all discussed by Popper, and we can use his 
thought to retrace what went wrong in each case. That way, we can become aware of popular 
mistakes, and avoid making them again in the future. The alternative to making the same 
mistakes over and over again is to adopt a rational attitude to problem-solving in politics. 
One must acknowledge one’s own fallibility and try to open even one’s most cherished and 
seemingly self-evident ideas and beliefs to critical scrutiny.  
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A central mistake is to believe that solutions or theories which seem substantiated are 
certainly and unshakably true. Those who want to make better public policies ought 
accordingly to value rational criticism as a resource which will enable everyone to produce 
better policies in the future. Instead of ignoring or punishing critics, the state should engage 
with those who voice such criticism, and try to establish institutions which would give these 
critics an opportunity to continue to scrutinise public policy. That way, we can gradually 
move closer towards better policies in public life, just like we through critical discussions 
move closer to the truth in science (James 1998:10ff). 
 According to James, there are five basic mistakes which are often made in politics 
and public administration (James 1998:3-6). One common mistake is to try to solve a 
problem before it is clearly understood what the problem actually is. A related mistake is to 
ignore that any solution or policy initiative no matter how elegant or well thought-through 
will ‘have its snags’. Often, policy-makers end up undermining their own policies or stirring 
up unnecessary opposition because they did not care to engage seriously with critics, and to 
correct mistakes as they happen.  
A third common mistake is to confuse laws with trends. Even if we can witness a 
strong trend, we cannot conclude that it will continue indefinitely. We cannot, either, 
confirm a hypothesis merely by finding facts that support it. Instead, policy-makers must like 
scientists criticise their pet theories. A final widespread mistake is the failure to distinguish 
‘established scientific theories’ from ‘unsubstantiated speculations’ and ‘theories which are 
partly dead, but will not lie down’. Beliefs which are at best partially accurate, but which 
continue to misinform the public because they are pleasing, contribute greatly to the 
continuation of ineffective policies. 
 Popper’s idea that we move forward through trial and error and through the 
formulation of new theories which match our experience better, is according to James 
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relevant to policy-making as well as science. Democracy is in this not only a necessary 
condition for a healthy scientific debate, but also a platform for using the scientific method 
of trial and error for solving more immediate political problems (James 1998:66-68). If we 
open up policy-making processes to critical thinking, we might avoid policies which remove 
us further away from our ultimate goals of minimizing suffering and building better 
communities and societies. 
Policy-makers need to know what the wishes of the people are, and how their policies 
affect the lives of ordinary citizens. Likewise must those at the receiving end of public policy 
be told what the state does, and why. That way, relevant criticism of public policy may arise. 
Put simply, both politicians and scientists make mistakes, and need critical comments on 
their thoughts and actions in order to correct the mistakes they make. Scientists cannot know 
whether or not their conjectures are the final truth about the matter in question, and policy-
makers cannot know all the effects and side-effects of their reforms. This need to build 
institutions in which past mistakes are routinely corrected, is according to James the 
fundamental parallel between science and democracy in Popper’s thought. Experts and 
specialists of all types, from physicians to bureaucrats, cannot find the truth all by 
themselves. For this, they also need a thriving and inclusive public debate. 
We can see in Popper’s thought, says James, that both science and politics must build 
on a method of trial and error. If this basic logic is not in place, the mistakes described above 
may lead to unnecessary hardship. The method is quite simple; first one must identify an 
actual problem, and then describe it in detail. Preferably, this should be done publicly, so 
that others can take part in the ensuing discussion. That way, one can reach a better 
understanding of what the features of a good solution may be. One can then, and only then, 
try to formulate a tentative solution, which may be criticised before its implementation.  
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This tentative solution to a political problem is akin to the tentative theory which 
scientists use to explain inconsistencies between the information available to us and old 
theories. The next step is to describe criteria for success and failure for the proposed solution 
which after debate becomes public policy. Finally, the implemented policy ought to be 
criticised yet again, so that one can make improvements in light of the experiences made, or 
suggest new reforms. This never-ending, critical approach to politics is according to James 
the expression of a typically ‘scientific’ attitude characterised by intellectual modesty and 
affection for rationality. It is also, incidentally, the very basis of any healthy democracy.   
5.5.2 Schmidt: The defence of freedom and pragmatism 
It is remarkably rare among prominent politicians to reveal any sort of interest in, let alone 
influence from, contemporary political theory. The influence of academic debates in political 
theory and philosophy on the world of practical politics and policy-making is in our day at 
best quite faint and indirect. Often, such influence comes only trickling down through think 
tanks or individual intellectuals who translate philosophical ideas about politics to a 
language which politicians and policy-makers may understand.  
One interesting exception to this rule is found in the writings of Helmut Schmidt, 
who was Federal Chancellor of Germany from 1974 to 1982. During and after his tenure as 
Chancellor, he has taken a quite noticeable interest in both the findings of social science and 
various discussions in political theory, and in particular Popper’s political thought. In one 
place, he counts Popper as a philosophical mentor, alongside other sources of inspiration 
such as Max Weber and Marcus Aurelius. What these writers have in common is that they 
have written philosophical works about politics in a way which makes sense to active 
politicians (Schmidt 2008:336). The difference between Popper and these other philosophers 
is, of course, that Popper was Schmidt’s contemporary. Through occasional meetings and 
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correspondence, they discussed among other things Popper’s political thought as well as 
burning political problems of their day, in which the two men both took a keen interest.  
From Popper’s political thought, it is especially the notion of piecemeal social 
engineering which has captured Schmidt’s imagination, and which suits Schmidt’s own 
often conspicuously pragmatic inclinations quite well. Like his fellow social democrat 
Magee, Schmidt also thinks of Popper’s thought as a centre-left phenomenon. He does not 
even contemplate the possibility of viewing Popper’s thought as a defence of so-called 
‘classical liberalism’, and seems wholly unaware of the whole idea presented by Shearmur.  
One of Schmidt’s favourite sayings, das Schneckentempo ist das normale Tempo 
jeder Demokratie or ‘the snail’s pace is the normal pace of every democracy’, neatly 
captures the very core of Popper’s theory of piecemeal social engineering. The democratic 
approach, which emphasises open and thorough debate, also ensures that society becomes 
more open to new ideas. In contrast, the Utopian method of social engineering will almost 
inevitably lead to internal conflict, war, and in some cases to mass murder. Worst of all, 
however, it will lead to a malignant form of conservatism, in which there is no room for new 
ideas in opposition to the official ideology: 
Totale Utopien können zur totalitären Gewaltanwendung verleiten. Offene, das heißt 
demokratische Gesellschaften (oder modisch gesprochen: pluralistische 
Gesellschaften), sind mit den politischen Maximen einer totalen Utopie oder eine 
Handlungsanweisung zur Verwirklichung eines völlig anderen gesellschaftlichen 
Systems nicht vereinbar. Eine demokratische, eine offene Gesellschaft pervertiert 
zum geschlossenen, totalitären Staat, wenn zugunsten eines abstraktes Ideals die 
Pluralität der politischen Zielsetzungen selbst aufgegeben wird. Wenn man unseren 
Staat davon bewahren will, so bleibt der Politiker auf eine schrittweise Veränderung 
angewiesen, wobei jedem Schritt ein dafür ausreichender Konsensus (und das heißt: 
Kompromiß!) vorausgeht. Nur dies kann der Demokrat eine rationale Art der Politik 
nennen. (Schmidt 1996:150) 
 
Schmidt is in this quote to be heavily influenced by Popper’s political thought. At least, it is 
clear that Popper and Schmidt had overlapping political inclinations, and that Schmidt chose 
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to frame his own criticism of Utopian radicalism in a language originally shaped by Popper. 
To Schmidt, Popper’s idea of an open society is a description of what a democratic and 
pluralistic society should look like, and of what existing democracies should aspire to 
become. Schmidt’s ideal democracy is, not unlike Popper’s open society, a far cry from a 
perfect society, but it is a society which strives to forge fragile compromises between 
different and often incompatible ideals and interests. Such a democracy must necessarily 
build on steady, incremental reforms rather than intermittent, revolutionary upheavals. 
Utopianism and radicalism is therefore in Schmidt’s books a latent threat to democracy, 
because their revolutionary potential undermines the spirit of compromise which permeates, 
or at least should permeate, political processes in a democracy.  
Schmidt is in many ways more straightforward than Popper, especially in his 
rejection of all kinds of Utopianism and other forms of political extremism. Whereas Popper 
treats Utopianism as a formidable philosophical opponent, Schmidt is much more directly 
dismissive of almost all kinds of visionary political thinking. The central lesson of Schmidt’s 
political thought is however directly derived from Popper’s theories of the open society and 
Utopianism, namely that one cannot have one’s cake and eat it too. One must choose 
between democracy, with all its inherent conservatism and frustrating compromises, and 
Utopianism, with its fraudulent promise of a totally different, perfect society. 
Like so many of the generations who were young before and during the two world 
wars, both Popper and Schmidt were keenly aware of the fragility of democracy and indeed 
ordinary human decency, as well as the dangers of political extremism. In fact, it is probably 
not possible to fully understand the sense of urgency contained in The Open Society and The 
Poverty of Historicism, without realising that they were written at a time when the enemies 
of democracy, human rights, and personal freedom were ready to extinguish the idea of an 
open society altogether. It is not an accident that Popper in his autobiography rote about 
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these two books as his contribution to the war effort. To Schmidt, however, Popper’s theory 
about the open society is still relevant, as an effective antidote to the hot air presented by 
visionaries and radicals of all political stripes.  
 Much in Schmidt’s political writings is based on his own unique set of practical 
experiences in politics, but the basics of his political thought is either shared with or derived 
from the theories and narratives presented by Popper in The Open Society. In his foreword to 
the anthology Kritischer Rationalismus und Sozialdemokratie, Schmidt presents critical 
rationalism as his preferred alternative to Marxism, and as the foundation of his own social-
democratic political convictions (Schmidt 1975). Later still, in a contribution to a Festschrift 
in Popper’s honour called In Pursuit of Truth, Schmidt describes the idea of an open society 
as the main alternative to the authoritarianism. Freedom, democracy and a piecemeal 
approach to political reform coincide with each other, just like Utopianism, totalitarianism 
and political mass violence tend to appear together (Schmidt 1982).  
Viewed in this way, Schmidt’s political thought may be thought of as an applied and 
perhaps popularised version of Popper’s social and political theories. And that may not be 
far from what Schmidt intended, even if he goes to great lengths to make Popper look like a 
pragmatic and incurably sceptical social democrat, not entirely unlike Schmidt himself.  
5.6 The politics of critical rationalism  
According to James (1998:vi), the usually observant British newspaper The Observer led its 
reports of Popper’s death in 1994 with the headline ‘Hero of the Right dies’. To place 
Popper and his political theories squarely on the right wing of the political spectrum must be, 
according to James at least, the result of a bald-faced misreading of Popper’s thought. 
Nevertheless, Popper has been quite popular among some right-wing liberals who have 
sought to enlist his well-known concept of the open society in their quest to delegitimise and 
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reduce public intervention in and regulation of the economy (cf. e.g. Fogh Rasmussen 
1993:194-205). But it may not be all that far-fetched to view Popper as a political thinker 
who occasionally has uttered and written sentences which may lend legitimacy to right-wing 
liberal economic policies. At least not as far-fetched as James apparently thinks.  
There is agreement in much of the secondary literature that Popper moved to the right 
after the war, closer to the liberal economic policies and assessments which he met with 
outright scorn in his war-time books. Even Magee has said, as mentioned earlier, that the 
older Popper was ‘no longer a socialist’, and that it is primarily Popper’s war-time books 
which serves as an inspiration for Magee’s own relatively moderate brand of democratic 
socialism. Popper even attended at least some of the early meetings of the Mont Pèlerin 
Society, a professedly liberal organisation which was originally convened by his friend F. A. 
Hayek, and which later became a leading force behind several ‘neoliberal’ reform initiatives. 
A paper he read at one of these meetings in 1954 does not, however, come across as a 
decisive shift away from the relatively moderate political attitudes expressed in The Open 
Society (Popper [1963] 2002a:467-476). There are no indications, either, which suggest that 
Popper became a permanent or prominent member of this ‘neoliberal thought collective’ (cf. 
Mirowski and Plehwe 2009).   
Even if Popper moved to the right, it is not clear to what degree he did so, and why 
he did not distance himself more resolutely from the quite radical economic interventionism 
he advocated in his war-time books. It is not clear, either, why Popper’s alleged shift in 
political attitudes should diminish the force of the arguments in his earlier works. But as 
Shearmur has shown it is not at all impossible to interpret Popper’s thought, or at least his 
most basic ideas, as leading to a ‘classical liberal’ political position characterised by a strong 
preference for unregulated markets and largely inactive states.  
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While Shearmur seems to me to have produced an exceptionally naive analysis of 
what the consequences of an unregulated market economy actually are, I accept that he is not 
alone in his faith in the blessings of the unrestrained market economy. He is also excessively 
pessimistic about the kind of role economic regulation and oversight may serve in a 
democracy, in order to create real political equality and a healthy public debate. Shearmur is 
in this nearly unable to see the subtle nuances between a democratic welfare state financed 
by high tax rates on one hand, and totalitarian, Soviet-style economic planning on the other. 
One must simply choose a traditional kind of liberalism in economic policy, or risk 
embarking on a slippery slope towards totalitarianism.  
It seems to me however, and I believe that I am in agreement here with the author of 
The Open Society, that the laissez-faire policies advocated by Shearmur will lead to much 
avoidable human suffering. The many differences between the kinds of economic 
redistribution taking place in a democratic welfare state and the all-out dirigisme which is 
the hallmark of some twentieth century dictatorships must be all but apparent to anyone who 
wants to study the matter closely. One may even claim that these differences illustrate the 
basic distinction between piecemeal and Utopian social engineering, which Popper described 
in The Poverty of Historicism.  
It is not, either, entirely clear how an entirely unregulated market economy is 
compatible with democracy, which relies on a public space where it is possible to reflect 
critically on, and propose solutions to, current political problems. In fact, unregulated 
markets, especially unregulated media markets, will frequently lead to a less open-minded 
public debate about the most pressing issues of the day. While Shearmur tries to recruit 
Popper’s thought for classical liberalism, he is not entirely successful in so doing. Perhaps 
one needs regulation in order to minimise suffering and maintain an open-minded political 
conversation going after all? 
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In spite of the fact that Popper is occasionally and habitually described as a 
proponent of liberal economic policies (cf. e.g. Judt 2009), his influence is at least as strong 
on the left side of the political spectrum. Magee, James, and Schmidt are all prominent 
examples of moderate socialists with an interest in political theory who claim to be 
influenced, indeed heavily influenced, by Popper’s thought. They apparently see little or no 
conflict between their own political beliefs and ideas, and Popper’s philosophy. In fact, they 
seem to be able to integrate Popper’s thought quite well with their other political attitudes 
and assessments, assessments which are far removed from Shearmur’s ‘classical liberalism’.  
Magee is more outspoken than the other two, who remain quite satisfied with the 
drawing of quite general lessons from Popper’s thought. Magee was of course aware of the 
fact that Popper was not at all very clear about his ideological affiliations, and that he after 
the war chose to talk of himself as a liberal, if he spoke in such overtly political terms at all. 
Popper was also late in life pessimistic about the whole idea of building a society in which 
extensive individual liberty is combined with equality and economic security for all, which 
with some justice might be considered central to the social democratic project to which 
Magee subscribes. But Magee definitely has a point, when he claims that Popper’s war-time 
books points in the direction of a position quite close to modern-day social democracy.  
Regardless of this, however, it remains that Popper’s thought is quite nourishing food 
for thought, for both liberals and socialists. He is a political philosopher whose theories are 
perhaps too inaccurately formulated and too much soaked in historical narratives to be of any 
real value to political theorists in our day and age. They are generally more preoccupied with 
quite general and abstract conceptual analyses rather than concrete choices between different 
alternative policies. One can however see why politicians like James and Schmidt are 
attracted to Popper’s thought, who may not be too rigorous, but which certainly is a breath of 
sweeping analysis in the world of practical politics. Popper is a political thinker who is not in 
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the business of providing clear and complete answers to any possible questions about how 
society ought to be organised. To leave some things open is the very core of Popper’s idea of 
an open society. But this means, also, that his thought is adaptable, and that his theories 
could be read as a warning to radicals and Utopians of any political flavour, and as an 
inspiration to moderates across the political spectrum.  
It is a mistake, and a regrettable attenuation of his thought, to view Popper just as a 
hero of the Right or classical liberalism, or indeed any other ideological tradition demanding 
that a fixed set of policies should be implemented no matter what. His thought might even be 
read quite profitably using different ideological spectacles. Much is left to considerations 
about which methods and organisational principles will bring about desired outcomes, such 
as increased rationality in political affairs, more democracy, and alleviation of avoidable 
human suffering.  
Some people may think that an unregulated market economy will lead us closer to 
such results. Others may be more sceptical about markets, and prefer public redistribution of 
resources to a greater degree than others. Popper’s thought is adaptable to, and not from the 
outset incompatible with these different background ideas about economic policy. The 
choice between a market economy and a more controlled economic system is at the end of 
the day a choice which must, and indeed ought to be, an empirical matter.  
Sound economic policy must build on systematic efforts to find out which 
organisational principles work in which situations, and under what circumstances. To bind 
oneself to the mast, and commit to a set of general economic policies and not be willing to 
change them if they turn out to be counterproductive, comes close to being flagrantly 
irrational. Such ideological blindness goes against the very grain of critical rationalism. In 
contrast, it is a comparatively moderate and incremental approach to economic policy-
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making, always open to revision, which is more in line with the spirit and letter of Popper’s 
thought.   
The perspective given by several commentators and presented above, that Popper is 
above all a political moderate, is most in line with what Popper actually says about how he 
wants society and the economy to be organised and structured. Stokes, for instance, claims 
that Popper’s thought is a mixture of liberal, conservative and socialist components. Eidlin, 
on the other hand, agrees with Magee and claims that Popper is better described as a 
moderate socialist than a classical liberal. But both see that Popper is, in political terms, a 
moderate and an eclectic thinker.  
It is clear, moreover, that it is a mistake to view Popper’s political theories primarily 
as a product of and subordinate to his epistemological thought, as Magee and especially 
Shearmur directly or indirectly do. Instead, we might profit quite considerably if we viewed 
critical rationalism less like a rigid philosophical system, and more like a general outlook 
under which influences between political and epistemological theories may run both ways. 
In that way, Popper’s political thought may appear more similar to Berlin’s historically 
informed and locally situated defence of liberal democracy and tentative compromises 
between basic values such as freedom, distributive justice, and common decency. 
5.7 Conclusion 
Quite regardless of ideological categories there is a lot to learn from reading Popper’s 
political essays and books. That we can see quite clearly in the writings of Roger James and 
Helmut Schmidt, who both have written about Popper’s political theories from the 
perspective of public life and practical politics. They largely confirm the idea that Popper 
was first and foremost a proponent of liberal democracy against totalitarianism, thoughtful 
pragmatism against ideological radicalism, and in general terms a proponent of moderation 
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and gradualism in politics. That does not mean however, that his political thought is 
uninspiring or uncontroversial.  
The most central lessons conveyed by Popper to politicians and the general public 
transcend conventional ideological differences. The Open Society and The Poverty of 
Historicism present, above all, arguments for the kinds of political processes which go on in 
modern, liberal democracies. In other words, they present arguments against autocracy, both 
traditional despotism and ideological totalitarianism – and the kinds of closed, political 
processes which go on in these types of political systems.  
As Eidlin has pointed out, pace Shearmur, there is also little evidence to support the 
idea that Popper did not remain a critic of laissez-faire economic policies, which he went to 
great lengths to criticise in his war-time books. In that sense, the early conclusions given at 
the end of the preceding chapter still stands, and they suggest that Popper was a liberal in a 
very general and almost all-encompassing sense, and that he above all was a proponent of 
liberal democracy and ‘planning for freedom’. Political measures should, according to 
Popper, be used whenever and wherever such measures will lead to more freedom and less 
avoidable human suffering. Leaving things to the blind forces of chance – and the animal 
spirits which sometimes govern mankind – is however one of the least attractive options 
available to us (cf. Akerlof and Shiller 2009; Posner 2009).  
Viewed in this way, it becomes perhaps clearer how one should view Popper’s 
political thought. It is a reflection of his wider philosophical outlook which he sometimes 
called critical rationalism. We can at least see that there are strong parallels and affinities 
between his thoughts about how a democratic society should be structured around an open 
search for better ways of organising human affairs, and his idea that scientific method should 
be described fundamentally as a method of trial and error. In practical terms this means that 
politicians and policy-makers, and not only scientists should try to learn from past mistakes, 
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and try to weed out the erroneous theories and assumptions which occasionally have inspired 
counterproductive or even disastrous modes of political action.  
For Popper, all this issues in a characteristically historical approach to normative 
political analysis, in which theories which may on the surface have impeccable philosophical 
credentials are rejected because they lead to less freedom and more avoidable human 
suffering than what would otherwise be the case. Such theories include historicism and 
Utopianism, which many of the greatest philosophers and ideologues of human history have 
subscribed to. But even if we should take our cues from experiences made, we should also 
remain open to new ideas in politics, which may turn out to be instruments of human 
improvement. In that way, the modern-day social experiments called liberal democracy and 
the welfare state show quite a lot of promising results, and should be encouraged further.  
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PART III:  THE NEOLIBERAL CHALLENGE 
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6. What is neoliberalism? 
6.1 Introduction2 
The term ‘neoliberalism’ has since the 1980’s become a widely used catchphrase in many 
political and academic debates. It is a term that is primarily used by authors and political 
theorists who claim to be critical of neoliberalism, and one could quite easily come to 
suspect that for some of these authors ‘neoliberalism’ has become a catch-all term of abuse 
or condemnation (Hartwich 2009). Several of these critical authors have nevertheless 
suggested that neoliberalism is ‘the dominant ideology shaping our world today’, and that 
we live in an ‘age of neoliberalism’, characterised by a massive surge of popularity for 
neoliberal ideas (Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005).  
The word neoliberalism usually describes what many political theorists and public 
intellectuals perceive of as a lamentable spread of global capitalism and consumerism, as 
well as an equally deplorable demolition of the proactive welfare state in Western Europe, 
and especially the political theories used to justify these changes (Bourdieu 1998; 1998a; 
2001; Chomsky 1999; Touraine 2001; Harvey 2005; Hermansen 2005; Saad-Filho and 
Johnston 2005; Hagen 2006; Plehwe et al. 2006; Garbo 2008; Mirowski and Plehwe 2009; 
Steger and Roy 2010; Nilsen and Smedshaug 2011). The immense importance many of these 
authors have accorded to the alleged spread of neoliberal ideology does not, however, 
signify that the term ‘neoliberalism’ is very often used to denote a clearly defined concept.  
 The term suggests its own definition; ‘neoliberalism’ must surely be a revival of 
‘liberalism’. This rather intuitive definition suggests that liberalism has been absent from 
political discussions and policy-making for a period of time, but that it has now re-emerged 
                                                 
2 This chapter draws on an earlier article, published in Norwegian and with Amund Lie as co-author, under the title “Kva er 
nyliberalisme?” in the book Nyliberalisme – ideer og politisk virkelighet (Thorsen and Lie 2007). An earlier version of this 
chapter has also been published as a separate article in English (Thorsen 2010). 
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in a rejuvenated form. It suggests, in other words, that liberalism has undergone a process of 
initial growth, intermediary decline, and finally a recent renewal. Alternatively, 
neoliberalism might be perceived of as a distinct ideology, descending from, but not 
identical to ‘liberalism’ in more general terms. Under this interpretation, neoliberalism 
would share some historical roots and some of its basic vocabulary with liberalism in 
general. This alternative interpretation would make neoliberalism analogous to 
‘neoconservatism’, which is a ‘political persuasion’ quite similar to and yet on some central 
areas of policy markedly different from conventional conservative thought (cf. e.g. Kristol 
1983; Wolfson 2004, Fukuyama 2006). 
An initial mystery facing anyone who wants to study neoliberal ideology in more 
detail is that there hardly is anyone who has written about neoliberalism from a sympathetic 
or even neutral point of view. The term itself has over the years become the property of 
critics of neoliberalism, and it has been quite uncommon to use the word in a positive sense, 
or as a form of self-identification (cf. though Moslet 1984; Fogh Rasmussen 1993; Norberg 
and Bejke 1994; cf. also Norberg 2001; 2003). Consequently, practically everyone who 
writes about neoliberalism does so as part of a critique of neoliberal ideology, or what they 
perceive of as such. Neoliberalism is in this ‘critical literature’ customarily thought of as the 
return and spread of one specific type of liberalism, which in the period around the 
penultimate turn of the century, with the rise of a type liberalism characterised by a more 
positive attitude to public intervention in the economy, became known as economic 
liberalism (cf. e.g. Hobhouse [1911] 1994).  
Economic liberalism and neoliberalism is therefore by most commentators held 
separate from liberalism in general, which according to the Oxford English Dictionary 
(1989) may be understood rather broadly as a political ideology which is “[f]avourable to 
constitutional changes and legal or administrative reforms tending in the direction of 
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freedom or democracy”. The same dictionary describes neoliberalism also, which is said to 
be “a modified or revived form of traditional liberalism, esp. one based on belief in free 
market capitalism and the rights of the individual” (Oxford English Dictionary 1989a). 
Neoliberalism is thus understood, basically, as the belief that states ought to abstain from 
economic intervention in order to protect the rights of individuals, and instead leave as much 
as possible in the hands of allegedly self-regulating markets. While these definitions are 
somewhat illuminating, they do need further elaboration. It is for instance uncertain how, 
and it what sense, neoliberalism is a descendant of – or offshoot from – liberalism in general. 
Neoliberalism might still, however, be given a more precise definition. If this is done, 
then the concept could become a useful analytical device in order to describe some recent 
trends in economic and political thought. In this chapter, I will first present a short 
conceptual history of liberalism. This analysis of liberalism in general will serve as a 
background to the third part, which will attempt to sort out the concept of neoliberalism. At 
the end of this section, I will propose a definition of neoliberalism.  
The next section will analyse neoliberalism as a common name for the political and 
economic thought of several prominent political theorists in recent times. In that section, 
entitled ‘the neoliberal thought collective’, a term copied from Mirowski and Plehwe (2009), 
I will briefly describe the political and economic thought of among others Friedrich Hayek, 
Milton Friedman, and Robert Nozick. Of these, Hayek – who has been described by one 
commentator as the ‘pathfinder of neoliberalism’ – is perhaps the most central theorist of the 
neoliberal tradition of political thought (cf. Fogh Rasmussen 1993:49-57). I will then in the 
final two sections discuss neoliberal ideology more thematically and generally, and ask if 
neoliberalism is a useful concept, before I will end this chapter by asking to what degree 
neoliberalism is a governing force in the world today, as many of the ‘critical’ authors would 
have it. These final comments will set the stage for further discussions in the next and last 
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chapter, which will round off this study, and it which I will compare the political thought of 
the central members of the neoliberal thought collective, with the political theories of Berlin 
and Popper. 
6.2 Liberalism 
The word ‘liberal’ took on a specifically political meaning with the establishment of liberal 
parliamentary caucuses throughout Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century, shortly 
after the first French Revolution (Gray 1995a). When these embryonic political parties 
coined the term ‘liberal’, they wanted to signal their positive view of the slowly emerging 
democratic systems of government in Britain and the United States, as opposed to their 
conservative opponents, who wanted to return to pre-revolutionary forms of government 
(Sartori 1987:367ff). Liberalism is however usually thought of as a considerably older 
ideology, dating at least back to John Locke and his philosophical and theological defence of 
property rights and religious toleration in the closing years of the seventeenth century (cf. 
e.g. Laski [1936] 1997). Because of its long history, the term ‘liberalism’ has come to 
represent a rather nebulous concept, and usage has varied quite considerably over time, and 
in accordance with different regional experiences. The opening sentences of an entry in a 
reference book should suffice to describe the lexicographer’s headache: 
Anyone trying to give a brief account of liberalism is immediately faced with an 
embarrassing question: are we dealing with liberalism or liberalisms? It is easy to list 
famous liberals; it is harder to say what they have in common. John Locke, Adam 
Smith, Montesquieu, Thomas Jefferson, John Stuart Mill, Lord Acton, T. H. Green, 
John Dewey and contemporaries such as Isaiah Berlin and John Rawls are certainly 
liberals – but they do not agree about the boundaries of toleration, the legitimacy of 
the welfare state, and the virtues of democracy, to take three rather central political 
issues. (Ryan 1993:291)  
The matter is not helped, either, by the fact that many have used ‘liberal’ as a general term 
“of praise or obloquy in the political struggle”, while others have tried to “define liberalism 
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in such a way that only the very deluded or the very wicked could fail to be liberals” (Ryan 
1993:292). In addition, liberal parties and political philosophers have frequently put forward 
differing opinions of what the true meaning of liberalism actually is. There is almost no limit 
to the kinds of policies, especially economic policies, which have garnered the support of 
political parties and individuals who have found it useful to call themselves liberals. We 
could however, following Alan Ryan’s introductory essay, identify some common forms of 
liberalism such as ‘classical liberalism’, a term used by Shearmur as a name for his own 
position (cf. section 5.3 above), and the ideology Ryan describes as ‘modern liberalism’.   
Classical liberalism is, according to Ryan, the ideology of earlier liberals such as 
John Locke and Adam Smith. In addition, he identifies F. A. Hayek as a more recent 
representative of classical liberalism. Classical liberalism is often associated with the belief 
that the state ought to be minimal, which means that practically nothing except armed forces, 
law enforcement, and other ‘non-excludable goods’ ought to be the concern of the state. This 
kind of state is sometimes called a ‘night-watchman state’, since its sole purpose is to uphold 
the most fundamental aspects of public order. With their perspective on the state, classical 
liberals are usually thought of as right-wing liberals. Classical liberalism has thus much in 
common with what I described above as ‘economic liberalism’, and it is quite often the case 
that contemporary proponents of classical liberalism are portrayed by their critics and other 
commentators as advocates of neoliberalism.  
 Modern liberalism is, on the other hand, according to Ryan characterised by a greater 
willingness to let the state become an active participant in the economy. Modern liberalism 
is therefore a profound revision of classical liberalism, especially of the economic policies 
traditionally associated with it. Whereas classical liberals favour laissez-faire economic 
policies because it is thought that they lead to more freedom or a better democracy, modern 
liberals tend to claim that this analysis is inadequate and misleading. Instead, they think that 
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the state must play a significant role in the economy, if the most basic liberal goals of 
freedom and democracy are to be made into reality. Such views could be associated, still 
according to Ryan, with early theorists such as Benjamin Constant and John Stuart Mill. 
More recently, John Dewey, William Beveridge, and John Rawls have articulated similar 
ideas. They have nevertheless still chosen to hold on to liberalism as a name for their 
political thought, in spite of the fact that their policy recommendations often coincide or 
overlap with those of many democratic socialists (cf. Brandal et al. 2011, chapter 1). 
An overlapping fault line within liberalism described by Ryan is the more recent 
conflict between ‘liberal egalitarianism’ and ‘libertarianism’ (Ryan 1993:296-297; Kymlicka 
2002:53-165). This dimension is to a certain degree similar to the division between classical 
and modern liberalism, but not entirely so. One might perhaps perceive of libertarianism as a 
more systematic version of classical liberalism, at least as this position has been expressed 
by for instance Robert Nozick (1974) and Murray Rothbard ([1962/1970] 2004). Liberal 
egalitarianism could, on the other hand, be thought of as a collection of more systematic 
restatements of modern liberalism (cf. especially Rawls 1971; Ackerman 1980).  
 Libertarianism is, as its name suggests, characterised by a categorical concern for 
individual liberty and property rights, coupled with a corresponding de-emphasis of other 
traditional liberal goals such as democracy and distributive justice. This sets libertarians 
apart from many earlier classical liberals such as Smith and Tocqueville who, while they 
advocated quite extensive freedom of action in the economic sphere, also acknowledge the 
validity and legitimacy of other concerns.  
Later classical liberals such as Hayek are however hardly distinguishable from the 
libertarians, at least if we look at the economic policies he tended to recommend. Even if he 
and other economists of the so-called ‘Austrian school’ of economics insisted on describing 
themselves as classical liberals, they accuse at the same time mainstream liberals of 
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advocating “a program that only in details differs from the totalitarianism of the socialists” 
(Mises 1962:v; cf. Hayek 1973; 1976, 1979). Liberal egalitarians, meanwhile, generally 
share the view that legitimate goals and ideals are many, and that individual liberty and the 
effective enforcement of private property rights are merely two of these goals. The name, 
liberal egalitarianism, indicates that liberal egalitarians would like to see equality as well as 
liberty, which places them alongside other modern liberals, politically to the left of classical 
liberals and libertarians alike.  
 Surveying the history and recent developments of liberal thought, one could quite 
easily come to agree with Ryan that it would be difficult to pinpoint exactly which political 
ideals, goals, and beliefs liberals have in common. There have, however, been made several 
attempts to construct a reunified definition of what sort of ideology liberalism actually is. 
John Gray’s solution is to emphasise what he believes most liberals have in common. He 
therefore identifies four elements of a conception of man and society which he believes 
liberals of all quarters adhere to, and which sets them apart from non-liberals: 
Common to all variants of the liberal tradition is a definite conception, distinctively 
modern in character, of man and society. What are the elements of this conception? It 
is individualist, in that it asserts the moral primacy of the person against the claims of 
any social collectivity: egalitarian, inasmuch as it confers on all men the same moral 
status and denies the relevance to legal or political order of differences in moral worth 
among human beings; universalist, affirming the moral unity of the human species 
and according a secondary importance to specific historic associations and cultural 
forms; and meliorist in its affirmation of the corrigibility and improvability of all 
social institutions and political arrangements. It is this conception of man and society 
which gives liberalism a definite identity which transcends its vast internal variety and 
complexity. (Gray 1995a:xii, author’s own emphases) 
Another attempt to submit a fairly broad and inclusive definition of liberalism has been 
given by George Crowder (2002:22):  
The idea of liberalism is, of course, complex and contested, but there is general 
agreement that liberalism involves a commitment to the following four main values 
or principles: the equal moral worth of individuals (issuing in a principle of equal 
treatment), individual liberties and rights, limited government and private property.   
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Ryan’s introductory essay on liberalism also contains a catalogue of core tenets, in the form 
of three ‘liberal antipathies’, and three ‘liberal prescriptions’. The liberal antipathy towards 
political absolutism, theocracy and unrestricted capitalism are common to all liberals from 
Locke to our day, according to Ryan (1993). Of these, the last may come across as a bit of a 
surprise, given the emphasis put on mercantile autonomy by the classical liberals. As Ryan 
shows, however, there are many differences between the moderately positive view of the 
market economy given by early classical liberals such as Smith, and the more unqualified 
support of the market economy displayed by twentieth century libertarians and classical 
liberals, which Ryan implicitly places outside of the main stream of the liberal tradition.  
The prescriptions he alludes to are perhaps more familiar. Liberalism is, he says, a set 
of political theories which emphasise first of all that individuals ought to be free to choose 
between different options in life-defining decisions. Secondly, liberalism includes the view 
that society ought to be subjected to the rule of law and democratic governance. Finally, 
Ryan connects liberalism with the idea that state power ought to be exercised with caution 
and within constitutional limits, for instance within a system based on the separation of 
powers, as suggested by earlier liberals such as Locke and Montesquieu.   
 ‘Liberalism’ is, undoubtedly, a rather vague and often highly contested concept. It 
usually describes a disposition towards individual liberty and democracy which might be 
present in a person’s political point of view, or ingrained in the political culture of a country, 
rather than a well-defined and clearly demarcated set of political beliefs (cf. Sartori 1987; 
Waldron 1987; Larmore 1990; Galston 1995). This means that liberalism today is not a 
‘partisan’ ideology, and more like a shared heritage between those that are committed to 
goals and ideals such as democracy and freedom. It is clear, however, that liberalism has in 
effect become an ‘essentially contested concept’, at least for the foreseeable future (Freeden 
1986; 1996; Abbey 2005; cf. Gallie 1956). 
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6.3 Neoliberalism: conceptual history and definitions 
6.3.1 The ‘critical’ literature 
According to Saad-Filho and Johnston (2005:1), “we live in the age of neoliberalism”. Along 
with the other authors of the book Neoliberalism – A Critical Reader, they share the quite 
common view that power and wealth are to an ever increasing degree being concentrated 
within transnational corporations and global elite groups. This concentration of power comes 
as a result of the practical implementation of an economic and political ideology they 
identify as ‘neoliberalism’. On the volume’s back cover blurb, the publisher of the book goes 
even further, and describes neoliberalism as “the dominant ideology shaping our world 
today”. But in spite of its purportedly overshadowing importance, Saad-Filho and Johnston 
find it “impossible to define neoliberalism purely theoretically” (ibid.).  
It is not, according to another contribution to the same volume, possible to date the 
emergence of neoliberalism precisely. Its foundations are all the same traced back to the 
classical liberalism advocated by Adam Smith, and to the specific conception of man and 
society on which he founded his economic theories. Neoliberalism is, according to this view, 
thought of as an entirely new ‘paradigm’ for economic theory and policy-making – the 
ideology behind the most recent stage in the development of capitalist society. At the same 
time, it is a revival of the economic theories of Smith and his intellectual heirs in the 
nineteenth century, especially David Ricardo and the proponents of ‘Manchester liberalism’, 
such as Richard Cobden and John Bright (Clarke 2005).  
  This line of argument is continued by Palley (2005), who argues that a ‘great 
reversal’ has taken place. Neoliberalism has according to him replaced the economic theories 
of centrist or (what Ryan calls) modern liberals such as John Maynard Keynes and William 
Beveridge (Keynes 1936; Beveridge 1944; 1945). Keynesianism has been replaced by a 
more ‘monetarist’ approach inspired by the theories and research of for instance Milton 
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Friedman (cf. e.g. Friedman and Schwartz 1963; Friedman 1969; 1991). Since the 1970’s, 
neoliberalism has according to Palley been the dominating ideological force in 
macroeconomic policy-making. This has led to less severe public regulation of the economy 
and greater emphasis on stability in economic policy, rather than goals which were more 
popular in the first decades after World War II, such as full employment and the alleviation 
of abject poverty. 
 Munck (2005) maintains that the possibility of a ‘self-regulating market’ is a core 
assumption in classical liberalism, and an important presumption among neoliberals as well. 
Efficient allocation of resources is, according to Munck, viewed by neoliberals as the most 
important purpose of an economic system, and the most efficient way to allocate resources 
goes through market mechanisms. Acts of intervention in the economy from government 
agencies are therefore almost always undesirable, because intervention can undermine the 
finely tuned logic of the marketplace. As ‘the dominant ideology shaping our world today’, 
neoliberalism wields great power over contemporary debates concerning international trade 
and reforms of the public sector. One is forced, basically, to take a stand against 
neoliberalism, or else contribute to its further entrenchment.  
 The Critical Reader is in many ways a typical representative of a recent wave of 
‘critical literature’ whose main goal it is to denounce a powerful tendency which goes under 
the name of ‘neoliberalism’ (cf. e.g. Blomgren 1997; Campbell and Pedersen 2001; Touraine 
2001; Rapley 2004; Harvey 2005; Plehwe et al. 2006; Mirowski and Plehwe 2009). Several 
of these works accord neoliberalism an overwhelming significance, while they at the same 
time seem quite happy to leave the concept itself completely without a clear definition. In 
effect they claim, along with Saad-Filho and Johnston, that it defies definition. One might 
therefore easily begin to suspect that the concept has become, in some quarters at least, a 
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generic term of abuse describing almost any economic and political development deemed to 
be undesirable.  
6.3.2 Neoliberalism: A conceptual history 
Even if the recent upsurge of critical literature suggests that neoliberalism is a new 
phenomenon, recorded usage of the term stretches back to the end of the nineteenth century 
(Oxford English Dictionary 1989a). It then appeared in an article by the prominent French 
economist and central ideologue of the cooperative movement, Charles Gide (1898; cf. also 
Gide 1922). In his article, which is a polemic against the so-called ‘neoliberal’ Italian 
economist Maffeo Pantaleoni (1898), Gide foreshadows later usage of the term. 
Neoliberalism is, according to Gide, a return to the liberal economic theories of Adam Smith 
and his attendants. After Gide, however, few make use of his concept, and usage is 
inconsistent (cf. e.g. Barnes 1921; Merriam 1938; Rüstow [1945] 1950).  
 The first book-length work I have been able to discover, employing the term 
‘neoliberalism’ in its title, is Jacques Cros’ doctoral thesis Le ‘néo-libéralisme’ et la révision 
du libéralisme (Cros 1950). To Cros, neoliberalism is the ideology which resulted from 
efforts to reinvigorate classical liberalism in the period immediately before and during World 
War II, by political theorists such as Walter Lippmann (1937), Wilhelm Röpke (1944; 1945), 
and Friedrich Hayek ([1944] 2001; Hayek et al. 1935). Cros’ main argument is, basically, 
that these ‘neoliberals’ have sought to redefine liberalism by going back to its roots, to a 
more traditionally liberal stance on economic policy issues, akin to what Ryan has described 
as ‘classical liberalism’. Cros generally applaud these ‘neoliberals’ for speaking out against 
totalitarianism and political extremism at a time when only few people did so, especially 
among intellectuals. He remains however sceptical to the central thesis of some of the 
proponents of ‘neoliberalism’, common to most classical liberals, that individual liberty 
demands that the market economy should be left almost entirely unregulated. 
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 After Cros, there is a long period of almost forty years in which the term 
‘neoliberalism’ is used only infrequently. In this period, the term was mainly used to 
describe the situation in Germany, as an epithet for the ideology behind West Germany’s 
‘social market economy’ (soziale Marktwirtschaft), for which in particular Röpke and other 
so-called ‘ordo-liberals’ served as central sources of inspiration (cf. Arndt 1954; Friedrich 
1955). In particular, it is the German social theorist and Catholic theologian E. E. Nawroth 
(1961; 1962) who attempts, building in part on Cros, to concentrate his analyses of the 
political and economic developments of the Federal Republic around a concept of 
Neoliberalismus.  
In Nawroth’s studies, it is the attempt made by Konrad Adenauer and Ludwig Erhard, 
the first two Federal Chancellors of West Germany, to combine a market economy with 
liberal democracy and ‘Catholic social teachings’ (katholische Soziallehre), which is 
described as ‘neoliberalism’. Nawroth himself, however, remains sceptical to this rather 
eclectic ideology behind what became better known as the ‘social market economy’ (soziale 
Marktwirtschaft), and he is especially concerned by his perception that the market economy 
inspires people to become acquisitive and self-centred, and thus hampering their moral 
development and weakening the internal solidarity of West German society. In short, 
Nawroth’s conservative critique of West German ‘neoliberalism’ inaugurates a new tradition 
of using the term depreciatively.  
 This concept of neoliberalism was slowly and gradually exported to the rest of the 
world. We can witness the early stages of this movement in an article by the Belgian-
American philosopher Wilfried ver Eecke (1982), which explicitly is an attempt to export 
Nawroth’s concept of neoliberalism to the English-speaking world. In his text, ver Eecke 
uses the concept of neoliberalism to describe the German ordo-liberalism of Wilhelm Röpke 
and others, as well as the American monetarism of for instance Milton Friedman. According 
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to ver Eecke, the ordo-liberalism and monetarism share a strong preference for a state which 
reserves for itself the right to intervene in the market only in order to preserve the market 
economy as such, for instance with monetary policies solely aimed at price stability.  
In his article, we can therefore see the concept of neoliberalism in a more mature 
state, compared to the expositions given by Cros and Nawroth. Under ver Eecke’s 
understanding, neoliberalism is a concept reserved for a particular kind of liberalism, which 
is marked by an ingrained commitment to laissez-faire economic policies. Among the 
proponents of such policies one finds classical liberals such as Ludwig von Mises and 
Friedrich Hayek. We also find monetarists and other economic theorists who want to 
establish and preserve what they perceive of as ‘free markets’, such as the afore mentioned 
Friedman. Finally, we also find libertarians whose much-repeated insistence on individual 
liberty issues in a demand for a minimal or virtually non-existent state, like Nozick and 
Rothbard. In sum, they are an internally diverse crowd of theorists, who may find a lot about 
which they could come to disagree, for instance why they would like to ‘roll back’ the 
frontiers of the state, especially the contemporary welfare state. On the level of practical 
policy proposals, they are however united in their wish to reduce the size and grasp of the 
state in general and individual government institutions, akin to the basic goal found in the 
nineteenth century liberalism, in the heyday of so-called classical liberalism.   
6.3.3 Some recent definitions of neoliberalism 
In the recent ‘critical’ literature, David Harvey stands out as being one of the few who tries, 
in his A Brief History of Neoliberalism, to give the concept a wide-ranging definition, which 
in part harks back to the analyses given by Cros, Nawroth, and ver Eecke (Harvey 2005). His 
definition does shed a ray of light on the issue of what kind of phenomenon neoliberalism is:  
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that 
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
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entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized 
by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. The role of the state is 
to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. The 
state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money. It must also 
set up those military, defence, police and legal structures and functions required to 
secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper 
functioning of markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, 
water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they 
must be created, by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should 
not venture. State interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare 
minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess enough 
information to second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful interest 
groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in 
democracies) for their own benefit. (Harvey 2005:2) 
 
Harvey’s definition of neoliberalism is tightly knit to his overall analysis, which includes the 
firmly held belief that the world has experienced “an emphatic turn towards neoliberalism in 
political-economic practices and thinking since the 1970’s” (ibid.). Harvey proposes with his 
definition to view neoliberalism, not as the renewal of liberalism in general, but as a 
distinctive economic theory. It is also apparent that Harvey sees neoliberalism not as a 
continuation of liberalism, but as something which lives independently of more traditional 
liberal values and policies.  
In fact, some leading neoliberals are not liberals in any meaningful sense at all, as 
Harvey seats clearly anti-liberal autocrats such as Deng Xiaoping and Augusto Pinochet 
among the political vanguard of neoliberalism, alongside democratically elected leaders such 
as Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. Nevertheless, many neoliberal theorists and 
ideologues share a liberal identity. Among these, liberal political theorists and economists 
such as Hayek and Friedman figure prominently alongside nominally conservative 
politicians such as Thatcher and Reagan in Harvey’s gallery of neoliberals.  
With his definition, which incorporates a set of rather diverse political and economic 
ideas, ranging from ‘Thatcherism’ and ‘Reaganomics’ to ‘Socialism with Chinese 
185 
 
characteristics’, Harvey emphasises quite rightly that neoliberalism is ‘a theory of political 
economic practices’ rather than a systematic political ideology. It remains, however, that 
neoliberalism is a set of economic policy proposals which is most often advocated, at least in 
the Western world, because it is thought that they will reinforce traditionally liberal goals 
such as democracy, individual liberty, and private property rights.  
Another attempt to study neoliberalism, but this time from a perspective rooted in 
political theory, comes from Anna-Maria Blomgren (1997). In a ‘critical analysis’ of the 
political thought of Friedman, Nozick, and Hayek, she describes their respective political 
and economic theories as representatives of a ‘neoliberal political philosophy’. In addition, 
Blomgren (1997:14n5) mentions David Gauthier, Jan Narveson, Milton’s son David 
Friedman, Murray Rothbard, James Buchanan, and Ayn Rand as being other prominent 
neoliberal political philosophers. Blomgren’s basic definition of neoliberalism overlaps, also, 
to a considerable degree with Harvey’s definition, but emphasise more clearly the internal 
diversity of neoliberal thought: 
Neoliberalism is commonly thought of as a political philosophy giving priority to 
individual freedom and the right to private property. It is not, however, the simple 
and homogeneous philosophy it might appear to be. It ranges over a wide expanse in 
regard to ethical foundations as well as to normative conclusions. At the one end of 
the line is ‘anarcho-liberalism’, arguing for a complete laissez-faire, and the 
abolishment of all government. At the other end is ‘classical liberalism’, demanding a 
government with functions exceeding those of the so-called night-watchman state. 
(Blomgren 1997:224) 
Under Blomgren’s view, Hayek, Friedman, and Nozick all give separate theoretical 
groundings to neoliberal evaluations and economic policies. Friedman is, according to 
Blomgren, on the surface a typical representative of consequentialist neoliberalism; he 
favours neoliberal policies such as deregulation, privatisation, and tax cuts because of the 
perceived positive consequences such courses of political action will have for the overall 
economic situation. When Blomgren delves deeper into the matter, however, she finds that 
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his policy recommendations are actually based on a conception of natural law. This means 
that Friedman wants to implement a package of neoliberal economic policies because human 
beings are by nature social, and that they should be ‘free to choose’ in as many situations as 
possible (cf. Friedman [1962] 2002; Friedman and Friedman 1980).  
 Hayek, on a similar note, is perceived by Blomgren to be a more conservative type of 
neoliberal who, while approximating at places a utilitarian argument in favour of 
neoliberalism, also bases his political thought on an idea of natural law. Central to Hayek’s 
theory is the notion of a ‘spontaneous order’ of social life, which is preferable to any kind of 
artificially created order, at least when it comes to securing individual liberty and well-being. 
A proactive welfare state will inevitably, no matter how benevolent its intentions are, stifle 
economic growth and put an unjustifiable limit on individual liberty, all in the name of an 
ideal of social justice which according to Hayek is little more than a mirage (cf. especially 
Hayek [1944] 2001; 1973; 1976).  
 Nozick is, still according to Blomgren, a representative of a deontological kind of 
neoliberalism, at least in his earlier works. He advocates many of the familiar neoliberal 
policies, but they are grounded in an idea of his that a set of immutable natural rights have 
been conferred to all human beings. These rights make it difficult to see that the state could 
have any legitimate role to play at all (Nozick 1974, especially the preface at pp. ix-xiv). 
Nevertheless, Nozick wants the state to rectify past injustices, even if this in the short run 
will mean much government intervention in the economy. Unlike Friedman and Hayek, 
Nozick does not allude to the purportedly good consequences of neoliberal – or more 
precisely libertarian – policies when he argues in their favour. Instead, he believes that such 
policies are the right measures for creating a society in accordance with his conception of 
justice and natural rights.  
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 These categorisations of different types of neoliberal political philosophy, which 
Blomgren makes in her book, are however not entirely unproblematic. A strong case could 
be made for other interpretations, in which for instance the political theories of Friedman and 
Hayek are given indirectly utilitarian foundations, rather than the kind of foundation in 
natural law envisioned by Blomgren (Lundström 1993; 1998; Malnes 1998). What remains 
quite easy to recognise in her overall analysis, however, is her final question: Is it 
meaningful to view neoliberalism as a unified tradition of political thought, given the widely 
different theoretical justifications for the neoliberal package of policies in circulation?  
Perhaps it is better, after all, to view neoliberalism not as a monolithic piece of 
political thought, but as a convenient common name for a loosely connected set of political 
theories instead. Such theories – often hastily subsumed under the common heading of 
neoliberalism – range from Rothbard’s ‘anarcho-capitalism’, which includes the belief that 
the state ought to be abolished altogether, to the re-invented ‘classical liberalism’ of Mises 
and Hayek, who firmly believes that a strong but largely inactive commonwealth is a 
necessary precondition for social life, as well as individual liberty. Frequently, however, 
these political philosophies speak with one voice on the level of practical policy-making, 
advocating a ‘rolling back of the frontiers of the state’, and the creation of a society in which 
the market economy plays a greater role than it does in most societies today. At the end of 
the day, a practical and almost unanimous agreement about what we should do next among 
political theorists that are usually thought of as representatives of neoliberalism, may quite 
easily overshadow the philosophical differences between them. 
6.3.4 Neoliberalism: a tentative definition 
In light of the literature presented above, it is possible to give a tentative definition of what 
neoliberalism is, which builds on some of the more systematic contributions to the large 
body of ‘critical literature’. The definition proposed below is as I see it more to the point, 
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and better able to function within the framework of a more disinterested analysis of the 
political ideas and theories which are usually subsumed under the heading of neoliberalism. 
 Neoliberalism may be defined as a loosely demarcated set of political beliefs which 
most prominently and prototypically include the conviction that the only legitimate purpose 
of the state is to be a safeguard for individual liberty, especially the mercantile liberty of 
individuals and corporations to act as agents in an unfettered market economy. Any 
transgression by the state beyond its sole legitimate raison d’être is unacceptable. This 
conviction usually issues in a belief that the state ought to be “minimal and dispersed” or at 
least considerably reduced in strength and size (Mont Pèlerin Society, no date; cf. also Mises 
1962; Nozick 1974; Hayek 1979; Friedman [1962] 2002). Neoliberalism is thus defined not 
as a complete ideology or perspective of how most aspects of human societies ought to be 
organised, but as a basic idea about how the relationship between the state on one hand, and 
individuals, corporations, and markets on the other, ought to be structured.  
The kinds of political thought which have led neoliberals to embrace the ideal of the 
minimal state could moreover be made to apply to the international level, and quite a few 
neoliberals have thought that a system of ‘free trade’ ought to be implemented between 
countries as well. The only acceptable reason for regulating international trade is, according 
to this perspective, to safeguard the same kinds of mercantile liberty and the same kinds of 
strong property rights which in the first place ought to be realised on a national level 
(Norberg 2001; 2003; T. Friedman 2006). Neoliberal convictions often also include the 
belief that market mechanisms almost always constitute the optimal way of organising the 
production and exchange of goods and services (Friedman [1962] 2002; Friedman and 
Friedman 1980; Norberg 2001). Unregulated markets and international trade will, it is 
believed, set free the creative potential and the entrepreneurial spirit which is built into the 
‘spontaneous order’ of human society (cf. Hayek 1973). A rolling back of the frontiers of the 
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state will thereby lead to increased individual liberty and higher levels of well-being, a more 
efficient allocation of resources, and ultimately to higher rates of economic growth and 
overall prosperity (Hayek 1973; Rothbard [1962/1970] 2004).  
 Neoliberalism may also include a perspective on individual moral virtue; the virtuous 
person is one who is able to access the relevant markets and function as a competent actor in 
these markets. He or she is willing to accept the risks associated with participating in 
unregulated markets, and to adapt to rapid changes arising from such participation (Fogh 
Rasmussen 1993; cf. Friedman and Friedman 1980). Individuals are also seen as being solely 
responsible for the consequences of the decisions they make. Inequality, even inequality of 
the most conspicuous sort, is under this perspective morally acceptable, at least to the degree 
in which it could be seen as the result of long chains of freely made decisions by individuals 
(cf. Nozick 1974; Hayek 1976; Joseph and Sumption 1979). If a person demands that the 
state should regulate the market or make reparations to those who have been caught at the 
losing end of a freely initiated market transaction, this is viewed as an indication that he is 
morally depraved and underdeveloped, and scarcely different from a proponent of a 
totalitarian state (Mises 1962).  
 Thus understood and defined, neoliberalism becomes a loosely demarcated set of 
ideas of how the relationship between the state and its external environment ought to be 
organised, and not a complete political ideology which tries to answer all questions relating 
to how society ought to be organised (Blomgren 1997; Malnes 1998). In fact, it is generally 
not understood as a theory about how the everyday running of political processes ought to be 
organised. Neoliberals may therefore disagree on many matters, and may provide very 
different answers to questions such as whether or not the state ought to be run as a 
democracy or if there ought to be a free exchange of political ideas. This means, as Harvey 
(2005) has indicated, that typically neoliberal policies aimed at deregulation and 
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privatisation could be implemented under the auspices of autocrats as well as within liberal 
democracies (cf. especially Steger and Roy 2010).  
Proponents of neoliberal policies are therefore sometimes in the ‘critical literature’ 
portrayed as being of the opinion that the democratic process ought to be sidestepped and 
replaced by the rule of experts or legal instruments designed for that purpose, whenever it 
slows down neoliberal reforms, or threatens the mercantile liberty of individuals or 
corporations, which it sometimes does (cf. especially Harvey 2005; Saad-Filho and Johnston 
2005). The practical implementation of neoliberal policies will therefore, in some cases at 
least, lead to a relocation of power from political to market-economic processes, from the 
state to markets and individuals, and finally from the legislature and executive authorities to 
the judiciary (cf. Østerud et al. 2003; Tranøy 2006). 
In the following, we must however bear one thing in mind, namely that concepts such 
as liberalism and – perhaps especially – neoliberalism are very much contested concepts (cf. 
especially Hartwich 2009). We must in addition make allowance for the fact that a lot of 
surprising emotions are sometimes stirred up with the use or disuse of such concepts. At the 
end of the day, one must nevertheless try to overcome such emotions, and try as best as one 
can to discuss what the future of human societies should be, preferably using readily 
available concepts from ordinary political parlance.  
6.4 The neoliberal thought collective 
6.4.1 Beginnings 
If we grant that neoliberalism is indeed a fairly coherent – albeit loosely demarcated –  
tradition within political theory, as many of the authors of the ‘critical literature’ appear to 
think, we can start to present the political thought of individual political and economic 
theorists which we with some degree of justice may describe as the most central neoliberal 
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political thinkers. We should also, however, bear in mind at least the outlines of a history of 
neoliberalism, particularly neoliberal thought, in the twentieth century and beyond.  
 We may for instance begin with the narrative given by Jacques Cros (1950; cf. also 
Denord 2009), who starts out his account of what he calls neoliberalism with a description of 
an intellectual movement founded in the years immediately before World War II. In his 
native France, Cros sees the beginning of a political movement as well as a tradition of 
normative political thought, centred on the Colloque Walter Lippmann, named after the 
American political theorist and public intellectual mentioned above.  
This colloquium, convened in Paris in the fall of 1938, counted an impressive number 
of liberal economists and political theorists from across Western Europe and North America 
among its attendees. During the colloquium, the German philosopher and political theorist 
Alexander Rüstow apparently even suggested that it should adopt the word neoliberalism as 
a term of self-description, but this idea never caught on among the others present (cf. Rüstow 
[1945] 1950). Taken together, its members were a diverse group of people with very 
different opinions on matters of economic policy, but they were united in the idea that a 
liberal tradition of political and economic thought needed a revival in order to turn back the 
tide of totalitarianism at opposite ends of the political spectrum. While the colloquium itself 
never amounted to much, primarily because of the beginning of World War II in Europe, 
several of its attendees contributed to a flurry of new ideas in economic and political theory 
in the years to follow.  
Shortly after the war, however, some centrist liberals such as Rüstow drifted away 
from the intellectual movement that began in Paris some years earlier, while other members 
of the colloquium went on to found the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS) in 1947, named after the 
resort town outside Lausanne in Switzerland in which the society met for the first time. The 
MPS was, from its establishment to 1960, led by the Austrian economist and political 
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theorist Friedrich Hayek, who had made a name for himself three years earlier with the 
publication of The Road to Serfdom.  
With the establishment of the MPS, we see the beginnings of an organised movement 
who wanted to implement and spread a collection of related political and economic ideas, 
tending in the direction of small or ‘minimal’ government, unfettered markets, and strong 
private property rights (Mont Pèlerin Society, no date; cf. Plehwe 2009). Like the Colloque 
Walter Lippmann, the MPS thought – and presumably still thinks – that liberal political and 
economic ideas had been put under siege by outright totalitarianism, but also that liberalism 
faced a more oblique threat from increased use of economic planning in the nascent 
democratic welfare states:  
The central values of civilization are in danger. Over large stretches of the earth’s 
surface the essential conditions of human dignity and freedom have already 
disappeared. In others they are under constant menace from the development of 
current tendencies of policy. The position of the individual and the voluntary group 
are progressively undermined by extensions of arbitrary power. Even that most 
precious possession of Western Man, freedom of thought and expression, is 
threatened by the spread of creeds which, claiming the privilege of tolerance when in 
the position of a minority, seek only to establish a position of power in which they 
can suppress and obliterate all views but their own. 
The group holds that these developments have been fostered by the growth of 
a view of history which denies all absolute moral standards and by the growth of 
theories which question the desirability of the rule of law. It holds further that they 
have been fostered by a decline of belief in private property and the competitive 
market; for without the diffused power and initiative associated with these 
institutions it is difficult to imagine a society in which freedom may be effectively 
preserved. (Mont Pèlerin Society, no date) 
 
Hayek is indeed a central figure in the history of neoliberalism, both as a leading political 
theorist and an organiser of people with views and interests similar to his own. In his 
opening address to the first meeting of the MPS, he suggests that a new liberal tradition 
which harks back to the ‘basic principles’ an older liberal creed has to be erected, and that 
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the aberrations of intermediary liberals in favour of ‘socialism’ and ‘nationalism’ has to be 
expunged from the liberal consciousness: 
The basic conviction which has guided me in my efforts is that, if the ideals which I 
believe unite us, and for which, in spite of so much abuse of the term, there is still no 
better name than liberal, are to have any chance of revival, a great intellectual task 
must be performed. This task involves both purging traditional liberal theory of 
certain accidental accretions which have become attached to it in the course of time, 
and also facing up to some real problems which an over-simplified liberalism has 
shirked or which have become apparent only since it has turned into a somewhat 
stationary and rigid creed. (Hayek 1967:149) 
 
It is, I think, important that we fully realize that the popular liberal creed, on the 
Continent and in America more than in England, contained many elements which on 
the one hand often led its adherents directly into the folds of socialism or nationalism, 
and on the other hand antagonized many who shared the basic values of individual 
freedom but were repelled by the aggressive rationalism which would recognize no 
values except those whose utility (for an ultimate purpose never disclosed) could be 
demonstrated by individual reason, and which presumed that science was competent 
to tell us not only what is but also what ought to be. Personally I believe that this 
false rationalism, which gained influence in the French Revolution and which during 
the past hundred years has exercised its influence mainly through the twin 
movements of Positivism and Hegelianism, is an expression of an intellectual hubris 
which is the opposite of that intellectual humility which is the essence of the true 
liberalism that regards with reverence those spontaneous social forces through which 
the individual creates things greater than he knows. (Hayek 1967:154-155) 
 
In this opening address, Hayek identifies a set of enemies which in in combination identifies 
the outlines of the new liberal creed he hopes that he and others will be able to recreate. 
Socialism, nationalism and excessive rationalism are all viewed as central enemies. The most 
central goal is apparently to create a broad alliance of different political forces united in the 
belief that the state should not try to create an ‘artificial order’ in order to fulfil an ideal of 
social justice or community, which may potentially eclipse the ‘spontaneous order’ of the 
market economy. Perhaps more surprisingly, we can also see that Hayek tries to make an 
enemy out the idea that one could and should try to construct a society based around the 
ideal that increased scientific knowledge could help build a social order more characterised 
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by human fulfilment and happiness. This certainly sets his type of liberal creed apart from 
the technology-driven optimism which to a much greater extent has characterised other 
political thinkers who have found it useful to describe themselves as liberals. This move 
must, however, also surely set Hayek’s political thought apart from the more cautiously 
optimistic type of egalitarian and ‘organised’ liberalism recommended by Berlin and Popper.  
If Hayek and other leading members Mont Pèlerin Society are viewed as the 
instigators of a neoliberal thought collective, we may easily come to view him as one of the 
most influential political and economic theorists of the twentieth century (Plehwe and 
Mirowski 2009). From a situation around the middle of the twentieth century, which was a 
period of time in which the ideas of nineteenth-century economic liberalism were at a nadir 
of popularity, they have spread across the world and influenced policy-making in many 
countries and international organisations (Judt [2005] 2010, especially chapter 17; cf. also 
Harvey 2005).   
 Hayek himself, however, is a political and economic theorist which it is possible to 
interpret in several different ways. Such interpretations may view Hayek’s political and 
economic thought as a fairly eclectic and moderate mixture of conservatism and liberalism, 
or they may view it as a particularly radical form of neoliberalism centred on a belief in the 
minimal state – or almost everything in between (cf. e.g. Røe Isaksen 2008; Nilsen and 
Smedshaug 2011, especially Astrup and Nilsen 2011). This is of course quite easily done 
when one considers his numerous works, spanning almost six decades, which also makes it 
all but impossible to give an exhaustive or representative review of his work in the course of 
a few pages.   
Some of these works are undoubtedly also more nuanced and detailed than others, 
ranging from quite comprehensive and systematic works within political and economic 
theory, to shorter and more general essays about politics and economics intended for a wider 
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audience. In his more substantial works such as The Constitution of Liberty (Hayek 1960) or 
Law, Legislation and Liberty (Hayek 1973; 1976: 1979), as well as several of his more 
polemical books such as The Road to Serfdom (Hayek [1944] 2001), we see the development 
of several common policy proposals tending in the direction of smaller government and 
more unfettered markets. On the level of practical policy recommendations, it is therefore 
only natural to interpret his political theory as a plea for a transfer of political power from 
the state to individuals, corporations, and the market economy largely overlapping with 
attitudes described above under the heading of neoliberalism. 
In several of his later essays and books, Hayek even considers the very idea of a 
public redistribution of wealth and resources according to an ideal of social justice to be 
fundamentally anti-liberal, even if many liberal thinkers and political parties have 
incorporated such ideals into their body of beliefs about how society ought to be organised: 
Especially in contrast to socialism it may be said that liberalism is concerned with 
commutative justice and not with what is called distributive or now more frequently 
‘social justice’. (Hayek 1978:139, emphasis added) 
 
The ideal of distributive justice has frequently attracted liberal thinkers, and has 
become probably one of the main factors which led so many of them from liberalism 
to socialism. The reason why it must be rejected by consistent liberals is the double 
one that there exist no recognized or discoverable general principles of distributive 
justice, and that, even if such principles could be agreed upon, they could not be put 
into effect in a society whose productivity rests on the individuals being free to use 
their own knowledge and abilities for their own purposes. (Hayek 1978:140) 
 
Hayek attempts to justify the establishment of an almost completely unfettered market 
economy, and a corresponding dismantling of public economic planning on purely formal 
grounds. He believes we are faced with an inevitable choice between totalitarianism on one 
hand, and a system in which the state does not try to plan or give shape to society and the 
economy at all on the other. According to Hayek, and this seems to be one of his most 
deeply held beliefs as he repeats it throughout his works, a third option does not exist. This is 
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so, because any attempt to impose political decisions on the market economy and the 
population at large, decisions which he insists on calling arbitrary, even if they are made by 
democratically elected legislatures, inevitably will lead to disappointment and a gradual 
descent into totalitarianism.  
If a democratic society tries to restrict the market economy, for instance by 
redistributing wealth and resources through taxation and the public provision of basic goods 
and services, it has already according to Hayek begun its move away from democracy to 
totalitarianism. If we follow Hayek in this train of thought, a mixed economy built around an 
idea of distributive justice becomes quite simply unthinkable, at least as a stable of affairs. 
We must instead choose between an entirely unfettered market economy on one hand, and a 
planned economy, which in the end will destroy both democracy and individual liberty, on 
the other. In his magnum opus called Law, Legislation and Liberty, he sums up this for him 
fundamental belief towards the end:  
There exists no third principle for the organization of the economics process which 
can be rationally chosen to achieve any desirable ends, in addition to either a 
functioning market in which nobody can conclusively determine how well-off 
particular groups or individuals will be, or a central direction where a group 
organized for power determines it. The two principles are irreconcilable, since any 
combination prevents the achievement of the aims of either. And while we can never 
reach what the socialists imagine, the general licence to politicians to grant special 
benefits to those whose support they need still must destroy that self-forming order of 
the market which serves the general good, and replace it by a forcibly imposed order 
determined by some arbitrary human wills. We face an inescapable choice between to 
irreconcilable principles, and however far we may always remain from fully realizing 
either, there can be no stable compromise. Whichever principle we make the 
foundation of our proceedings, it will drive us on, no doubt always to something 
imperfect, but more and more closely resembling one of the two extremes. 
Once it is clearly recognized that socialism as much as fascism or 
communism inevitably leads into the totalitarian state and the destruction of the 
democratic order, it is clearly legitimate to provide against our inadvertently sliding 
into a socialist system by constitutional provisions which deprive government of the 
discriminating powers of coercion even for what at the moment may generally be 
regarded as good purposes. (Hayek 1979:151)  
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Reading Hayek’s most seminal works, one could quite easily get the impression that it is the 
actual policy recommendations, and not how they are justified, which are most important to 
Hayek. On the more fundamental level of ethical theory Hayek therefore appears to fluctuate 
between different ways of justifying his support of neoliberal policy recommendations. His 
justifications ranges from the consequentialist view that the frontiers of the state ought to be 
rolled back because such a move will have favourable consequences, to the deontological 
view that government ought to be scaled down because it would make a society more 
morally acceptable, quite regardless of the likely consequences of such a move.   
It is, however, possible to view Hayek’s thought in a way which will transform it into 
a fairly coherent philosophical system, and not merely a collection of different attempts to 
justify policy proposals aimed at introducing smaller government and fewer fetters on the 
market economy. Such an interpretation, which I find quite convincing, builds on the idea 
that Hayek has constructed a political theory in two layers, consisting of one ‘deontological’ 
theory at an instrumental and ideological level, which is the theory Hayek wants be the basis 
of routine politics, as well as a ‘consequentialist’ theory at a more fundamental level, which 
is supposed to provide a basis for the more instrumental theory: 
Many of his interpreters find Hayek’s political philosophy to be inconsistent and 
contradictory. A major theme in this dissertation is that many of these contradictions 
can be eliminated if his claims are interpreted in terms of two levels. Hayek has two 
fundamental aims in his writings. The first is to posit a fundamental theory 
expressing a correct point of view. The second is to formulate ideological 
conceptions which can provide human actors with the appropriate guidance regarding 
what, in Hayek’s view, is right behaviour. On the first level he assumes responsibility 
for the good society. However, on the ideological and instrumental level he provides 
an alibi for not taking responsibility. He argues [at an instrumental and ideological 
level] for an objective conception of the sources of norms. He defends a 
deontological conception of ethics and an antirationalistic attitude towards social 
processes. (Lundström 1993:223) 
 
At the more fundamental level, however, Lundström interprets Hayek as a ‘consequentialist’ 
and even as a ‘nihilst’, and not as a believer in the existence of objective ethical norms or 
198 
 
imperatives. Hayek did moreover hold what Lundström calls “an instrumentalist view of 
human conceptions”, which “enables him to defend ideas which he himself does not accept” 
(Lundström 1993:224). In essence, Hayek is interpreted to defend ‘The Great Society’ (cf. 
Hayek 1976), i.e. a society built on ‘catallaxy’, or a market order which is not planned or put 
into place as a result of political decisions, in two different ways. In practical terms, ‘The 
Great Society’ is a society of ‘liberal institutions’, primarily small government and 
unfettered markets. One such defence is ‘deontological’ and ‘instrumental’, or intended for a 
wider audience, and another defence is ‘consequentialist’ and more ‘fundamental’, intended 
for an audience with a more developed taste for philosophical stringency:   
Like Sidgwick before him, Hayek defends liberal institutions [at a more fundamental 
level] for consequentialist reasons. He applies the same perspective to the 
conceptions underlying liberal institutions. Putting it somewhat provocatively, one 
can say that Hayek views liberalism as a necessary ‘false consciousness’ supporting 
‘The Great Society’. (ibid.) 
 
Quite regardless of how one should ultimately interpret the entirety of Hayek’s political and 
economic thought, it remains however that at least his practical recommendations in the 
longer run steadily became more popular. Perhaps one could explain this slowly rising 
popularity in part because Hayek so skilfully supplied his economic policy recommendations 
with different types of justification, at different levels and with different audiences in mind, 
as time went on. Another contributing factor was the flexible way in which Hayek and others 
organised ‘the neoliberal thought collective’ as a relatively loose network of think tanks, 
foundations for economic research, and meetings which brought political and economic 
theorists together with politicians and entrepreneurs. When Hayek and others founded the 
Mont Pèlerin Society in 1947, however, they believed that the kinds of liberal economic 
policies they wanted to defend were under siege by the rising popularity of socialism and 
economic planning (Plehwe 2009:16). Consequently, they needed to organise themselves at 
an international level, and then hammer out a strategy for how to make their preferred 
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policies more popular, ultimately hoping to push back the tide of Keynesianism and 
economic planning. 
6.4.2 Towards a more mature tradition of political thought 
In Western Europe, the economists and political theorists of the Mont Pèlerin Society had 
some measure of success at least in the longer run, and Hayek himself and other prominent 
members of the MPS became a central source of inspiration for liberal and conservative 
politicians, at least from the 1970’s to our own day (Denord 2009; Tribe 2009; Ptak 2009). 
In the United States, however, we see an earlier turn away from ‘big government’, and 
towards the kind of liberal economic policies recommended by Hayek during and after 
World War II, with the rise of ‘movement conservatism’ from the 1960’s onwards (Krugman 
2007:101-123; cf. also Goldwater [1960] 2007; Madrick 2009; Judt 2010). Here, we also see 
a more complete turn towards traditionally liberal economic policies, away from the welfare 
state which was developed in that country in the first twenty years after the war. 
 One of the more influential intellectuals of this movement was the American 
economist Milton Friedman, himself an erstwhile follower of Keynesianism, who in 1962 
published his book Capitalism and Freedom (Friedman [1962] 2002). After the publication 
of The Road to Serfdom and the establishment of the Mont Pèlerin Society, Hayek moved to 
Chicago in 1950, where he helped establish a thriving new atmosphere for economics 
research, characterised by a negative attitude towards Keynesianism and economic planning. 
He was less successful, however, in his ambition to write an American edition of The Road 
to Serfdom, and ended up writing the slightly less accessible book The Constitution of 
Liberty instead in 1960, shortly before he moved back to Europe. Friedman was undoubtedly 
less of an accomplished political theorist than his fellow economist Hayek, but his book was 
ultimately better suited to a general American audience than anything Hayek ever wrote, and 
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it went on to become one of the most influential texts produced by the so-called Chicago 
School of economics research (cf. Van Horn and Mirowski 2009).  
In his book, Friedman wrote in a characteristically practical way about the kinds of 
liberal economic policies both he and Hayek recommended. This has led some political 
theorists to view him as an unsophisticated thinker (cf. e.g. Malnes 1998:312-313). Sadly for 
political theorists, however, it is not only the philosophical rigour of a book which 
determines its influence and its political importance. Friedman’s book was however never 
intended, like some of Hayek’s more extensive works, to describe how the philosophical 
foundations of his political views and policy recommendations ought to be understood. His 
book is, rather, an informative attempt to describe in an American context what the basic 
political attitudes and priorities of a ‘consistent liberal’ actually are, and which policies such 
a type of liberal ultimately would recommend. This ambition, which is also present in other 
books such as Free to Choose (Friedman and Friedman 1980), is clearly more of a political 
than a theoretical nature – the basic aim is to present arguments which will inspire politicians 
and others to help establish a ‘free society’. His books are not intended to convert 
philosophers to his cause. 
Both Hayek and Friedman recommend, throughout their works, a rolling back of the 
frontiers of the state. As Friedman ([1962] 2002:34-36) writes, even the relatively limited 
government of the United States ought to be rolled back and reduced in size, in order to 
secure the establishment of a ‘free society’, and government programs from agricultural 
subsidies, via regulation of the financial industry, to national parks and toll roads, ought to 
be completely abolished. At the same time, the state has a legitimate role to play when it 
comes to the fulfilment of a handful of rather central tasks: 
A government which maintained law and order, defined property rights, served as a 
means whereby we could modify property rights and other rules of the economic 
game, adjudicated disputes about the interpretation of the rules, enforced contracts, 
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promoted competition, provided a monetary framework, engaged in activities to 
counter technical monopolies and to overcome neighborhood effects widely regarded 
as sufficiently important to justify government intervention, and which supplemented 
private charity and the private family in protecting the irresponsible, whether 
madman or child – such a government would clearly have important functions to 
perform. The consistent liberal is not an anarchist. (Friedman [1962] 2002:34)  
 
Both Hayek and Friedman view the states in their own time as too extensive, and too 
involved in affairs which ought to remain in the hands of citizens living in a ‘free society’. 
At the same time, they do not recommend a complete elimination of the state. The state 
should rather only do the tasks it alone may perform fairly successfully, in particular the 
effective enforcement of laws which are necessary to have a functioning market economy in 
the first place, as well as a few other tasks which would otherwise be left undone. They both 
agree that beyond this the state should not venture, because any attempt by the state to 
redistribute wealth and power – or even the means necessary to stave of hunger, disease, and 
squalor – is a threat to liberty, democracy, and the rule of law, at least in the long run (Hayek 
[1944] 2001:59-90; Friedman [1962] 2002:7-36). Underpinning the thought of both authors 
is the view that there is no attractive alternative to a political system in which the state is 
limited to the performance of a small and relatively clearly defined set of tasks. If the state 
tries to perform other tasks, particularly economic planning, it will embark on a slippery 
slope towards totalitarianism. Hayek sums up this shared argument in The Road to Serfdom: 
It is the price of democracy that the possibilities of conscious control are restricted to 
the fields where true agreement exists, and that in some fields things must be left to 
chance. But in a society which for its functioning depends on central planning, this 
control cannot be made dependent on a majority being able to agree; it will often be 
necessary that the will of a small minority be imposed upon the people, because this 
minority will be the largest group able to agree among themselves on the question at 
issue. Democratic government has worked successfully where, and as long as, the 
functions of the government were, by a widely accepted creed, restricted to fields 
where agreement among a majority could be achieved by free discussion; and it is the 
great merit of the liberal creed that it reduced the range of subjects on which 
agreement was necessary to one on which it was likely to exist in a society of free 
men. It is now often said that democracy will not tolerate “capitalism”. If 
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“capitalism” means here a competitive system based on the free disposal over private 
property, it is far more important to realise that only within this system is democracy 
possible. When it becomes dominated by a collectivist creed, democracy will 
inevitably destroy itself. (Hayek [1944] 2001:73) 
 
Neoliberalism may be viewed as a tradition of political thought, not consciously defined and 
described by its most important theorists, who largely claimed that they, instead of creating 
an entirely new tradition of normative political theory, rather thought that they were 
resurrecting an older creed, namely the economic liberalism which rose to prominence in the 
nineteenth century, only to be abandoned by the rise of economic planning and the welfare 
state (cf. especially Hayek [1944] 2001:10-23). Like other traditions of art, literature, and 
political thought which are usually named using the addition of the prefix ‘neo-’ in front of 
an older name, it shares a varying degree of common ground with the older tradition, but 
also adds some new features of its own. This is explicitly made clear by Hayek in the 
introduction to The Constitution of Liberty, in which he motivates his own political theory as 
a restatement of an older liberal creed for a new age (Hayek 1960:1-8). 
Hayek’s philosophical explorations of this way of looking at things, and Friedman’s 
various popularisations of a more political point of view largely overlapping with Hayek’s 
own, remain the most important and influential contributions to what one with some degree 
of justice may describe as a neoliberal tradition of political thought.  
Other theorists have, however, jumped on the bandwagon (to use a traditional 
expression from the scientific study of political behaviour), and tried to develop their basic 
ideas further, and in different directions. One of the most influential and important 
contributions from these more recent neoliberal theorists comes from Robert Nozick. Nozick 
later revised some of his views (Nozick 1989:286-296), but he nevertheless argued – in his 
most famous work in political theory called Anarchy, State, and Utopia – in favour of a 
liberal, or more precisely libertarian, political theory based around an idea of a ‘minimal 
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state’ inspired, in part least, by Hayek and Friedman (Nozick 1974). Nozick does so, 
however, not from an indirectly consequentialist perspective on political morality (cf. 
Lundström 1993; 1998; Malnes 1998), but from a conception of natural rights which precede 
and predate the state, and which determine what the state ought and ought not to do: 
Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them 
(without violating their rights). So strong and far-reaching are these rights that they 
raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials may do. (…)  
Our main conclusions about the state are that a minimal state, limited to the 
narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement [sic] of 
contracts, and so on, is justified; that any more extensive state will violate persons’ 
rights not to be forced to do certain things, and is unjustified; ant that the minimal 
state is inspiring as well as right. Two noteworthy implications are that the state may 
not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting some citizens to aid others, 
or in order to prohibit activities to people for their own good or protection.  
(Nozick 1974:ix, author’s own emphasis) 
 
In some places, Nozick is more direct than the other two, for instance when he calls his ideal 
form of government ‘a minimal state’, rather than using the immediately more attractive-
sounding name ‘free society’, like Hayek and Friedman tend to do. In other places he does 
not go nearly as far as Hayek does, for instance in the essay The Atavism of Social Justice 
(Hayek 1978:57-68), when he claims that he builds on a conception of distributive justice. 
Nozick holds, pace Hayek, that concepts such as social justice or distributive justice are not 
entirely devoid of meaning. He does, however, favour a conception of justice which is 
singularly adapted to illustrate the attractiveness of a minimal state which does not 
redistribute wealth and the resources needed for a decent existence, except in exceptional 
circumstances: 
The complete principle of distributive justice would say simply that a distribution is 
just if everyone is entitled to the holdings they possess under the distribution. 
(Nozick 1974:151; cf. also Thorsen 2008:415-417; 2011:361-363) 
 
There are many differences of a philosophical nature between these three leading members 
of the neoliberal thought collective – Hayek, Friedman, and Nozick – but there are rather 
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striking similarities between as well, especially if one looks at the practical policy 
recommendations at which they ultimately arrive in their most famous works. If we define 
neoliberalism not as a complete philosophical system or political theory, but rather as a set of 
policy recommendations which may be justified using different philosophical or 
‘metaphysical’ background theories (cf. Rawls 1985), we may come to appreciate the many 
manifest similarities between these three theorists, and others who recommends similar 
economic policies, as well as a similar view of the state. 
 We can now see that a neoliberal tradition of political thought developed in the 
intermediary and latter parts of the twentieth century, which mixed together an older 
tradition of economic liberalism with new restatements of its core policy proposals, better 
suited for a century which witnessed the advent of the welfare state and economic planning.  
This tradition is decidedly not a very conservative tradition (cf. Hayek 1960:397-
411), even if it has received quite considerable acclaim in some nominally Conservative 
political parties around the world, in addition to several self-styled Liberal parties. It is, 
rather, an alternative way of viewing the modern state, not as a champion of freedom as 
social democrats and social liberals tend to do, but rather as the primary threat to individual 
liberty and the autonomy of markets. It is not, either, a necessarily radical political ideology 
in the sense that it may be considered an extreme or revolutionary ideology, for there are 
countries around the world which come much closer than others to its basic ideals and policy 
recommendations, and where neoliberals would tend to be defenders of the status quo. It 
may, however, in other parts of the world be viewed as a radical set of policy proposals, in 
the sense that it amounts to a political ideology which wants the political development of 
some countries to turn in a different direction – towards smaller government and more 
unfettered markets.   
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6.5 Neoliberalism – is it a useful concept? 
On a less fundamental level, it is pertinent to ask a few questions about the scientific utility 
and fruitfulness of the concept of ‘neoliberalism’. It may have its use as an epithet for a 
collection of political theorists with overlapping view about what the state ought and ought 
not to do, but does the concept help us to understand better what goes on in the world, or 
does it rather lead us astray? Will it make us overstate some trends and underestimate others, 
of which some will counteract and even neutralise developments inspired by neoliberal 
political and economic theories? Has the concept itself somehow become tied up with a 
particular narrative found in the ‘critical literature’, in which the popularity of attitudes 
commonly associated with neoliberalism has been greatly exaggerated? 
Much of the ‘critical literature’ tends to mix several different currents of thought into 
a jumble which they then give the name neoliberalism. It is one thing to point to political and 
economic theorists who share a quite considerable ‘family likeness’, such as Friedman, 
Hayek, and Nozick, and try to discuss them together under the heading of neoliberalism, in 
the way Blomgren does with a mixed degree of success. It is an entirely different matter to 
combine, as Harvey and many others do, their political theories with more ideologically 
neutral ambitions to find efficient and practical solutions to wasteful spending in the public 
sector, or the desire to see more effective and coordinated regimes for international trade. It 
does seem to me, however, that the word neoliberalism describes, in the convenient way that 
only a single word can describe an influential set of beliefs, some patterns of thought which 
for some time have been a highly significant force in policy-making around the world 
(Thorsen 2009).  
In particular, attitudes resembling what I above defined as neoliberalism have 
become more popular among business leaders, politicians, and to a lesser extent the general 
population, during the last few decades. There are however signs which suggest that this 
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upsurge in popularity for neoliberal ideas has petered out in the new century, especially after 
the ‘dot-com bubble’ of the years around the turn of the century, and especially the global 
financial crisis which burst onto the scene in 2008 (Thorsen 2009; Duménil and Lévy 2011). 
Used in a limited and cautious way, avoiding the temptation to use ‘neoliberalism’ as a 
shorthand for ‘everything I think is wrong and horrible’, as several authors of the ‘critical 
literature’ seem to be doing, it can therefore potentially describe some important currents of 
thought in recent times.   
 A further argument against using the concept of ‘neoliberalism’ too prolifically in 
more systematic discussions is that the concept unleashes a surprising amount of emotion. 
Because it is a concept used almost exclusively by critics of economic liberalism, many who 
tend to approach or even adopt neoliberal attitudes tend to shy away from describing 
themselves as neoliberals. Often, people who want to ‘roll back the frontiers of the state’ and 
remove fetters from the market economy, deny that they are supporters of neoliberalism. On 
a similar note, many who describe themselves as liberals tend not to be proponents of 
typically neoliberal ideas and policies. In a situation where the concept of ‘neoliberalism’ 
has become a conspicuous part of political parlance around the world, there is therefore often 
a semantic gulf between the term ‘neoliberalism’ on one hand, and the more general term 
‘liberalism’ on the other. While the latter is used as a name for the ideology of many centrist 
and centre-right politicians and political parties, the former is a name more often used to 
describe an ideology or body of political thought belonging more clearly on the right wing of 
the political spectrum.  
 One author, Gunnar Garbo, who for good measure was the leader of Norway’s 
Liberal Party in the 1960s, has even tried to construct a narrative in which neoliberalism is 
thought of as being ‘neither new nor liberal’ (Garbo 2008; cf. also Steger and Roy 2010). In 
fact, he goes on to say that political theorists and politicians who advocate a rolling back of 
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the contemporary welfare state are not liberals at all. Perhaps more surprisingly, he also 
claims that ‘good liberals need to be good socialists just as much as good socialists need to 
be good liberals’. The whole concept of ‘neoliberalism’ is according to his perspective an 
instance of ‘political counterfeiting’, because it is an attempt to muddle together the 
moderate and egalitarian types of liberalism behind which Garbo throws his alleigance – 
roughly corresponding to what Ryan calls ‘modern liberalism’ – with the kinds of policy 
proposals put forward by the neoliberals. In that way, authors of the ‘critical literature’ have 
succeeded in confounding neoliberalism and the wider liberal tradition, so that people who 
call themselves liberals are automatically associated with the dismantling of the welfare 
state, and the establishment of a minimal state in its stead.  
The contrast between Garbo and another Liberal politician, Denmark’s former Prime 
Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen (1993), is almost too illustrating to be true. Fogh 
Rasmussen is actually one of the few, and to my knowledge the only prominent politician, 
who have stated that there is a need to formulate a new type of liberalism (which he 
occasionally calls ‘neoliberalism’) which takes more seriously the supposed threat which 
expansive welfare states poses to individual liberty. His own analysis of the development of 
liberal political thought even mirrors the narratives found in parts of the ‘critical literature’, 
and he describes neoliberalism as a rejuvenation of an older liberal creed, which reached the 
height of its popularity in the nineteenth century. Intermediary liberal theorists and 
politicians who wanted the state to become an active participant in the economy, or who 
wanted to construct a welfare state in order to distribute health and wealth more evenly, is by 
Fogh Rasmussen viewed as liberals in name only, and as adversaries of core liberal tenets.  
Fogh Rasmussen (1993:36-64) goes on to describe Hayek, being the ‘father of 
neoliberalism’, as a central source of inspiration, but he also claims that Nozick and his idea 
that natural rights could be thought of as an auxiliary philosophical foundation of the 
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neoliberal political agenda. His stated goal is a society in which each individual person has a 
direct responsibility for all aspects of her own well-being. ‘The liberal agenda’ should be, 
according to Fogh Rasmussen, a political programme which will facilitate the move ‘from 
the welfare state to the minimal state’. He is therefore an honest proponent of the attitudes 
defined above as the very core of neoliberalism.  
Both Garbo and Fogh Rasmussen may be extreme examples of Liberal politicians 
who situate themselves at opposite ends of the economic policy spectrum. But even if they 
are extreme examples, their analyses are indicative of the tremendously wide variety of 
economic policies which could be described as part of the liberal tradition. Neoliberalism is 
in many ways part of this tradition, but neoliberalism is itself hardly a revival of liberalism in 
general terms. It is, rather, a selective revival of what Hobhouse and others in earlier times 
called economic liberalism, which in the contemporary world amounts to a political 
programme with which other liberals may find it very hard to agree.  
6.6 Do we live in ‘the age of neoliberalism’? 
In the preceding, we have seen that neoliberalism is not merely, as the term itself might 
suggest, a recent revival of liberalism in general. Neoliberalism is perhaps best perceived of 
as a set of economic policies rather than a complete political ideology, characterised by a 
practical demand for a general deregulation of the economy, liberalisation of industry and 
international trade, and privatisation of the public sector (Steger and Roy 2010:14). Some 
neoliberal theorists and politicians have even suggested that the ultimate goal should be to 
establish a ‘minimal state’, or a state which has ceased to do anything apart from upholding 
the most basic aspects of public order. More traditional liberal demands for ‘equality of 
liberty’ and ‘equality in liberty’ have been set aside by a demand for a systematic rolling 
back of the frontiers of the state. In this, neoliberalism resembles the parallel phenomenon of 
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‘neoconservatism’ which is not, either, a new form or recent revival of traditional 
conservatism or conservatism in general, but rather a set of political ideas which only bears 
some degree of semblance to the ideology from which it is supposed to be descended. 
 This chapter originated as a part of a larger research project called ‘Politics in the 
Age of Neoliberalism’ (Claes et al. 2007). The name of the project suggests that a transition 
from a previous but unspecified stage in the world’s political and economic development to 
‘the age of neoliberalism’ is taking place right before our eyes. According to this analysis, 
which is related to the one found in for instance the Critical Reader and Harvey’s Brief 
History, one has moved away from a society marked by proactive welfare states and a large 
room for exercising political authority, to a new type of society in which the ‘conditions for 
politics’ have been severely curtailed because of the increased popularity of neoliberal 
political thoughts and theories.  
There are a number of perhaps irreverent questions which naturally arise when one is 
confronted with the belief that we live in an age of neoliberalism. Is it really the case that 
neoliberalism is ‘the dominant ideology shaping our world today’? Are we really on the 
move towards ‘the neoliberal society’, understood as a society in which neoliberal ideology 
has become a major governing force? Could we really in any meaningful sense think of 
ourselves as living in ‘the age of neoliberalism’? There are also other questions to be asked. 
If there is a trend towards reforms of the public sector, the economy, and international trade 
inspired by neoliberalism, is it a trend which is gathering speed? Or are there perhaps 
indications that the push for ‘neoliberal’ reforms might be slowing down or stalling 
altogether (cf. e.g. Duménil and Lévy 2011), especially after the financial crisis of the last 
few years?  
There are evidently many quite exaggerated analyses around on both sides of the 
argument, both among neoliberals who promise economic growth and increased individual 
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liberty to those who implement their preferred economic policies, and critics who think that 
neoliberal ideology is something one should oppose and not something one should embrace.  
Maybe it is a bit boring as a solution, but perhaps truer and more accurate, to instead 
think of our age as an age of greater complexity, uncertainty, and volatility, rather than an 
age dominated by neoliberal ideology. If that is the case, the concept of neoliberalism ought 
to be set aside as a description for a set of ideas which or a tradition of political thought 
which only has had a varying degree of impact on contemporary societies. It is still, 
however, an open question whether or not neoliberalism is a prevailing trend in the world 
today, which much of the critical literature suggests, or if it is better perceived of as body of 
political thought which may have had an influence on society and politics in recent times, 
but not anything more than that.  
It might even be true that the recent negative trends in the world economy has 
reduced the relevance and importance of neoliberal ideas for some time to come, and that we 
in some sense have slipped out of a strong trend leading towards an implementation of 
neoliberal policies. But as the rather surprising revival of economic liberalism during the last 
quarter of twentieth century has shown, ideas which today may be thought of as neoliberal 
ideas have had a remarkable resilience and longevity, and a surprising ability to survive long 
periods of declining popularity. It remains therefore that neoliberalism ought to be studied 
more closely by political theorists, economic historians, as well as other social scientists.  
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7. Berlin and Popper – The defence of liberal democracy 
7.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, we saw that the set of ideas conventionally named neoliberalism 
may be characterised by a thoroughgoing demand for a ‘rolling back of the frontiers of the 
state’, and for a state characterised by ‘minimal and dispersed’ government institutions (cf. 
especially Mont Pèlerin Society, no date; Fogh Rasmussen 1993). We also saw that 
neoliberalism is hardly a complete political ideology, or a wide-ranging answer to the quite 
general question of how society ought to be organised, but more like a package of economic 
policies which may be supplied with different kinds of justifications. Finally, we saw that 
this package of economic policies may be implemented in liberal democracies as well as 
within other, more autocratic forms of government.  
Neoliberals such as Hayek, Friedman or Nozick – described above as the most 
central members of ‘the neoliberal thought collective’ – have hardly criticised democracy 
directly, even if they have wanted to remove a great deal of issues from the political agenda. 
Whenever they write about democracy in their most influential works, they tend to write 
about what democratic institutions may not do if one wants to avoid the gradual development 
of a totalitarian society. Democratically made political decisions characterised by benign or 
benevolent intentions may lead us down a path to totalitarianism, or a society in which 
individual liberty and private property rights have been effectively extinguished by 
governments which begin to redistribute capital and resources (Nozick 1974:276-294; Hayek 
[1944] 2001:59-74; Friedman [1962] 2002:7-21).  
The most central political goal in neoliberal thought – including of course the 
political thought of Hayek, Friedman, and Nozick – is at any rate not to construct a more 
energetic liberal democracy where the most important political decisions are made by the 
people or its representatives. The most central goal is instead to reduce government 
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interference in the lives of individual citizens and especially in the economic sphere. So 
much so, that it is not particularly clear what democratic institutions could and should do in a 
neoliberal society with ‘minimal and dispersed’ government institutions.  
Berlin and Popper, on the other hand, both saw democracy - understood as a set of 
political institutions and practices in which the population of a country at large tries to devise 
solutions to shared problems – as the very core of the kind of liberal tradition to which they 
claimed to belong. Indeed, a central theme in Berlin and Popper’s political thought is the 
defence of liberal democracy, primarily against totalitarianism, but also against what they 
perceived of as a gradual withering-away of democracy in societies which allow poverty and 
other sources of avoidable human suffering to remain rampant.  
During World War II, when Popper wrote The Open Society and The Poverty of 
Historicism, a sense of doom and despair loomed over debates in political theory and social 
philosophy. Many even thought that totalitarian governments were destined to conquer the 
world, and that liberal democracy suffered from a crisis from which it would be hard pressed 
to escape. We can even find this pervasive pessimism in relatively hopeful works written 
during this period (e.g. Mannheim 1940; Schumpeter [1942] 1976). The optimism of The 
Open Society stands in sharp contrast to this defeatism, even if we take into account that 
Popper’s war-time books were published in 1944 and 1945, at a time when an allied victory 
seemed to be a foregone conclusion.  
Totalitarianism was according to Popper always a blind alley, and definitely not a 
viable way to realising even the relatively modest goal of minimising avoidable suffering. 
Throughout his books, Popper argued that a dictator must try to limit the flow of information 
in order to stay in power. Scientific progress, so vital if one is to solve the many problems 
facing mankind, depends however on a free exchange of ideas, even potentially subversive 
ideas. A free exchange of ideas has only been approximately achieved in democracies, and it 
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is therefore a close link between Popper’s humanitarian theory of justice and the more 
specific idea of liberal democracy.  
In 1958, thirteen years after the publication of The Open Society, when Berlin wrote 
Two Concepts of Liberty, a new geopolitical order had been established. Western 
democracies displayed a new sense of self-confidence, even if most of the world was still 
ruled by autocratic governments, including colonies ruled over by Western states which 
practiced democracy at home. Totalitarianism was very much a part of the collective 
consciousness, but its apologists were dwindling in number, at least in Western Europe. 
Nevertheless, the general perception was that liberal democracy was under siege by 
totalitarianism, especially Soviet totalitarianism, and still in danger of extinction.    
For Berlin, democracy was almost self-evidently the basis for any type of political 
system worth defending. Berlin thought, like Popper, that authoritarianism was a threat to 
liberty and progress, and something which had the potential of stunting the intellectual 
growth of whole nations (Berlin 2004). But democracy has to be limited if it is to function 
properly. It has to respect a measure of individual, negative freedom. The ideal democracy is 
therefore not a political system in which every conceivable decision is put up for a 
referendum. Instead, one has to strike a good balance between personal freedom and 
democracy, and try to find an honourable compromise between the two ideals (Berlin 
2002:283-286).  
Throughout their books we see that Berlin and Popper defended liberal democracy 
against totalitarianism. It must be remembered, however, that they wrote their most seminal 
works in political theory at a time when proponents of liberal democracy were faced with 
stiff opposition from intellectuals and political movements who praised some or another 
form of autocracy. Debates in political theory were therefore encircled by the larger public 
debate of whether or not democracy was the best available form of government. Democrats 
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like Popper and Berlin therefore had to take advocates of totalitarian ideologies rather more 
seriously, and defend their own theories against those who actively supported the abolition 
of representative government.  
But how will their defence of democracy fare when it is turned in a different 
direction? Neoliberalism is decidedly not a totalitarian ideology. The neoliberal challenge to 
the kind of energetic liberal democracy envisaged by Berlin and Popper is much more 
indirect. No prominent neoliberals have spoken out against democracy, even if Nozick 
(1974:276-294) comes close to doing so, and neoliberals have instead tended to voice their 
support for democratic ideals. It is however not entirely clear what role the institutions of 
representative government could and should play in the minimal state, if they have a role to 
play at all (cf. especially Hayek [1944] 2001:59-74; Friedman [1962] 2002:7-21).  
In this chapter the main question is therefore how the defence of a quite limited 
democratic welfare state given by Berlin and Popper compares to the view submitted by 
neoliberal political theorists. A central, shared idea among these theorists is the belief that 
there is no permanently sustainable middle ground between ‘minimal and dispersed’ 
government institutions on one hand, and the totalitarian state on the other. Consequently, 
they want to reduce the scope of democratic politics down to a bare minimum, in order to 
preserve individual liberty, private property rights, and in some cases even democracy itself.  
I will therefore in the two next sections in outline discuss their key doctrines of value 
pluralism and political protectionism against the backdrop of neoliberal ideology. In so 
doing, I will employ a combination of Williams’ ‘history of philosophy’-approach and 
Rawls’ and Daniels’ ‘wide reflective equilibrium’-approach, which I briefly described 
above, in sections 1.4.2 and 1.4.3. The basic aim is to try to describe how the political 
thought of Berlin and Popper may inspire us to think about politics in a new century, and to 
discuss how their theories may be understood in light of recent experiences with various 
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types of economic policy. I will compare Berlin’s ethical and political theory of value 
pluralism, as well as Popper’s ‘protectionist view of the state’, with neoliberal ideology, all 
in order to tease out the most fundamental aspects of the political though of both theorists. I 
do this in the hope that I may contribute to making these theories more lucid and better 
suited to form a basis for future, more practical policy proposals and recommendations, as 
described in section 1.4.3 above, on the methods employed in this thesis.  
My ambition with this chapter is, briefly put, to complement the political thought of 
both Berlin and Popper with a discussion of how one should understand some central aspects 
of their political thought in practical terms, using neoliberal political thought as a way of 
contrasting their type of moderate and egalitarian liberalism, against alternative and yet – to 
some degree at least – related modes of political thought. I will conclude the chapter with a 
discussion about the relationship between the fallibilism and ‘organised liberalism’ of Berlin 
and Popper on one hand, and neoliberalism on the other, before I round off this study with 
some final words about the democratic attitudes which inform both theorists.  
7.2 Value pluralism and neoliberalism  
7.2.1 Two concepts of negative liberty  
It is common among prominent neoliberals – such as Hayek, Friedman, and Nozick – to 
view what Berlin called negative liberty as an overriding value. Freedom from state-
sponsored interference in the economy and the lives of individual citizens is so important to 
them, that they consider other central liberal values such as democracy or social justice to be 
of derived importance, or not important at all (Nozick 1974; Hayek 1978; Friedman [1962] 
2002; cf. also Fogh Rasmussen 1993; Norberg and Bejke 1994). This alone makes 
neoliberalism different from the value pluralism and liberal gradualism Berlin described, 
even if negative liberty is an important value to him. Instead, Berlin tends in his essays to 
voice the idea that freedom may be a very important concern, but it is certainly not all that 
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matters (cf. especially Berlin 2002:3-54). Negative liberty could instead be thought of as a 
potentially dangerous ideal if it is pursued at the exclusion of other values and goals, such as 
justice, generosity, decency, and equality – and indeed compound values such as ‘equality of 
liberty’ and ‘equality in liberty’.  
In addition, Berlin’s view of negative liberty is itself different from the way in which 
the most central neoliberal political theorists tend to view individual liberty. Berlin was 
primarily worried about what he thought of as a dangerous erosion of negative liberty in 
some autocratic political systems. He was also worried about a downplaying of the 
importance of negative liberty in some types of radical political thought. He was less 
interested in whom or what threatened the negative liberty of individual human beings, and 
very well aware of the fact that threats to personal freedom may come from several different 
sources. The most important neoliberal theorists, on the other hand, have from the outset 
rejected government intervention as a way of guaranteeing the personal freedom of 
individuals whose negative liberty is under threat. They have also tended to be less 
concerned than Berlin about threats to individual freedom which comes from other 
individuals, private corporations, or other types of non-governmental organisations.  
When neoliberal theorists talk about liberty or freedom, they tend to build on a more 
specific conception of liberty, at least compared to Berlin’s talk of the importance of a 
measure of negative liberty for all (Friedman and Friedman 1980). A common way of 
looking at things among neoliberals is that individual rights and liberties are given in 
advance, as parts of how things naturally are and ought to be (cf. especially Nozick 1974). 
Liberty itself is a prearranged state of affairs, not something which needs to be established 
by way of political decisions, or fought for against those who wish to dominate others (cf. 
e.g. Hayek 1973; 1976: 1979). But liberty is nevertheless under threat from states which are 
considered too powerful and too intrusive in the lives of individuals and the organisations in 
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which they choose to take part (Hayek [1944] 2001). The basic demand neoliberals put 
forward is therefore quite naturally that the state should control and govern less, and most 
definitely less than states tend to do in our day and age. 
 Together with this demand for less government, many neoliberals – but certainly not 
all – tend to promise that a whole host of good things will befall the society which 
implements their preferred policies. This promise is based in a firm belief in the idea that 
most things will end more happily, if only the state intervenes in the economy to a lesser 
extent. The neoliberals’ idea of freedom is for instance actually rather simple. If the 
government abstains from economic intervention and redistribution, then the free market will 
take care of most of our needs anyhow, or at least the needs of those who can access the 
relevant market-places in a competent way. This will in turn lead to greater freedom of 
choice and ultimately to a greater happiness for each individual citizen. That way, greater 
commercial liberty leads to more personal freedom and contentment for all (cf. especially 
Fogh Rasmussen 1993; Norberg 2001; 2003).  
 Of course, there will always be counter-examples which may rebut this surprisingly 
prevalent belief. The absence of regulation and redistribution does not always lead to greater 
freedom or happiness for all. In fact, it is built into the whole logic of the market economy 
that some actors must lose, namely those suppliers that are unable or unwilling to provide 
buyers with the goods and services they demand. It may also happen that the market-place 
fails to function in an optimal way, for a wide variety of reasons. For instance, buyers and 
suppliers may fail to access the same market-place, so that a demand for certain types of 
goods and services are not met, even if there are people or corporations who would be able 
and willing to meet the demands in question. One may also occasionally come across actors 
who are not at all interested in maintaining market efficiency. Instead, they use intimidation, 
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violence, or accumulated financial resources in order to make sure that they receive a greater 
profit for themselves, even if society at large will stand to lose from such behaviour.  
A traditional argument for the market economy, that ‘private vices’, most of all greed 
and selfishness, inevitably will lead to ‘public benefits’, or that an ‘invisible hand’ will make 
sure that optimal overall results will come out of a series of self-interested market decisions 
(cf. Mandeville [1732] 1924; Smith [1776] 1993:IV.2.9). In fact, these metaphors are found 
everywhere in the literature usually described under the heading of neoliberalism, even if the 
original intentions of Mandeville and Smith are rarely understood particularly well.  
 In contrast, Berlin observes that “total liberty of the powerful, the gifted, is not 
compatible with the rights to a decent existence of the weak and the less gifted”, and that 
“liberty (...) may have to be curtailed in order to make room for social welfare, to feed the 
hungry, to clothe the naked, to shelter the homeless, to leave room for the liberty of others, 
to allow justice or fairness to be exercised” (Berlin 1990:12).  
So we see that Berlin recognises that the threats to liberty are many, and that liberty 
needs to be traded off to some extent if we are to realise other values such as equality, 
democracy, and ordinary human decency. The most central members of the neoliberal 
thought collective, on the other hand, bring a much less complicated analysis of the 
conditions for human liberty to the fore. The neoliberal theory of liberty, if such a thing 
could be gathered from the political thought of the most central neoliberal theorists, claims 
that non-intervention in the market economy will automatically lead to increased individual 
liberty. Berlin’s liberal theory, on the other hand, holds that other values have to be upheld if 
personal freedom is to become a reality for most people. In essence, the two views of 
negative liberty – Berlin’s view and the neoliberal view – represent different ideas about 
what the preconditions for individual negative liberty actually are. 
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7.2.2 Neoliberalism in a world of plural values   
The most central assumption of value pluralism is, as indicated in chapter 2, that there is a 
plurality of different but equally fundamental human values, between which one must try to 
strike some sort of balance. If one tries to pursue only one such value at the expense of all 
others, or if one tries to put together a perfect society, one will according to Berlin’s way of 
looking at things end up with a worse overall result. The alternative is to establish an ‘uneasy 
equilibrium’ between different values and ideals (Berlin 1990:19).  
The idea that fundamental human values are many, that they sometimes clash with 
other values of a roughly equal importance, and that they are not always commensurable 
with each other, leads Berlin to the idea that everyone should be accorded a “measure of 
negative liberty” (Berlin 2002: 216). One should let everyone pursue their own ends, as long 
as that pursuit does not exclude others from being admitted a parallel degree of personal 
freedom. In practical terms this means that open-ended gradualism and liberal democracy 
should be the basis of politics and government. But it also means that negative liberty should 
not be considered the only value of importance to politics, and that it should merely be part 
of a compromise with other ideals such as social justice and common decency. Value 
pluralism thus has some real political consequences, in that it stresses the importance of 
compromise between different interests through inclusive political processes, and not just 
extensive personal freedom (Lamprecht 1921).  
Neoliberalism comes across as a quite different type of political theory. The more 
enthusiastic neoliberal politician will probably claim that the best results come not through 
compromise, but through the determined pursuit of one single end, namely the greatest 
degree of freedom from government intervention in the market economy. If the government 
deliberately reduces its strength and ‘rolls back’ its reach, then society as a whole will be 
better off because of it. This is the case in part because a reduction in the scope and reach of 
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government intervention is thought of as an end in itself, and in part because it is thought 
that unregulated markets will lead to increased economic growth and overall prosperity 
(Fogh Rasmussen 1993; Reinfeldt 1993).  
This neoliberal attitude is perhaps best described by Thomas Paine’s famous 
aphorism: ‘that government is best which governs least’. The unfettered market economy 
will, according to the typical neoliberal politician, as well as the most central neoliberal 
political theorists, tend to society’s needs more efficiently than the cumbersome and 
compromise-ridden political processes which take place in an energetic liberal democracy. A 
state which intervenes in the economy as little as possible is therefore preferable to a more 
extensive state, quite regardless of whether or not it is a democracy. Of course, if all the state 
is supposed to do is to uphold the most basic aspects of public order, then it hardly matters 
that much if the state is run by a popularly elected government, or if some other method is 
chosen to decide who is to lead the state. 
It would of course be a wild exaggeration, and gravely misleading, to suggest that 
neoliberalism is related to the authoritarian ideologies which Berlin criticises in his essays, 
as some of the authors of the ‘critical literature’ actually comes close to suggesting. 
Neoliberalism, described above in chapter 6, has however quite a few features in common 
with the political theories Berlin called monism and Utopianism. At the very least, neoliberal 
doctrines resemble monism more than pluralism, and Utopianism more than the kinds of 
open-ended gradualism and liberal scepticism which Berlin ultimately recommended (Berlin 
2004a). 
The probably most famous illustration of the idea that severely weakened political 
institutions – the so-called minimal state – could form a central ingredient in a vision of an 
ideal society is Robert Nozick’s book Anarchy, State and Utopia. In it, he claims that the 
goal of demolishing more extensive states, and instead replacing them with minimal states 
221 
 
which only ensures the very basics of public order, is not in any way a worst-case scenario. 
It is instead an inspiring semi-Utopian dream of a society in which the so-called natural 
rights of men are finally respected, and not routinely trampled on by the state (Nozick 1974). 
Strong governments are a large part of the problem, and not a part of the solution according 
to this way of looking at things. In fact, it is often claimed – at least by more practically 
oriented politicians and political theorists than Nozick – that increased personal freedom and 
prosperity, will follow if we roll back the frontiers of the state as much as possible (Fogh 
Rasmussen 1993; Reinfeldt 1993; Norberg and Bejke 1994; Booth 2006).  
Neoliberalism fits Berlin’s description of monism and Utopianism quite well. It is 
monistic because the typical neoliberal will claim that good things come in a single package. 
Even the more thoughtful political and economic theorists included in the neoliberal thought 
collective, described above in the preceding chapter, come close to this view (Hayek 1960; 
Friedman and Friedman 1980). It is therefore not necessary to strike a compromise between 
individual and mercantile liberty on one hand, and other values and ideals on the other. 
Neoliberalism is also, at least in some versions, Utopian because it entertains the idea of a 
perfect or nearly perfect society or state of affairs (Nozick 1974; Booth 2006). For these 
reasons, neoliberalism should be treated with a considerable amount of scepticism, at least if 
one believes that fundamental human goals are many and that we should try to pursue 
several of them all at the same time (cf. especially Berlin and Williams 1994; Berlin 
2002:55-93). 
7.2.3 Pluralism, ethical and political  
Is neoliberalism then compatible with the kind of pluralism envisioned by Berlin? If we want 
to answer a question such as this, we must of course take into account that neoliberalism is 
not a monolithic body of political thought, but a diverse set of economic policy initiatives 
which nevertheless pull in the same direction, towards a state which governs less, especially 
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a state which intervenes less frequently in the market economy. It is certainly not the case 
that all things someone at one or another point in time may have found it pertinent to place 
under the heading of ‘neoliberalism’ is always at odds with value pluralism, and its concern 
for negative liberty in conjunction with other values and goals. Instead, limited political and 
economic reforms inspired by neoliberal thought, limited because they merely propose that a 
restricted amount of activities should be handed over from the state to private citizens and 
corporations, may not be incompatible with value pluralism from the outset.  
It is in fact conceivable that such limited reforms, which many critics routinely 
characterise as ‘neoliberal’, might contribute to greater economic efficiency and more 
personal freedom, without at the same leading to significant and unfortunate side-effects on 
other accounts. This is especially the case if limited reforms come about in societies marked 
by too much centralised public control of the economy. If for instance a society comes out of 
a prolonged period of excessive dirigisme, such as the countries of Eastern Europe after the 
collapse of communism at the close of the twentieth century, limited reforms tending in the 
same direction as neoliberal political theory, towards a rolling back of the frontiers of the 
state, may be quite appropriate.  
A case may even be made for the view that countries which have only recently 
adopted a market economy in the first few years needed to go through a ‘valley of 
transition’, in which the establishment of a market economy would be followed by an 
economic depression before lasting improvements could take place. This valley of transition 
was characterised by expedited neoliberal reforms, which many thought were absolutely 
necessary if the countries in question were to re-emerge after a few years with a fairly well-
functioning market economy, even if that meant violent economic fluctuations in the short 
run for the population at large (cf. especially Przeworski 1991). Only after the establishment 
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of an effective market economy could one then start to worry about the distribution of 
income, or about the establishment of a more extensive welfare state.   
Too much control over the economy may however not be the most pressing problem 
in most advanced industrial economies in our day and age. It may even be the case, as 
indicated by a large part of the conventional wisdom after the financial crisis of 2008, that 
economic policy-making has moved too far in a neoliberal direction in many places around 
the world (Gamble 2009; Posner 2009). The increased popularity of neoliberal ideology 
around the turn of the century could therefore in itself be perceived of as an important root 
cause of the crisis (Thorsen 2009; Duménil and Lévy 2011). It is, however, not always the 
case that neoliberal economic reforms are at odds with a pluralist outlook, and occasionally 
it might even be the case that such reforms might be a prudent course of action – perhaps 
even the only prudent option available to us – if an economic system has moved to far in the 
opposite direction towards an all-out type of dirigisme.  
 I said above in chapter 2 that it may not have been an accident that Berlin chose to 
use the term ‘pluralism’, already familiar from political theory and to some degree from 
ordinary political parlance, to describe his ethical theories. Moral pluralism is in Berlin’s 
works vaguely related to a phenomenon others have given the name of political pluralism, or 
the idea that we need compromises between several different ways of organising society and 
the economy, if we want to be successful at pursuing several different values concurrently 
(cf. e.g. Dahl 1967; 1985; Galston 2005). With such a pluralistic way of organising society 
and the economy we may be able to diversify and spread the risks to which we are subjected, 
and ultimately be able to reap the benefits of different organisational principles in different 
areas of economic activity.  
Berlin’s political thought is indeed a plea for pluralism in politics and economic 
affairs, as well as moral theory. If one accepts that fundamental human values are many and 
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that we need to build a compromise – however tenuous and fragile – between them, the most 
important recommendation for makers of economic policy is that several different ways of 
organising the economy have to be tried and tested. It is through the use of different 
organisational principles in different areas of economic activity, which we may find out 
which policies works best in each particular area. That way, one may be able to identify 
which package of policies will lead to the most favourable overall results, and lead us 
towards the kind of ‘uneasy equilibrium’ between different values envisioned by Berlin. The 
central idea is that we should try different policies to see which of them gives the most 
encouraging results, and replace those which produce grave side-effects that outweigh 
whatever advantages they may provide. 
The basic idea behind political and economic pluralism is that the production of 
different goods and services require different methods of organisation. Some goods, for 
instance consumer products such as running shoes or strawberry preserves, may be most 
efficiently produced by privately owned corporations competing with each other on a market 
with only quite limited government oversight. Other things, basic services such as healthcare 
and education, may not be produced in an optimal way if they are bought and sold in an open 
market-place. Society as a whole may therefore stand to profit quite considerably if the 
production of such services is conducted by the state itself, or at least in some or another 
fashion controlled by political processes at a local or national level. As a society, we need 
varying degrees of government oversight, if the goal is an overall satisfactory distribution of 
the various things people need or would like to have. Another basic idea is that practical 
experience with public and private ownership, and with varying levels of public regulation 
and intervention, may show what type of organisation will suit the needs of society – and the 
individuals which populate it – best. 
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The most central policy recommendation of neoliberal political and economic 
theorists is, however, to roll back the frontiers of the state, and in effect use the market 
economy as a predominant way of organising the ways in which society is run on a daily 
basis. Like those who maintain that the government should plan and regulate practically 
everything, a group of people perhaps more numerous when Berlin wrote Two Concepts of 
Liberty than they are today, neoliberal theorists insist that a single mode of organisation 
should be used across the spectrum of economic activity. But this insistence may make it 
difficult to achieve a good balance or compromise between various goals and values such as 
equality and liberty, or even stability and general contentment. This is especially the case if 
an almost entirely unregulated market economy will lead to violent fluctuations between 
boom and bust in production and investments, or to a type of economic inefficiency caused 
by very large disparities of income and a lack of access to basic goods and services for the 
less fortunate.  
It is quite likely that an all-encompassing and largely unregulated market economy 
will have such unfavourable effects. The most central neoliberal theorists, on the other hand, 
promises that we will be better off if governments do less, and some of them even suggest 
that governments should do as little possible quite regardless of the likely consequences. If 
more things are left in the hands of a largely unregulated market economy and the free 
dealings between individuals which allegedly take place there, society as a whole will reap 
the benefits of increased economic growth and efficiency (cf. especially Friedman and 
Friedman 1980; Norberg 2001; 2003; T. Friedman 2006). But if this is not case after all, then 
what we are left with is just another body of political and economic thought resembling the 
monistic moral and political ideas which Berlin claimed shared the most dangerous belief 
ever entertained by mankind – the belief that there is an ultimate solution to all the problems 
with which humankind and human societies are faced.  
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7.3 Political protectionism and neoliberalism 
7.3.1 The neoliberal promise 
Many neoliberals, but certainly not all, are consequentialists of sorts. Some of them, Hayek 
among them, may favourably be thought of as proponents of an ‘indirect consequentialism’. 
They believe that neoliberal policies will lead to a better state of affairs than would 
otherwise be the case, even if they evidently also believe in the usefulness of other, non-
consequentialist ways of justifying neoliberal economic policies and the institution of 
smaller government and fewer fetters on the market economy. The more direct 
consequentialists, however, advocate a set of policies and reforms tending in the direction of 
deregulation, liberalisation, and privatisation of the economy precisely because it is thought 
that such policies will lead to a better end result, compared to a continuation of the status quo 
(cf. especially Friedman and Friedman 1980; Fogh Rasmussen 1993; Friedman [1962] 2002; 
Norberg 2001; 2003; cf. also Steger and Roy 2010). But how exactly are such policies better, 
compared to policies which lead to a higher degree of government regulation and oversight 
of the economy?  
The most central promise of these (more or less) ‘results-oriented’ neoliberals is that 
things will go rather well, and better than what would otherwise be the case, if only 
governments do less than they tend to do in our day and age (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009). 
Instead, it is thought that the modern ‘nanny state’ ought to be replaced by a more traditional 
‘night-watchman state’ which does fewer things to make sure that its citizens have a fairly 
tolerable existence. A good example of this attitude is found in Friedrich Hayek’s 
monumental work on Law, Legislation and Liberty (Hayek 1973; 1976; 1979). Hayek claims 
here that a ‘spontaneous order’, better than any ‘artificial order’ based on political and 
economic planning, will emerge if individuals and the market economy are left alone, and if 
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we abandon any notion that the government should regulate the economy in order to 
implement an ideal of social justice.  
Hayek is apparently however not a political and economic theorist who believes in 
the unregulated market economy only because it will deliver better overall results compared 
to economic planning. He also advocates the idea that unregulated markets and ‘minimal and 
dispersed’ states are part of how human affairs ought to be structured, even if it is likely that 
consequentialist arguments are more important to him, at least at a more fundamental level. 
He therefore builds on the assumption that less regulation and less public provision of basic 
goods and services will lead to increased economic efficiency. That is why Hayek thought 
that neoliberal policies would benefit society as a whole, even if most people might be badly 
placed to reap the benefits. In essence, the benefits of deregulation are thought to outweigh 
any possible drawbacks such as rising levels of inequality, simply because the drawbacks of 
such policies are explicitly thought of as being less important than the benefits. In this, he 
turns the thought of other neoliberals such as Nozick (1974), who believes that a rolling back 
of the frontiers of the state is a way towards a state of affairs in which human societies are 
structured in way they fundamentally ought to be quite regardless of the likely consequences, 
on its head. 
Fundamentally, it is an empirical question whether consequentialist arguments in 
favour of ‘minimal and dispersed’ governments and laissez-faire economic policies actually 
holds true or not. In the long history of economic liberalism, of which the increased 
popularity of neoliberal thought of the last few decades is just the most recent offshoot, we 
see that there are actually several periods in which economic ideologies quite similar to what 
we described above as neoliberalism has been quite popular (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). 
There are of course many differences, but the most central policy recommendations of the 
leading neoliberal theorists are actually surprisingly similar to for instance those of the 
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French physiocrats in the second half of the eighteenth century, or for that matter the 
Ricardian economists and ‘Manchester liberals’ of Great Britain in the first half of the 
nineteenth (cf. Reinert 2009).  
Deregulation, liberalisation, and privatisation of the economy have however only 
been popular in some periods, followed by longer periods of dwindling popularity. Perhaps 
somewhat surprisingly, this is so because the kinds of policies recommended by the 
champions of so-called free markets have been tried and tested several times, with rather 
mixed results every time. The great economic crises of the 1780s and the 1840s are all 
examples of sharp downturns preceded by an implementation of policies tending in the 
direction of deregulation and privatisation.  It is only natural, therefore, that neoliberalism 
and related theories gain popularity only whenever vivid memories of the last crisis caused 
by laissez-faire policies fade away, and the alluring fictions of this economic ideology 
becomes believable yet again (Reinert 2009; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009; Thorsen 2009). This 
is of course not in any way a conclusive argument, and it is of course always conceivable 
that the neoliberal package of economic policies will work better the next time someone tries 
them out, quite independently of how many times such policies have failed in the past. For 
every time they come to naught, however, neoliberals and close intellectual relatives need an 
argument in order to convince others that they will not fail to deliver on their promises the 
next time around.  
 Popper wrote his war-time books at the end of an economic and political crisis. This 
crisis was of course not exclusively caused by deregulation, liberalisation, and privatisation 
of the economy, but it was made deeper by a widespread and ideologically informed 
unwillingness by states to intervene effectively in the faltering industrial economies of the 
world. The Open Society and The Poverty of Historicism are books which primarily warn 
against totalitarian dictatorships of all political stripes, or quite simply governments which 
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try to do and control too much. They also contain, however, several criticisms of the 
opposite outcome, namely a situation in which governments do not control and do enough, 
especially not enough to make sure that people do not suffer needlessly.  
One important way of making sure that people are not placed at a disadvantage in 
vain is to guard against economic instability. So Popper’s war-time books are a call for 
governments to make sure that personal freedom and financial stability is guaranteed, so that 
avoidable human suffering is kept at a minimum. For Popper, of course, the economic crisis 
of the 1930’s was a quite vivid memory when he wrote his books, alongside the immediate, 
contemporary experience with Communism and Nazism alike, and he scarcely need to 
remind his immediate audiences of the fate of a largely unregulated capitalist economy after 
the crises at the close of the 1920s.  
The connection between economic troubles and increased popularity for political 
authoritarianism must have been all but apparent to Popper, especially considering his first-
hand experience with his native country of Austria’s steady descent into totalitarianism.  But 
even if he did not postulate any inescapable causal effect from policies aimed at deregulation 
and privatisation through economic crises to amplified attractiveness for anti-democratic 
ideologies, he does make a rather compelling argument for avoiding the apparently quite 
opposite ‘traps’ of laissez-faire and totalitarianism. He most certainly rejects the idea that 
policies resembling what would later become known as neoliberalism is an attractive and 
inspiring sort of solution to many of our problems, at least in the long run. In this, he follows 
what appears to be the conventional wisdom of his day, namely that a measure of economic 
oversight and ‘planning for freedom’ has to be in place if a society is to avoid the worst side-
effects of the market economy, and if one is to ensure that most people have access to the 
resources necessary for a decent existence (cf. e.g. Keynes 1936; Beveridge 1942; 1944; 
Polanyi [1944] 2001)). 
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7.3.2 Planning for freedom  
The central economic policy recommendation in The Open Society is that the state should do 
everything in its power to protect its citizens from avoidable harm and exploitation, while at 
the same time maintaining and guaranteeing a generous measure of personal freedom for all. 
This basic policy recommendation is based in the idea that the state should guarantee the free 
exchange of ideas, which in turn will ensure the growth of human knowledge, and hopefully 
lead to the reduction of political violence and human misery. As we have seen, this 
recommendation is at odds with the political and economic thoughts and theories of the 
leading neoliberal theorists. Neoliberals want to curb public intervention in the economy and 
extend mercantile liberty quite regardless of how that liberty is used. Popperian political 
protectionism, on the other hand, is a doctrine which cares more about achieving concrete 
results, in particular a state of affairs under which individual citizens are protected from 
harm and exploitation, and under which avoidable human suffering is kept at a minimum. 
The key phrase in Popper’s economic thought, if such a thing could be pieced 
together from his works, is ‘planning for freedom’ (cf. quote in section 1.3.1 above). The 
central insight on which Popper builds his analyses of economic policy is that freedom, 
especially freedom from fear and want, does not come about entirely by accident (Popper 
[1945] 1966a, ch. 17). We should instead do what is within our powers to minimise fear and 
want, with the aim of increasing personal freedom for all. In this, we obviously need, 
coordinating efforts in the form of political decisions which aim to make sure that we 
actually do make it easier for people to live lives with which they have a reasonable chance 
to be contented. But there is according to Popper absolutely no reason to suspect that 
neoliberal or related economic policies will lead to more widespread contentment or 
increased personal freedom for the vast majority of people (ibid.).  
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 I said above, in section 4.4.3, that Popper’s political thought might be described quite 
accurately by the term ‘organised liberalism’, which is a term originally used by Eduard 
Bernstein to describe his own democratic and anti-Marxist brand of socialism (Bernstein 
1899:132; cf. also Steger 1997; Pierson 2001). Bernstein contends in his book, succinctly 
named Evolutionary Socialism in one of the English translations, that socialism and 
liberalism are ideologies which are not worlds apart when it comes to which values and 
goals they seek to promote. On the level of abstract values, they are both direct heirs to the 
Enlightenment, and they both try to live up to the revolutionary slogan of ‘liberty, equality, 
fraternity’. They do differ quite considerably, however, when it comes to their respective 
analyses of what level of genuinely political organisation is necessary in order to realise 
those shared values and goals (cf. Lukes [1962] 2005).  
  The positive political and economic ideas, described in The Open Society and The 
Poverty of Historicism, tend in the direction of a high degree of organisation. Popper’s 
analyses of concepts such as political protectionism and planning for freedom basically 
claims that a hands-on approach by the government in economic policy issues is necessary in 
a liberal society which takes its own goals of freedom, equality and democracy seriously. 
Popper may be right about his claim, that the state should protect its citizens from harm and 
exploitation. If he is, however, also correct in his belief that much avoidable harm and 
exploitation will come about if the state fails to actively control the economy, then surely the 
natural policy recommendation must be that democratically elected governments should do 
more and not less, at least compared to what the neoliberals tend to claim (Popper 1966a, 
chapter 17; cf. Hayek 1960; [1944] 2001; Nozick 1974; Friedman [1962] 2002). 
7.3.3 Negative utilitarianism  
Whether or not neoliberal economic policies will lead to the least conceivable amount of 
avoidable human suffering, or if some other ‘package’ of economic policies is preferable 
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from a negative-utilitarian point of view, is fundamentally an empirical question. As Popper 
indicates in The Open Society, however, historical experience shows quite clearly that some 
sort of regulation is needed if avoidable suffering and exploitation is to be minimised both in 
the short and the long run.  
As mentioned earlier, Popper believes that unfettered market economies have in the 
past, for instance in the epoch of ‘classical liberalism’ in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, led to suffering as a side-effect of public policy, and one must assume for the most 
part avoidable. It is no wonder, therefore, that this period was marked by quite visible 
inequality and widespread poverty, at a time when the state did virtually nothing to alleviate 
poverty and the immediate effects of poverty and inequality. This means that neoliberals 
who want to argue for their preferred package of policies in a consequentialist fashion has, to 
say the least, a didactic challenge ahead of them, if they are to convince anyone that laissez-
faire style economic policies will work better than they have done in the past. The idea that 
some sort of economic regulation is needed to minimise avoidable human suffering is, on the 
other hand, built into Popper’s ‘protectionist view of the state’, under which it is thought that 
the state ought to protect its citizens from unnecessary suffering and infliction. 
Other attempts to use a single organisational principle on the entire economic life of a 
country have however frequently failed as well. Attempts to for instance construct a 
centralised, planned economy have an even worse ‘track record’. Instead, we see that almost 
all economies above a certain level of technological sophistication tend to mix both 
economic planning and market-based principles of organisation. It is, seemingly, the ‘mixed 
economy’ – an eclectic mix of different economic policies and organisational principles – 
which is most able to provide both the stability and the flexibility which advanced industrial 
and post-industrial economies need in order to function properly, or in a way which will 
minimise avoidable human suffering (Popper [1945] 1966a, chapter 17).  
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Both too much and too little regulation will in all likelihood lead to economic 
inefficiency and to side-effects in the form of frustration and suffering among large groups 
of people. What is needed is a willingness and abundant opportunities for individuals to try 
out new ideas which may reduce such frustration and suffering. At the same time, one should 
build on past experience, and try to construct an economic system which is less likely to 
‘spin out of control’ (cf. Obama 2009). Sharp economic fluctuations may perhaps seem like 
dry numbers on the balance sheets of macroeconomists and policy-makers, but they 
represent real trouble for those who are hit by unemployment and poverty. From a 
Popperian, negative-utilitarian point of view, the preferred economic system will be of a type 
which not only guarantees everyone the very basics needed for a fairly decent sort of 
existence, but which also tries to combine the stability of a regulated economy with the 
flexibility of a market-based economic system. The conspicuously moderate cry for 
individual freedom within limits is everywhere to be found in Popper’s political thought 
dealing with economic matters, a cry which has hitherto only been approximately answered 
in liberal democracies with a mixed economy.   
7.4 The politics of fallibility 
7.4.1 Fallibilism 
Fallibilism, or the quite commonsensical idea that human beings sometimes make mistakes 
and that all our claims of knowledge should be met with a measure of scepticism, is an idea 
shared by Popper and Berlin. Turned on its head, the immediate upshot of this thought is that 
we ever so often get things just about right, and end up knowing more than we did at the 
outset (cf. especially Popper 1979). In philosophy, however, fallibilism is not an entirely 
uncontroversial piece of theory. Instead, there are many people, and among them several 
philosophers, who believe that unshakable truth is out there for anyone – or alternatively just 
a select few – who wants to see it. We also find people who believe that human beings are 
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incapable of knowing the truth, or all but incapable of doing so, scattered throughout the 
history of philosophy.  
Fallibilism is an integral part, even a corner-stone, in Popper’s epistemology and 
philosophy of science, and in his political thought as well. Everywhere in his writings, one 
can find reminders of this for him fundamental idea. Sometimes we humans make mistakes, 
even very great mistakes, and we should accept this as a point of departure in our struggle to 
create better societies and a better future for ourselves. We should be wary of all kinds of 
claims of knowledge, even our own, because they occasionally turn out to be false. We need, 
therefore, to structure our political systems in such a way that false beliefs and wrong ideas 
do the least amount of damage.  
Berlin is also a fallibilist of sorts, and mirrors in many ways Popper’s cautious 
epistemological optimism (cf. especially Berlin 1978; 2000). The often dire political 
consequences of what Berlin perceives of as false beliefs, especially the Utopian idea that it 
is possible to create perfect societies and the monistic belief that it is possible weigh all our 
values on one scale, are central themes in Berlin’s political thought. Value pluralism might 
in this be thought of as an idea borne out of the conviction that we sometimes make mistakes 
about the validity of normative claims. This is so because moral evaluation is not thought of 
as a matter of slavishly applying a single principle, but rather as an activity which tries to 
forge a precarious balance between several different principles, values, or goals. Since we 
occasionally make mistakes when we try to answer questions about what we really ought to 
do, we need a strategy for reducing the harmful effects of such mistakes. In practical terms, 
this means that we need political institutions which will reduce the harmful effects of our 
occasional mistakes (Berlin 1990:1-19). 
 Fallibilism is, basically, the view that we can all make mistakes which lead us to 
entertain false beliefs from time to time. From this belief, which (to use one of Berlin’s 
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expressions) must seem almost self-evident to ‘practical men’, they both draw the idea that 
society ought to be structured in a way which minimise the harmful effects of the mistakes 
we occasionally, and over time inevitably will make. One must especially be on the lookout 
for theories which in some way or another reject the idea that some of the products of the 
human mind are inherently fallible, and that some has a privileged access to eternal and 
unshakable truth. From this belief, it is only a short distance to the belief that a received 
political ideology ought not to be doubted, and that it ought to serve as a permanent 
foundation for our choices between different courses of action.  
 Fallibilism does not, however, entail that everything is to be doubted at once, or that 
everything could be doubted in one go, but merely that everything we believe could 
potentially be doubted, and subjected to revision in the future. Some of our beliefs are in 
addition quite irrational to doubt in everyday life, although they could in principle be 
doubted and held up to closer scrutiny by philosophers and others with a fondness for 
splitting hairs. In practice, however, we must quite often act on beliefs which may on closer 
inspection turn out to be inaccurate or quite plainly wrong – and we must be able to correct 
our mistakes whenever we discover them.  Mistakes will crop up from time to time, and we 
must continually strive to discover and correct them. 
Fallibilism has some very tangible consequences for politics. If one believes that all 
humans are fallible, then one needs institutions which will ensure that mistakes, mistakes 
which even the most talented person will make from time to time, will do the least possible 
amount of damage. One particularly promising way of ensuring this goal of reducing the 
damage of wrong ideas is the kind of representative democracy seen in all consolidated and 
well-functioning democracies found around the world today. That way, there is at least the 
possibility that people might discover mistakes made by elected government officials and in 
due course replace those officials if they refuse to correct their fraudulent policies. 
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Such representative democracies are based around the rule of law and the sovereignty 
of popularly elected institutions and in the last instance the people itself, rather than 
individual persons who just seize political power for themselves. Another important 
ingredient is the separation of political power into different institutions, most commonly a 
horizontal separation between legislative and executive power, and a vertical separation 
between national, local, and in some cases international and supranational institutions. This 
kind of arrangement is properly called a liberal democracy, quite simply because the central 
level of the state does not try to seize total control of political processes, even if it is elected 
in free and fair elections, and in fact does the opposite because it devolves much power to 
other institutions and to individuals on a routine basis.  
7.4.2 Liberal democracy 
The epistemological and ethical theories which Berlin and Popper developed and defended 
had quite tangible political consequences, at least if we take their own interpretations of 
these theories at face value. Berlin thought, in short, that there are many different goals and 
ideals between which we must strike some sort of ‘uneasy equilibrium’ or fragile 
compromise. Popper believed, on the other hand, that we sometimes make mistakes, even 
great mistakes, but that we nevertheless need to try to solve the most pressing problems we 
are faced with at any given point in time, in order to alleviate avoidable human suffering. We 
must therefore accommodate our different values and beliefs within a common political 
framework which allow for some degree of experimentation without putting the basic 
structure of the democratic society in jeopardy, or in a constant state of flux.  
Instead of allowing for an authoritarian implementation of one particular political 
theory or ideology which might turn out to be deceptive and harmful, we should try to build 
political structures in which different political ideas are put to the test, and moulded together 
to form a compromise which will satisfy most people, as well as their most immediate 
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interests. The result may not be a particularly thought-out or even a very logical set of 
political institutions. But it will be a political system which seriously tries to accommodate 
and realise different demands and ideas which different people believe will contribute to the 
building of a better society.  
 For both Berlin and Popper, being a liberal was first and foremost a matter of 
adhering to a set of political ideas centred around a particular view of how the democratic 
state ought to be structured and what goals such a state should pursue. What made them 
liberals, at least in their own eyes, was that they wanted both individual liberty and 
democracy, and some sort of balance between these two ends whenever they come into 
conflict with each other. Built into their understanding of what liberalism should mean is a 
pronounced egalitarianism. Everyone deserves a measure of liberty and adequate protection 
from threats to that liberty, and everyone deserves to be heard and to take part in the process 
of making the political decisions which affect and define their own lives. What they wanted, 
in short, was liberal democracy, understood as a state or political system in which each 
individual citizen has real and potentially equal access to influence over political processes, 
and where people to some degree and in some areas are left alone to govern their own lives. 
They both remind us, however, that freedom is not the same thing as democracy, and 
frequently the two basic goals of come into conflict with each other and other values of 
roughly equal importance.   
Both Berlin and Popper acknowledge the fact that any thriving liberal democracy 
needs to redistribute resources in order to function properly. Economic policy, the great 
dividing issue between liberals, was however clearly not particularly interesting for either of 
them, at least not interesting enough to spell out a sufficiently clear or comprehensive set of 
guidelines for policy-making. Their concerns and interests lie elsewhere, in the hammering 
out of general principles for politics, and not in the nitty-gritty world of economic policy. 
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The two political theorists may nevertheless be placed at the left side of the liberal tradition 
to which they claimed to belong, if they are to have a place within it at all (cf. chapters 3 and 
5 above). We may at least see that the kind of liberalism put forward by Berlin and Popper is 
quite moderate or centrist when it comes to economic policy issues, and closely related to 
their idea of what it takes to organise a modern democratic society with an advanced 
economy well. At any rate, this is the case if one compares the political thoughts and theories 
of Berlin and Popper with the views and policies put forward by the leading members of the 
‘neoliberal thought collective’ (cf. section 6.4 above).  
If liberal democracy is meant to be a reality for everyone, and not merely a 
ceremonial front for what is in reality an economically defined oligarchy, one needs a state 
willing to put into place institutions which will ensure both personal freedom and 
involvement in the democratic process for all and not just the privileged few (cf. Tawney 
[1931] 1964; Wolin 2008; Hacker and Pierson 2010). At least, this is the case if democracy 
is understood as a state of affairs in which everyone have the means necessary for 
understanding the political processes in a democracy in a fairly enlightened way, and that 
they are able to effectively participate in them (cf. Dahl 1989). If democracy is to be a 
meaningful undertaking, it entails that the state must go beyond the kind of minimal or 
nearly minimal state envisioned by the most central neoliberal theorists. 
 This is what the two thinkers try to capture with some crucial political ideas of theirs. 
For Popper it is the afore mentioned protectionist view of the state which completes his 
preference for democracy, in that he wants not only the outward vestiges of representative 
government, but a state which protects the personal freedom and integrity of each individual 
citizen, including protection from avoidable harm and suffering. These two views are, at 
least in practice, mutually reinforcing; one needs a ‘protectionist’ state in order to make sure 
that everyone is truly able to participate in democratic processes, and democracy is a 
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precondition for a protectionist state in which the state is actually concerned about the 
welfare and freedom of every citizen – rather than just the political and economic elite.  
For Berlin, on the other hand, the defence of liberal democracy is more indirect. 
When he identifies himself as a liberal, it is negative liberty which lies at the heart of his 
political convictions. And liberty is clearly not the same thing as democracy, as it is quite 
possible to conceive of a political system which is not a democracy, but in which a ‘liberal-
minded despot’ respects personal freedom but keeps power over political processes for 
himself (Berlin 2002:166-217). But such liberal-minded despots are a very rare breed indeed, 
at least if we take historical experience at face value. In practice, therefore, the egalitarian 
‘liberal morality’ of which he speaks has the best chance of becoming the ethos of a society 
if the state is governed by democratically elected institutions: 
[Western liberals] believe, with good reason, that individual liberty is an ultimate end 
for human beings; none should be deprived of it by others; least of all that some 
should enjoy it at the expense of others. Equality of liberty; not to treat others as I 
should not wish them to treat me, repayment of my debt to those who alone have 
made possible my liberty or prosperity or enlightenment; justice, in its simplest and 
most universal sense – these are the foundations of liberal morality. Liberty is not the 
only goal of men. I can, like the Russian critic Belinsky, say that if others are to be 
deprived of it – if my brothers are to remain in poverty, squalor and chains – then I 
do not want it for myself, I reject it with both hands and infinitely prefer to share 
their fate. But nothing is gained by a confusion of terms. To avoid glaring inequality 
or widespread misery I am ready to sacrifice some, or all, of my freedom: I may do 
so willingly and freely; but it is freedom that I am giving up for the sake of justice or 
equality or the love of my fellow men. (Berlin 2002:172) 
 
Constructing a thriving democracy is no easy task, and definitely easier said than done. It is a 
fragile construction under constant threat and in constant need of repair. These threats come 
not only from those who believe that democracy ought to be replaced by more autocratic 
forms of government, but from many other sources. Two such threats are, to use Berlin’s 
phrases, glaring inequality and widespread misery. Inequality is a threat because poverty is 
in itself a threat to the reality of personal freedom and representative government. Misery is 
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however also a threat, because pervasive hopelessness leads people affected by it away from 
participation in democratic processes. So a thriving democracy is not only dependent on the 
existence of formal rights and liberties, but on an equitable distribution of welfare and 
resources as well – and in the last instance on a sufficient number of people wanting 
democracy to work. 
7.4.3 Compromise and gradualism 
In the thought of Berlin and Popper we see quite clearly the wish to carve out a middle 
ground in politics. A middle ground, that is, between the revolutionary belief that we should 
try to construct a perfect society at any cost on one hand, and the conservative idea that we 
should be satisfied with the status quo, because attempts to improve the way human societies 
are structured will inevitably end in disappointment, on the other. Their practical policy 
recommendations are quite moderate, almost mundane, in that they recommend – in most 
cases at least – limited reforms rather than revolutionary upheavals, and some degree of 
regulation of the economy, instead of either an all-out dirigisme or for that matter the 
opposite idea of absolute laissez-faire. The spirit of compromise between opposing ideals 
lies at the heart of the political thought of both, because they believe that the single-minded 
pursuit of a single political ideal or value almost certainly will lead to adverse and 
unintended consequences, if that pursuit is carried through to its ultimate conclusion (cf. 
Lamprecht 1921). 
 This willingness to compromise is the core of a well-functioning liberal democracy. 
Such a democracy, no matter how well-designed its institutions are, will in the longer run 
fail if too many people are unwilling to compromise, participate, and defend the institutions 
in which broad compromises are forged and implemented. If a majority of the people in 
addition actually wants to replace democracy with some sort of dictatorship, democrats have 
an uphill struggle, to say the least, even if democratic institutions are relatively well 
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entrenched. This was for instance the case in Germany’s Weimar republic (1918-1933), 
where liberal democracy was quickly eroded because a clear majority of the people voted for 
and actively supported politicians and political parties which wanted to abolish democracy 
(cf. Bracher 1955; Möller 2004).   
The continuation of a liberal democracy is dependent on the active assent of a 
sufficient proportion of its citizens. The people need to know what democracy is, and it is 
necessary that they support and want to participate in the democratic process, if democracy 
is to thrive and ultimately survive. That means, of course, that they have real opportunities to 
do so. The continued survival and improvement of democracy is in any case not something 
which should be taken for granted. Instead, it is something one must constantly fight for 
against those who want to seize power for themselves, either for personal gain or in order to 
implement some sort of far-reaching ideology. And one must be willing to compromise with 
people which one disagrees with on many issues.  
Gradualism is a key theme in both Berlin’s and Popper’s defence of liberal and 
representative democracy. Popper’s idea of ‘piecemeal social engineering’ and Berlin’s 
many vehement rejections of Utopianism capture this gradualist attitude quite well. As the 
name suggests, gradualism is in politics the idea that political reform should, at least under 
favourable circumstances, come as gradual or incremental change to the status quo. In many 
ways, gradualism emerges from the fallibilist attitude described above. If we sometimes 
make great mistakes and unwittingly come to entertain wrong ideas, it would be prudent not 
to put all one’s eggs in one basket by forcing through a thoroughgoing implementation of a 
pet theory or package of policies. Instead, a more sensible course of action would be to try 
out new ideas on a limited scale, and only gradually implement them on a larger scale if they 
turn out to make a positive contribution to society at large (cf. James 1998). 
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We should however not be too contented with our present lot, and try to improve it 
when we have the opportunity to do so. But that does not mean that all change is for the 
good, or that revolutionary upheaval is a probable way of achieving the improvements we 
through discussions and cooperation find out that we want to see realised. This in turn does 
not mean, moreover, that incremental improvements are always preferable to more sweeping 
change. From time to time, mankind has found itself living with an intolerable political 
system and situation, and in such cases a more drastic approach to political change may be 
warranted. Once a satisfactory democratic system has been established and consolidated, 
however, gradualism should be the general norm for political action and reform. Constant 
upheaval will quite simply not contribute to the happiness and welfare of the population in 
most cases, but will instead lead to insecurity and much avoidable suffering.   
As Popper reminds us in several of his works, practical politics is a form of problem-
solving, and politicians as well as ordinary citizens should try to solve the most pressing 
political problems put before them. Democracy is not a complete ideology or blueprint for an 
ideal society, but a process for how to solve such problems through dialogue and 
compromise. This means that one should not try to solve all our problems at once with the 
help some grand scheme for how the best society imaginable should look like. Such schemes 
may nevertheless have a role to play, as a yardstick for how far we have come in solving 
general problems identified as an obstruction on the way to creating a better society.   
The kind of gradualism recommended by Popper and Berlin may sound rather 
conservative, and clearly ill-suited for impatient souls who desperately want to see real and 
sweeping political change happen, preferably right now. Most revolutionaries have however 
yet to prove that their preferred method of political change will lead to lasting change for the 
better. Democracy, compromise, and gradualism are all principles that are clearly better 
suited for ‘low sensation-seekers’ who want democratic politics to be an unexciting and 
243 
 
everyday activity. Such everyday politics may not satisfy some people’s need for excitement 
and ‘something different’, but it clearly has the potential for bringing about real and lasting 
improvements instead. And that may be just what we ought to look for in politics (cf. 
especially Berlin 1990:1-19). 
7.5 Instead of a conclusion 
Neoliberalism is a set of political ideas which, in spite of the nominal similarity, appear to be 
very different from anything Berlin or Popper ever recommended, whenever they spoke of 
themselves as liberals. Their kind of liberalism comes across as more moderate and 
egalitarian compared to the ‘economic liberalism’ of prominent members of the neoliberal 
thought collective like Hayek, Friedman, and Nozick. Berlin and Popper were, in essence, 
liberals at a time when liberal thought was dominated by what was then called ‘the new 
liberalism’, and from which much of the intellectual heritage of contemporary welfare states 
was born (cf. especially Beveridge 1945).  
Compromise between different goals and ideals such as freedom and equality lie at 
the heart of this kind of liberalism, which Berlin and Popper ultimately recommended. It is a 
type of ‘organised liberalism’ with a complex idea of personal freedom. Freedom is, under 
this understanding, not merely thought of as the absence of government intervention in the 
economy and the everyday life of ordinary citizens. This kind of freedom may be very 
important, but it is not everything that matters for Berlin and Popper. Instead, freedom is in 
addition freedom from ‘want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness’, as well as the 
freedom to participate in the making of political decisions which affect one’s own life in a 
meaningful way (cf. Brandal et al. 2011, chapter 1). This, as explained above, is quite visibly 
different from the neoliberal demand for less government and more unfettered markets, even 
at the expense of almost everything else.  
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 Liberal democracy is the political system preferred by both Popper and Berlin, 
because it has the potential of realising some of the goals they view as particularly important, 
such as the free exchange of both political and scientific ideas, and a measure of personal 
freedom for everyone. It is also a political system which goes well with a gradualist 
approach to politics and policy-making – an approach we should adopt because we humans 
are fallible and occasionally make mistakes about what we ought to do. Democracy is 
however something which must be fought for, not only against would-be dictators, but also 
against those who are perfectly happy to weaken democracy by doing what the leading 
members of the neoliberal thought collective recommend we should do. The immediate 
upshot of neoliberal ideology is after all that we should remove many important political 
decisions from agenda of popularly elected legislatures, and instead effectively transfer 
many decisions we have hitherto thought of as political decisions to the market-place (cf. 
especially Nozick 1974:276-294; Hayek [1944] 2001:59-74; Friedman [1962] 2002:7-21).  
This neoliberal state has little room for a thriving democracy, or the right to a decent 
existence and a degree of personal freedom for those who are unfortunate enough to not be 
able to come out on top in the unfettered market economy. But the existence of neoliberal 
ideology may however be important and useful for a surprising reason. It shows that it is 
possible to organise human societies differently than we for the most part tend to do today, 
and should be part of a continuing discussion about how we should organise our existence, 
and what we should to next in order to solve the most pressing problems put before us. 
Even if one manages to build a more energetic liberal democracy characterised by 
real political equality, there are many problems that still need to be solved, and many rival 
values and ends which need to be balanced against each other (cf. Dahl [1970] 1990; 2006). 
The debate of what democracy could and should be will therefore continue for the 
foreseeable future. This is so in part because different people will always have different 
245 
 
ideas about what the most important qualities of a good democracy actually is and should be, 
and in part because a critical and constant self-inspection is an integral part of any living and 
thriving liberal democracy. 
Among the most important dilemmas facing democracies today is the question of 
how to deal with uncertainty and deep disagreements, and the question of how to find and 
implement satisfactory solutions to problems wrought with ambiguities. How can we realise 
Berlin’s ideal of building an uneasy equilibrium between many competing values and 
ultimate ends, values and ends that are, roughly speaking, equally important and admirable?  
And how can we at the same time move closer to Popper’s vision of a society in which 
everyone is protected from exploitation, exclusion, and arbitrariness? These questions are 
parts of an on-going and recurring set of issues for democratic polities – the uneasy 
equilibrium is in constant need of repair. 
What we do know, however, is that we do need equality, not only political equality 
but economic equality as well, if effective citizenship in a liberal democracy is to become a 
reality for everyone who is fortunate enough to live under such a system of government (cf. 
Marshall 1964; Dahl 2006). A generous measure of personal freedom is of course integral to 
any sort of liberal democracy, but political and economic equality is needed as well if such a 
system of government is to function optimally, as a reality and not merely as a set of stage 
props for what is in effect very different form of government (Wolin 2008; Hacker and 
Pierson 2010). In short, both freedom and equality is needed, and the two values must be 
balanced against each other. Negative liberty is certainly not enough if one wants a healthy 
democracy. What we get, however, when the neoliberal idea of negative liberty is advanced, 
under which the ideal is understood rather reductively as freedom from government and little 
else, is what Tawney ([1931] 1964) aptly described as a ‘religion of inequality’. Inequality 
will then be viewed as a natural outcome – and even as a desirable state of affairs.  
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That is why the political and economic thought of the leading members of the 
neoliberal thought collective indirectly serves as an important reminder. It reminds us that 
there are alternative ways of thinking about how society ought to be organised, and 
indirectly that the basic institutions or constitutional structures which characterise liberal 
democracy are constantly in need of improvement. It may also serve as a reminder that a 
thriving democracy should therefore always be open to and welcome debates about whether 
or not its institutions should be reformed, so that they may better live up to the ideal of a 
‘government of the people, by the people, for the people’. Like in Otto Neurath’s famous 
boat analogy, we must constantly repair our beliefs and ideas as we move forward at the 
same time, not only in science, but in democratic politics and everyday life as well: 
Es gibt keine Tabula rasa. Wie Schiffer sind wir, die ihr Schiff auf offener See 
umbauen müssen, ohne es jemals in einem Dock zerlegen und aus besten 
Bestandteilen neu errichten zu können. Nur die Metaphysik kann restlos 
verschwinden. Die unpräzisen „Ballungen“ sind immer irgendwie Bestandteil des 
Schiffes. Wird die Unpräzision an einer Stelle verringert, kann sie wohl gar an 
anderer Stelle verstärkt wieder auftreten. (Neurath 1932:206) 
 
There are two central lessons to be learnt from all this. The first lesson is that democracy will 
never become a perfect or even a finished political system, and it must constantly be fought 
for, built, and rebuilt in order to meet new problems. The second lesson is that conflict is 
inevitable in any recognisably human society. It seems that mankind have an ingrained 
disposition for dividing itself into groups who may come into conflict with each other. In 
addition, it seems that conflict between different groups of people which occupy different 
roles in the economic system is a built-in feature of any market economy. This is also the 
case in a mixed economy in which markets and individual corporations are routinely 
overseen by democratically elected authorities. We must nevertheless move forward as best 
we can, and solve new problems as we go along, always on the lookout for something better. 
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Summary 
Through seven chapters, I have discussed and sought to answer three basic questions, as well 
as three follow-up questions to each of the basic questions. These questions, presented at the 
end of the introduction, are as follows: 
- Is Berlin’s ethical theory of value pluralism capable of providing us with a basis for a 
recognisably liberal political theory? What are the most central characteristics of the 
political theory Berlin ultimately recommends? 
- Is Popper’s epistemological theory of critical rationalism capable of providing us 
with a basis for a recognisably liberal political theory? What are the most central 
characteristics of the political theory Popper ultimately recommends? 
- What are the central features of the body of political and economic thought 
commonly called neoliberalism? How does it compare to the kinds of liberalism 
recommended by Berlin and Popper?  
 
In the second and third chapter, I examined the political thought of Isaiah Berlin, in an 
attempt to give an answer to the first group of questions. The second chapter was an attempt 
to describe and give a preliminary interpretation of his political thought. In it, I first 
described and explained Berlin’s ethical theories, commonly called value pluralism, and 
their relationship with related perspectives with similar names. I also discussed Berlin’s 
conceptual divide between positive and negative liberty, as well as his idea that successful 
political action is dependent upon sound political judgment and ‘a sense of reality’. I 
concluded the chapter with a discussion of his idea that we need to maintain an uneasy 
equilibrium between different values and goals. 
In the third chapter, I emphasised that there are no strong arguments in favour of the 
view, defended by John Gray and others, namely that value pluralism actually leads away 
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from liberalism. Instead, Berlin’s own view, that value pluralism entails a measure of 
negative liberty for everyone, is largely vindicated. Consequently, I found that his strong 
preference for liberal democracy is indeed compatible with value pluralism. I therefore 
indicated that value pluralism can indeed provide a basis for liberalism, at least if liberalism 
is understood very broadly, as a strong preference for liberal democracy. Value pluralism 
does not, however, lead its proponents directly to liberalism in a more restricted sense, and 
certainly not directly to conventionally liberal economic policies, which Berlin occasionally 
warned against. It is clear that the type of liberalism advocated by Berlin is more moderate 
and egalitarian compared to traditional economic liberalism or ‘neoliberalism’. I concluded, 
therefore, that he was more like a political eclectic who combined elements of liberalism and 
democratic socialism in his political thought. 
The second part of the thesis, consisting of chapters 4 and 5, was my attempt to 
analyse and interpret Karl Popper’s political theories, and to give an answer to the second 
group of questions. In the fourth chapter, I set out to describe and interpret Popper’s political 
thought, as well as some other parts of the epistemological theories he and others have given 
the name critical rationalism. I found that there are several links between his epistemology 
and his political theories, often originating in and running through a rather sketchily 
developed set of moral considerations. It is especially his view that one should minimise 
avoidable human suffering, an idea Popper called ‘negative utilitarianism’, which links his 
theories together so that they become parts of a philosophical system. Because ignorance, 
unfreedom, and economic exploitation in Popper’s mind lead to much avoidable suffering, it 
was his view that the state should actively protect the freedom and integrity of all. I therefore 
described Popper’s political thought, using a concept originally developed by the German 
political theorist and politician Eduard Bernstein to describe his own version of democratic 
socialism, as a form of ‘organised liberalism’.  
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In the fifth chapter, I presented and discussed some of the remarkably different 
interpretations of Popper’s political thought. In the ensuing discussion, I sided with those 
commentators who above all have described Popper as a political moderate who wanted 
human reason and knowledge to guide political action. There is however also a lively dispute 
between those who emphasise his war-time books, and who tend to think of Popper as a 
social democrat, and those who call attention to his later works, and who believes that 
Popper ought to be understood as a ‘classical liberal’ instead. In this dispute, I sided with the 
former group. To the latter group I conceded, however, that it is ultimately an empirical 
question whether or not Popper’s ‘protectionist view of the state’, that political institutions 
should protect everyone from exploitation and minimise avoidable suffering, is compatible 
with traditional economic liberalism.   
Traditional economic liberalism, which through some quite surprising twists and 
turns in our day has become better known as ‘neoliberalism’, was a central topic of the third 
part of this thesis. In these last two chapters, I tried to answer the third and last group of 
questions. In the sixth chapter, I examined the history of the term neoliberalism and the 
relationship between political theories commonly called neoliberalism and liberal political 
theories in general. In fact, the differences between the two theorists and the neoliberals, 
which I discussed in chapter seven, illustrate the many disagreements between different 
groups of people who have found it useful to describe themselves as liberals.  
In my exposition in the sixth chapter, I have tried to highlight the differences between 
modern and classical liberalism on one hand, and libertarianism and liberal egalitarianism on 
the other. I found that political ideologies such as classical liberalism and libertarianism are 
not far removed from the political theories commonly called neoliberalism. This is the case 
at least if one primarily looks at the basic economic policies recommended by thinkers who 
have been described using one or more of these epithets, even if they to varying degrees 
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differ from each other on other scores. There is nevertheless so much agreement between 
proponents of neoliberal policies that it is clearly quite useful to describe neoliberalism as a 
loosely demarcated set of political and economic ideas. Therefore, despite certain theoretical 
differences between the political theorists described as leading members of a ‘neoliberal 
thought collective’, they advocate a thoroughgoing ‘rolling back of the frontiers of the state’, 
and for the establishment of ‘minimal and dispersed’ government institutions.  
In the seventh and final chapter, I brought the political thought of both Berlin and 
Popper back into the discussion. In it, I described the relationship between key theories 
proposed by the two philosophers, most prominently value pluralism and political 
protectionism, and the moderate and above all democratic and egalitarian liberalism which 
they ultimately recommended. This kind of liberalism is clearly very different from the body 
of political and economic thought described in the preceding chapter under the heading of 
neoliberalism, and may serve as the beginnings of a critique of the economic policies 
associated with neoliberal political theories. The larger question of what to do next, how we 
ought to organise our common future, was however left open in this study. 
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